


ACADEMIA SCIENTIARUM
ET ARTIUM EUROPAEA

EUROPÄISCHE AKADEMIE DER
WISSENSCHAFTEN UND KÜNSTE



EUROPEAN ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES AND ARTS

L'ACADÉMIE EUROPÉENNE
DES SCIENCES ET DES ARTS

Manifest for Europe in the 21st Century

- ❖ Europe is the place of freedom, tolerance and peace, conditions for the coherence of a multidimensional society. It is the cultural treasure of the future and for our descendants.

- ❖ Nationalism is the biggest opponent of the European integration project. Overcoming it cannot be achieved only through vertical integration, but must focus increasingly on those processes that occur horizontally. A horizontal approach creates a European society, which is able to overcome the nation-state barriers and break through nationalist mindsets permanently.

- ❖ The European political system is characterized by a lack of democratic legitimacy and transparency. The participation of citizens in political decision making processes is insufficient, and limited to direct democratic and/or representative elements. A lively and prosperous Europe requires the participation of its citizens – an improvement in their political participation and transparency needs to be tackled to abolish democratic deficit in Europe. Overcoming national boundaries will lead towards a tangible success for Europe.

- ❖ The European Parliament must be strengthened in its role and be integrated stronger in the important processes of decision making. The Lisbon Treaty has provided a first and important but not sufficient contribution. As the only directly democratically elected body, the competencies of the Parliament on key policy areas, such as the financial and economic policy, have to be extended.

- ❖ Europe is in a fundamental crisis of orientation lacking long-term strategies for the future of the European project of integration. Greatest importance is to the sciences, to make a significant contribution to a definition, which way Europe wants to pursue and therefore which paths have to be selected.

- ❖ Europe's economic competitiveness must be increased. The Member States are encouraged to keep their political promise to invest 3% of European GDP in research, development and innovation. The current crisis serves as a reason to cut back on their research and development budgets. However, these areas are essential for Europe's medium-and-long-term development and international competitiveness.
- ❖ The role of education and science for the design and future of the European project must be perceived consciously. The stronger integration of European topics in the structures of education and science must be a declared goal of all states to lay the foundation for those European citizens who will later carry Europe.
- ❖ Europe is more than just politics. The sciences, arts and religions enrich Europe; their freedom must be protected and ensured at all times and their important contributions for Europe and its society has to be acknowledged. European citizens altogether must be motivated in shaping our European future and overcoming of the past. Combating poverty and promoting jobs are a priority.

Brussels, 5th December 2012

For the Academy

Felix Unger
President EASA

Konrad Meßmer
Decan EASA

Stefan Schepers
Soc. Acad.

Werner Weidenfeld
Principal Alma Mater Europaea

Comment on the Manifest

The European integration has fundamentally changed the continent "Europe". For the first time in history the whole of Europe is united peacefully. The 27 Member States of the European Union have moved extensive decision-making powers from the national to the European level and embrace these now jointly. Its citizens live in a Europe where national borders were removed. The European single market generates market opportunities and thus jobs - even beyond the EU itself. Worldwide, the European Union is seen as a role model for the successful transformation of conflict, mistrust and war towards peace, trust and unity.

Nevertheless, crisis scenarios characterize the current image of the European Union. The terms "euro crisis", "Europe crisis" and "European currency crisis" are encountered on a daily basis in the headlines of the media. General confusion seems to reign about the solution of the current crisis, the fundamental future of the euro and the European Union. The economic crisis scenario is not the only challenge that Europe must tackle currently. Rather, three other fundamental critical topics are again acute that were thought of having been overcome by the Treaty of Lisbon:

On the one hand here the *fundamental crisis* of legitimacy of European policy towards its citizens has to be mentioned. In the decision making structures of the EU there are still too few direct democratic or representative elements. Also, the opportunity of a European citizen's initiative has not created any lasting improvements. In addition, increasing the transparency of European procedures is not as successful as it had been hoped for by the Lisbon Treaty. The Council meets mostly behind closed doors and the decision making is not always comprehensible for the public. Add to that the technocracy of policy making, which is driven by hectic crisis management. The lack of opportunities for active participation and the problems of transparency occur due to the lack of European politics more than ever and raise again the question of the legitimacy of European politics.

