Gulf Security: Between Balance of Power and Collective Security

The following paper provides an overview of the political as well as the academic proposals for organizing cooperation and security affairs in the Gulf. Given the frequency of major wars, its abundance of natural resources and its pivotal geopolitical location, this region is not only a political and security hot spot of great strategic importance, it is also particularly interesting for scholars of international relations who, historically, have understood this region as a realpolitik, balance of power system, par-excellence.

The Gulf can be conceptualized as a sub-complex of the greater-Middle Eastern regional system with its own distinct security political practices and challenges. It includes three regional great powers, i.e. Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as well as regional small powers, such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Somewhat on the regional margins is Yemen, often regarded as a fragile state more concerned with its own domestic affairs than regional or international politics. Since the emergence of the Gulf region as a strategic, geographic space, it has also gained a prominent place on the international security agenda; for this reason, various external actors continuously played an important role in regional affairs. After the First World War, the UK was the main actor in terms of ensuring regional stability and guaranteeing Western strategic interests. Following the British withdrawal from its territories ‘East of Suez’ in the early 1970s, the US took over this role as external balancer, cooperating with regional allies but also becoming ever-more militarily engaged in order to preserve the Gulf’s precarious stability.

A series of critical events, the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and the resultant US Operation Desert Storm, intensified American engagement and led to the permanent stationing of troops in the region. Subsequently, the US introduced a policy of dual-containment--an attempt to maintain regional stability by keeping both Iraq and Iran in check.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and with the increasing influence of neoconservative thinking in Washington, active regime change in Iraq became a viable option that was quickly formulated and ultimately implemented. The 2003, US-led invasion of Iraq removed Saddam Hussein. For Washington policy-makers, it was envisaged that Saddam’s regime would be replaced by a liberal and democratic government that would serve as an example for other countries in the region, essentially generating a democratic domino-effect. The failure of this strategy, however, became quickly apparent as it led to chaos and civil war-like conditions in Iraq and resulted in the final dismantling of the balance of power in the Gulf.

Throughout this period, there were efforts to at least think about and begin to formulate concepts of regional cooperation that could be used to escape the perennial cycle of instability that was defining the Gulf region. None of these ideas went farther than the drawing board or were seriously considered for implementation by the respective regional stakeholders, however. As a result, a new security architecture must take into account the failures of the past and consider the strategic circumstances that presently exist.

The necessity to continue thinking about and discussing a regional security framework is underlined by the numerous security problems that challenge not only the Gulf, but that also have implications for peace and security beyond the region itself:

First, the domestic situation in Iraq is far from stable and the country’s future regional role still needs to be determined; second, Iran’s opaque foreign policy and its disputed nuclear and missile programs have generated suspicions among its neighbors and the international community as to its regional ambitions; third, there is a fear that the Sunni-Shia divide is deepening which would have destabilizing political and social effects on the region; fourth, the stability of Yemen concerns all regional actors, in particular the countries of the GCC; finally, border disputes in the region, most prominently between the UAE and Iran, must be resolved; in addition to these concerns, the region must also address cross-cutting security challenges such as terrorism, drug trafficking and piracy.

This paper provides an overview of the various proposals and ideas that have been put forward concerning potential options for resolving the Gulf security dilemma. Looking at the list below, it becomes clear that most of the concerned parties agree that a return to the status quo ante (e.g. the old realpolitik balance-of-power approach which depends on the US to guarantee regional stability) is no longer workable and that in order to overcome regional challenges, cooperation is needed.

Given that the region suffers from political and ideological conflicts and a lack of trust among the involved actors, finding a way to operationalize even minimal cooperation is no easy task.

Most parties suggest that any new security agenda should be more inclusive, i.e. that it addresses not only military aspects of security, but also issues such as regional economic development, counterterrorism, disaster response, and environmental, social and cultural topics as well. In
addition, a more cooperative approach to inter-state relations as a basis for a new regional security architecture is called for, as this is essential to an understanding of security that leaves behind zero-sum calculations of national security.

Yet, whereas it has been possible to achieve some form of agreement across the region – and beyond – regarding the general aim (i.e. regional peace and stability), the actual shape of, and the practical means for establishing this new security architecture remain unresolved. As can be seen from the proposals below, there are diverging suggestions as to the basic design, the rules and the participants. Differing views pertain in particular to the following questions:

- What degree of institutionalization and which *modus operandi* would be appropriate for this sub-regional security system? Should it be organized as a network of bilateral relationships or a formal, multilateral framework? Should it resemble the OSCE (very formal) or the ASEAN (rather informal) example? Is a cooperative balance of power system with issue-oriented cooperation the preferable structure?
- Who should be member of this security system? Only littoral states of the Gulf? All Middle Eastern countries including Israel? What role should external actors, such as the US, Russia, China, India or the EU, play?
- Should a new architecture be established in an incremental process, i.e. starting with limited cooperation on specific issues? Or is the situation ripe for a big bang approach, putting all issues on the table and aiming for a comprehensive package deal?
- Is there a need to re-adjust the sub-regional balance of power in order to allow for a new security architecture or is it possible to directly move towards a concept of cooperative security?

On the one hand, it seems that in particular the GCC countries, as well as the US, Russia and the member states of the European Union, prefer a very broad approach when considering which states should participate in regional security affairs. Iran, on the other hand, accepts that external actors have legitimate interests in the Gulf region, but Tehran regards such interference as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. In the meantime, Iraq’s current preoccupation with national reconstruction is also reflected in its regional agenda as Baghdad is primarily concerned with building strong, bilateral relations with its neighbors while simultaneously seeking the support of the international community.

The focus on regional cooperation suggested by most of the proposals stands in contrast to the current practices. Many of the littoral states of the Gulf continue to follow the very clear realpolitik approach of increasing their military capabilities and forging strategic alliances with external actors. For the GCC countries in particular, the cooperation with the US is the main pillar of their defense posture. This is evidenced by the various bilateral defense cooperation agreements, the sustained US military presence in the region, and the cooperation in multilateral forums, such as the Gulf Security Dialogue. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia also continue to participate in efforts to improve the interoperability of US-GCC militaries through regular arms purchases as well as close coordination and training measures. Yet, the Arab Gulf countries have also expanded their bilateral defense cooperation with other external player, such as the UK and France, in order to strengthen the historical ties to the region that these countries still hold. Both have formal defense agreements with Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, and France, as of 2009, opened a naval base in the latter. Two other developments to be noted are the expansion of NATO into the Gulf region through its Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
and the intensification of GCC countries’ security relations with other major actors outside the Western realm, such as Russia or India. Iran, on the other hand, applied for membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Council where it currently holds an observer status and seeks to strengthen its ties with Russia and China, two of the Islamic Republic’s major arms suppliers. Moreover, there is the suspicion that the Iranian nuclear program ultimately aims to achieve a military dimension.

Yet, several attempts have been made to alleviate regional tensions and contribute to a more cooperative climate in the Gulf, for example the invitation of Iranian President Ahmadinejad to attend the GCC summit in 2007 and the multilateral meetings on the stability of Iraq assembling Iraq, its neighbors as well as the US and other international parties in 2007 and 2008. Yet, as has been the case in the past, none of these initiatives actually achieved a substantial and sustainable change of the political climate in the region. In fact, the only regional entity that seems to have internalized multilateralism and cooperation as a modus operandi seems to be the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The following list of proposals is far from complete; nonetheless, it assembles many ideas and propositions that have either been circulated within the academic community or proposed by the political actors themselves. It is provided here as a base for discussion from which to continue the thinking and deliberations about how to bring about more constructive and broad-based regional security cooperation.