This is primed by a development which can be regarded as *crisis of orientation*. The nation-states operate on a purely situational crisis management and are not in a position to develop even a medium-term strategy, which provides guidance on how to continue with the European integration. Within the euro zone, the economically strong countries oppose the establishment of permanent transfer mechanisms, while the receiving countries fear a hierarchy of relationships that could limit their political choices permanently. Some of the Member States in turn, which have not adopted the euro, fear a two-tier EU with the euro group in the centre and all other at the political periphery. The reactive crisis management stirs distrust within Europe on the one hand, and opens up long-term consequences which magnitude cannot be fathomed yet on the other hand.

The third dimension of the crisis relates to the *institutional level* of the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon had launched major reforms which particularly provide for the greater involvement of the European Parliament. The Parliament has been made a co-decider in most areas of policy. Currently it is obvious, that the Parliament as well as the Commission is not holding any key positions in areas such as the financial and economic policies. The heads of state make their decisions on an intergovernmental level and bypass the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty by non-contractual arrangements in key policy fields. Thus, the already existing potential crisis of confidence is reinforced. Similarly, the crisis of legitimacy is further pushed, since the European Parliament as the only elected European body is by-passed.

Hence, Europe's crisis cannot be made smaller. The history of European integration has also shown that Europe has emerged stronger from each crisis so far. This requires, however, a strategic reflection, of which currently nothing can be seen unfortunately. It is the noble and urgent task of scientists and intellectuals to make a contribution here. They must bring up this painful subject and raise the basic issues that have been neglected due to the acute economic crisis. They must leave the beaten paths, question seemingly legitimate practices and thus provide the necessary intellectual corrective to the status quo. As independent and critical thinkers, they must focus on strategic and normative questions and consider political, social and cultural issues that are overlooked in the wake of the economic crisis. Recently, the European integration process in the context of the debate on the European Constitution has been accompanied by the input of science. The small results that have been achieved during the then proclaimed "phase of reflection" fatigued supposedly the intellectuals, although the results have also shown, that the question of the orientation of the EU has not been resolved finally.

So far it has been attempted to respond to the crisis of legitimacy primarily through communication activities, which are based on public relations strategies. The crisis management aimed at preventing further loss of legitimacy. Transparency and inclusiveness as foundations of legitimacy are rarely taken into view - on the contrary: They seem to be seen as an obstacle. Science here has a communicative-media task to accompany the debates at the European level critically but fair, in order to mediate and question on European politics and thus facilitate and bring the discourse between society and politics in motion. Europe only has a future as a democratic community. This also requires an intellectually vital European cultural debate.

At the same time, however, it is valid to state, that European policy is always characterized by a certain degree of complexity. European issues must therefore be anchored in sustainable education and research structures in order to strengthen European political competencies and thus provide an indirect contribution for improvements and transparency.

To overcome the crisis in orientation and transform the challenges of the time in strengthening Europe, it requires strategic thinking and action. The sciences are encouraged to politically question the prevailing economically focused crisis management. It concerns a problem definition which takes into consideration the fundamental political challenges facing Europe. Only on this basis it is possible to develop a sustainable solution strategy, including a forecast on the consequences which provide long-term orientation assistance for Europe.

The institutions crisis can be overcome through critical analysis and honest self-reflection. Europe needs more than ever constructively cooperating institutions.

Europe is a place of freedom and peace and cannot be reduced only to banking crisis, sovereign debt and bail outs. But what Europe lacks is a confidence-building strategy, a vision, which provides orientation for European policy and which includes the normative dimension politically. Answers are missing to the question, where Europe wants to go and how the path can be treaded. A European debate which is searching for answers to these questions is missing and therefore we are lacking the pre-requisites, that this crisis will become an opportunity to make Europe stronger than before. Science plays a special role to address these shortcomings and to contribute actively to eliminate these.