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## Gulf Security Concepts

### Implemented proposal from political actor/countries

| Gulf Cooperation Council 1981 | Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf  
Regional integration project including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  
The six GCC member states base their cooperation on their special historical, cultural and political relationship. The goals of the GCC are to establish coordination, cooperation and ultimately integration “in all fields.” Hence, the GCC charter is based on a cooperative understanding of security.  
GCC cooperation refers to political, economic and security matters, even though the main focus has been on economic concerns. Cooperation on defense policy exists and was intensive in the 1980s; however, it plays only a secondary role in the national security strategies of the member states today, and it advanced only on a case-by-case basis. In terms of security, the GCC’s main achievement might be the establishment of peaceful and considerably stable relations between its member states.  
At their summit meeting in 2000, the GCC states agreed on a Gulf Defense Pact, pledging to come to each other’s aid in the event of an attack on any member state. The pact however, requires the ratification of each member state, which has not occurred to date. |
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| NATO June 28, 2004 | Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)  
**Goal:** Creation of strong bilateral security relationships between NATO and countries in the greater Middle East, particularly with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This does not, however, include security guarantees. NATO currently maintains these relationships through cooperation and dialogue but hopes to translate these efforts into permanent security sector reforms in the future. A further objective is the settlement of the Palestine-Israeli Conflict.  
**Issues:** Counter terrorism, limiting the spread of WMDs, assistance with defense reform and budgeting, training and education, joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, disaster preparedness, crisis management, civil emergency planning, and border security cooperation to curb illegal trafficking of arms, drugs, and people;  
**Countries involved:** Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE. While Oman and Saudi Arabia have indicated their interest in the initiative, they have not joined ICI as of February 2010.  
**Sources:**  
[http://www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html) |
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<th>UN Secretary General</th>
<th>informal group/Future of Iraq</th>
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<td>December 1, 2003</td>
<td><strong>Goals:</strong> Achieving a consensus to build a regional framework within which to incorporate Iraq; stabilization and regional re-integration of Iraq as nucleus for a “Helsinki Process” in the Gulf-region.</td>
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<td><strong>Means:</strong> Informal, result-oriented meetings hosted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations; limited number of participants, but ultimately expansion to include the Middle East as a whole.</td>
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<td><strong>Countries involved (initially):</strong> Six immediate neighbors (Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran), Egypt, Permanent UNSC members</td>
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<th>Toda Institute et al.</th>
<th>HUGG West Asia</th>
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<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>As a case for Triple Track Diplomacy, Tehranian presents Toda Institute’s HUGG West Asia project as an attempt to join civil society/NGOs and governments in peace building efforts. The project started in 1998 and aimed at enhancing Persian Gulf security. A regional security regime should be made possible by the establishment of an “International Commission for Security and Cooperation in West Asia,” consisting of diplomats and scholars from the eight littoral states plus the five permanent members of the UNSC and a UN representative. The Commission last met in 2001 and was supposed to prepare peace proposals for the consideration of the relevant governments.</td>
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<td>The Commission agreed that a regional security system should build on consensus (regular communication between governments to develop common views on regional issues), inclusiveness (all regional states need to be part of the process) and functionalism (functional cooperation comes before and might lead to political cooperation). The Commission also came up with a list of potential confidence-building measures and identified major security concerns of the regional states that need to be addressed before any attempts at regime building could be started: for example, stability in the flows and price of oil, non-interference in internal affairs, and long-term economic development are common concerns of the petroleum exporting states.</td>
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### Proposals from political actors/countries (not implemented so far)

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<th>Country</th>
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<td><strong>UN Security Council, Resolution 598 (1987)</strong></td>
<td>In this resolution and acting on the basis of Chapter VII, the UNSCR recognizes a breach of the international peace with regard to the Iran-Iraq War. Beyond an immediate cease-fire, it demands a set of peace building and reconstruction measures, and specifically “requests the Secretary-General to examine in consultation with Iran and Iraq and with other states of the region measures to enhance the security and stability of the region.”</td>
<td><a href="http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/fact-book/speeches/2004/041205-saud-bahrain.html">http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/fact-book/speeches/2004/041205-saud-bahrain.html</a></td>
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| **Saudi Arabia, Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Manama Dialogue 2004** | A regional security framework will rest on four pillars:  
- A politically, economically and militarily integrated GCC with increased defense capabilities as well as a clear and unified economic and security strategy  
- A prosperous Yemen closely related to the Gulf states  
- A stable and unified Iraq undergoing a process of national dialogue and reconciliation  
- A friendly Iran that feels secure and engages in the war on terrorism as well as a peaceful solution of the Emirates’ islands issue  