Signatory

Coordinators and Authors

Felix Unger • Werner Weidenfeld • Konrad Meßmer • Stefan Schepers

Maria R. Altenburg • Alfonso Andria • Tibor Asbóth • Reinhard Aufschnaiter • Günther Bader • Ján Bakoš • Velimir Baltezarević • Michael Beintker • Wilfried Bergmann • France Bernik • Pavle Bogetic • Thomas Brandt • Nedjan Bratasevec • Fritz Breuss • Marko Brezigar • Stefan Brunnhuber • Peter Buckel • Jozef Bulla • Erhard Busek • Vladimir Buzek • Zlatko Četinc • Igor Čolaković • Maurizio Luigi Cumo • Robert von Dassanowsky • Julio De Nadal • Momir Djurović • Jörg A. Draeger • Maria Eder • Hannes Ehrhardt • Olga Erdelská • Reinhard Fatke • Georg Färber • Monika Fioreschy • Jakob Förg • Emmanuel G. Fragoulis • Ingrid Franz • Emmanuel E. Gdoutos • Ágnes Gerdelics • Ferenc Glatz • Jean-Mathias Goerens • Klaus Habetha • Birgit Harreß • Ervin Hartman • Wolf D. Hartmann • Erich Hödl • Peter Hommelhoff • Andrej Ivanuša • Rudolf Janoschek • Tālavš Jundzis • Beno Jorjovec • Ivars Kalvins • Vlado Kambovski • Yücel Kanpolat • John Katsikadelis • Hermes Kick • Paul Kirchhof • Gerhard Kollaritsch • Anton Končnik • Edgar J. Korherr • Irena Kos • Zoran Kovačević • József Kriston Vízi • Muhamedin Kullashi • Reiner Kümmel • Ulrich Kunze • Lubica Lacinova • Walter G. Land • Mojca Leguart • Ioannis Liritzis • Štefan Luby • Martina Lubyova • Constantin Octavian Luca • Armando Luches • Ladislav Macho • István Madarassy • Eva Majkova • Aiman A. Mazyek • Hans Joachim Meyer • Stefan Mihina • Svetislav Milovanović • Dragoljub Mirjanić • Gerhard Mockenhaupt • + Heinrich Mussinghoff • Christos Mylonopoulos • Adriana Nagdovsky • Rade Nedeljковиć •

Simon Neglič • Velimir Neidhardt • Eugene Nickolov • Gabriela Nosalova • Peter Oberender • Nikola Obradović • Stanislaw Olszewski • Fritz Paschke • Horst Pietschmann • Franci Pivec • Jan Plesník • Franci Pliberšek • Momir Polenakovik • Peter Polterauer • Thorsten Posselt • Albin Prinz • Christopher Provatidis • mons. Želimir Puljić • Dietmar Pum • Reinhard Putz • Dušan Radonjić • Sotirios Raptis • Julius Rajčáni • Helmut Reinalter • Matjaž Ribaš • Herbert W. Roesky • Viera Rosová • Krešimir Sajko • Georg Salem • Peter Samuely • Christoph Schäfer • Günter R. Schmidt • Anton Spolar • Janis Stradins • Joseph Straus • George E. Theodorou • Oto Težak • Ludivk Toplak • Jochen Tröger • Igor Tunyi • Christian F. Vahl • Janez Valic • Stanivlav Vehovec • Viktorija Vehovec • E. Sylvester Vizi • Franz Vranitzky • Manfred Wagner • Hans Waldenfels • Egon Wetzels • Peter A. Wilderer • Edmund Willinger • Dietmar W. Winkler • Karlheinz Wurster • Arthur George Weidenfeld • Rado Wutej • Jože Zadavec • Tadeusz Zasepa • Davor Žic • Rado Žic • Jan Zima • Otmar Zorn.