Additionally, international guarantees – similar to those parts of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Borders Accord – need to support regional integration. International guarantees cannot be provided unilaterally by the only superpower in the world but can only be provided by the collective will of the international community through a unanimous declaration of the Security Council. A Middle Eastern Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) will rest on Israel abandoning its NW program. Emerging Asian powers, especially China and India, need to be engaged positively. | [Source: Ibid. 2008: Challenges and Dangers Facing the Gulf Region, in: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ed.): Arabian Gulf Security. Internal and External Challenges. Abu Dhabi, pp. 19-28.](https://www.emiratescenter.net/publications/gulf-security-internal-external-challenges/) |
| **Saudi Arabia, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, King Faisal Center 2008** | The conflict between Shia and Sunni Islam while often misrepresented by international commentators, threatens regional security. According to Prince Turki Al-Faisal, this doctrinal dispute must be separated from the need to coexist peacefully. Political efforts to increase cooperation between GCC states and Iran must not be obstructed by doctrinal considerations.  
In particular, Prince Turki Al-Faisal demands cooperation between Iran and the GCC-states in rebuilding Iraq and developing Lebanon and Palestine. Also, mutual economic investments could help break down the atmosphere of fear and doubt. Moreover, Iran and GCC-states face similar socio-economic challenges and should join forces in attempts to find solutions. | [Source: Ibid. 2008: Challenges and Dangers Facing the Gulf Region, in: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ed.): Arabian Gulf Security. Internal and External Challenges. Abu Dhabi, pp. 19-28.](https://www.emiratescenter.net/publications/gulf-security-internal-external-challenges/) |
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<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Chief of Staff Fahad Ahmad Al-Amir, 2008</td>
<td>Besides extremism, Al-Amir identifies the issue of population composition and – in extenso – the quality of education and training as the main internal challenges of the Arab Gulf states. Development and security can only be guaranteed after finding ways to nationalize the workforce and improve education. While cooperation between GCC states and the EU and/or NATO is an important feature of regional security, more emphasis should be put on improving the capabilities of the Gulf States themselves. Besides the need to increase regional dialogue, Al-Amir proposes Maritime Confidence Building Measures; the establishment of a GCC common market and monetary union; economic, political and administrative reforms in the GCC states; and increased military capacity building, including the adoption of a joint Gulf military strategy. Source: Ibid. 2008: An Overall Perspective of Gulf Security, in: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ed.): Arabian Gulf Security. Internal and External Challenges. Abu Dhabi, pp. 39-48.</td>
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<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Prime Minister Hamad Jassim Al-Thani, Kuwait News Agency, March 10, 2008</td>
<td>Al-Thani demands international cooperation based on the UN Charter, because “the concept of regional security and that of international security go hand in hand.” He suggests developing a new GCC mechanism to deal with the security challenges and to form a comprehensive security strategy. Such a strengthened GCC should then engage in dialogue with Iran. Source: <a href="http://www.gcclub.org/index.php?show=news&amp;action=article&amp;id=1353">http://www.gcclub.org/index.php?show=news&amp;action=article&amp;id=1353</a></td>
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| Bahrain, Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid Al-Khalifa, Manama Dialogue 2009 | The long-term goal of developing a comprehensive overall security arrangement that includes all Gulf countries can only be achieved as result of a gradual process. The starting point should be dialogue and confidence-building measures between the Gulf countries (i.e. GCC states, Iran and possibly Iraq):
- coordinate responses on disaster risk reduction (e.g. dust storms) as also called for by Iran
- establish a regional development program (e.g. on Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan)
- regional consultation to prevent future nuclear disasters from occurring

The goal is to shift the security paradigm from state/military security to human security - security of the people. Hence, it is imperative to strengthen the rule of law, protect the environment, safeguard the rights of women, move towards a diversified and knowledge-based economy that provides employment, tackle poverty and hunger, boost public health, end occupation and armed conflict


| Gulf Cooperation Council, Secretary General Abdulrahman Al-Attiyah, 2008 | The uniqueness of the security situation in the Gulf is characterized by the inherent instability of the region, especially after 2003, that makes achieving an equilibrium very difficult. Further complication is due to the internationalization of regional security issues. Additionally, Iran and Iraq, under Hussein, obstructed the GCC’s approach to regional security without promoting a viable alternative.

Al-Attiyah identifies resolution of land disputes between the UAE and Iran as a pivotal issue for reaching a regional framework for security. Settling the dispute peacefully by referring it to the International Court of Justice would lead to a qualitative transformation of GCC-Iran relation. Other issues that loom large – rebuilding Iraq, the Iranian nuclear ambitions – cannot be solved by relying on an external security umbrella. According to Al-Attiyah, the Gulf states need to take those matters in their own hands.


| Iraq, Vice President Tariq Al-Hashemi, Manama Dialogue 2007 | Hashemi demands both regional and international measures to make Iraq more stable and secure, which, in turn, will be a prerequisite for a functioning Gulf security system. While accepting the principle of non-interference, GCC states should engage in close cooperation with Iraq. The neighbouring states should refrain from any claims to debts or compensations, the refugee problem needs both regional and international attention, and the fact that Iraq is still subject to chapter VII of the UN-Charter should be considered.

10-point proposal

1. Establishment of a Persian Gulf Security and Cooperation Organization comprising the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as Iran and Iraq in accordance with Clause 8 of Resolution 598 of the United Nations Security Council
2. Preparing common security grounds for fighting terrorism, organized crime and drug smuggling, as well as other joint security concerns
3. Gradual removal of all restrictions in political, security, economic and cultural fields
4. Development of trade ties by taking the countries' potentials into consideration and conducting joint investment in economic projects to achieve a regional free-trade mechanism
5. Guaranteeing the security and energy export of regional countries to secure their interests and achieving a sustainable mechanism for supplying energy internationally
Guaranteeing the security and the interests of regional energy exporters by achieving a sustainable mechanism for safeguarding international energy supplies
6. Building confidence among regional countries in the domestic uses of nuclear energy
7. Setting up a joint consortium for uranium enrichment among regional countries to procure nuclear fuel and other peaceful nuclear activities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency
8. Forging A Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction
9. Putting an end to arms races in the region by providing resources for the purpose of economic development and fighting poverty
10. Demanding foreign military personnel to exit the region and establishing full security by the regional countries

Other Iranian politicians have brought forward similar proposals, e.g. President Ahmadinejad (on the occasion of his participation at the GCC-Council summit in 2007) and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manoucher Mottaki (at the Manama Dialogue 2006)

Countries involved: Iranian proposals accept that outside powers have legitimate interests in the Gulf, yet it is unclear how (if at all) international actors should be involved in regional security. External actors (in particular the US) are rather seen as part of the problem.

Sources:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/TD14Ak04.html
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7125268.stm

Turkey, President Abdullah Gül
UN GA, September 23, 2008

Turkey uses its regional influence to support the resolution of the various conflicts in the Middle East; however, a comprehensive approach is necessary to end these conflicts on a sustainable basis

Proposal: Collective arrangements for conflict prevention and resolution in order to promote regional security and stability by building confidence, facilitating political dialogue and encouraging economic and cultural cooperation in the Middle East

1. Three-tier system of organizing security assistance /Alliance approach
   - Each states’ ability to defend itself: refers to states’ efforts to assure internal stability; GCC are unlikely to welcome the direct involvement of other GCC nations as the US in this tier
   - The ability to mount a collective defense of any GCC state threatened by an external aggressor and to support coalition operations involving multinational forces
   - The ability to function as partners and hosts

2. Cooperative Security System

   In 1994, CENTCOM identified the need for a Gulf security forum to address transnational issues such as environmental pollution, mass migration, terrorism and trafficking; forum should be “cooperative, comprehensive and compartmentalized” (Craig Dunkerley)
   - **cooperative**: inclusive and not aligned against any state in the region; inclusion of international and regional NGOs; US should support Iran's participation since both already cooperate on many issues that a Gulf security forum would address (Search and Rescue (SAR) and Incident at Sea (INCSEA)) and share common interests (avoiding war, reducing their military expenditure)
   - **comprehensive**: hard and soft security
   - **compartmentalized**: any process would be specific to the Gulf itself and not tied to the success or failure of the Israeli-Palestine or Israeli-Syrian negotiations

   The forum should focus on the issues that local states care about and external powers should attend the forum with observer status only; the influence of the US should be channeled thought NATO; the forum should be built/designed like the ACRS before it collapsed in 1995;

   **Scope of work:**
   - Non-aggression pacts that stress the political and territorial sovereignty of the regional states
   - Mechanism for resolving regional disputes peacefully
   - Cooperative security initiatives to ensure Maritime security (safety in the Gulf and Straits of Hormuz)
   - Cooperation on common threats, such as subversion and terrorism

   **Timeframe:**
   - Short term: Establishing processes and developing a statement of principles and intent, developing a number of uncontroversial ACRS agreements on SAR, INCSEA, establishing a communication network
   - Medium-/long-term: Exchange visits by military and security officers, educational exchange, port visits by military vessels in transit, exchange of military information, development of a conflict prevention centre with arms register and maritime security database, WMD and nuclear free zone agreements

   In general CBMs, regular communication between security officials, creation of guidelines and understandings of sensitive issue, such as policing of joint land and maritime borders;

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| USA, Gen. D. Petraeus, Manama Dialogue 2008/2009 | A robust architecture is already in place and has evolved around the responses to the numerous, complex and interwoven transnational, state-centric and other threats in the region. This architecture rests on the cooperation of like-minded nations that hold a similar threat perception and want to advance shared interests. The US is particularly engaged in creating multilateral cooperation on the basis of bilateral partnerships. Main interests (of US and regional partners): stability of Iraq & countering extremism. Further action to improve this architecture could be categorized as comprising five areas:  
- Expansion of existing bilateral missile-defense initiatives, aiming at true multilateral cooperation  
- Combined maritime security operations, including counter-proliferation and counter-smuggling measures  
- Information sharing and cooperative intelligence operations  
- Critical infrastructure protection  
- Leveraging regional training centers  
Essentially a balance of power approach as like-minded nations try to shift regional power in their favor and achieve a position of strength: “As history has shown this kind of cooperation (…) can, over time, persuade destabilizing actors to reconsider their actions.”  
Sources:  
| France, Defense Minister M. Alliot-Marie, Manama Dialogue 2005 | A regional security system for the Gulf seems inevitable and logical, considering similar processes in other regions. The European contribution to this could be as follows:  
- The EU already is – not only economically and diplomatically, but also in terms of defense and security cooperation – an important partner of numerous Gulf countries and the GCC and a player within the region. Europe might serve as a model of reconciliation and cooperation and the OSCE might be an example for future attempts at deepening and enlarging the GCC.  
- European Defense tools such as the Battlegroups 1500 and the European Gendarmerie Force might prove as helpful as the European Security and Defense College- Cooperation mechanisms like ‘Recamp’ and the 5+5 security dialogues could be adapted to the Gulf region.  
System of collective security in the Gulf area as an integral part of the post-crisis arrangement for the entire Middle East

**Goals:** Settlement of the Iraqi crisis and resolution of the conflict over Iran's nuclear program; long-term objectives include the creation of an (regional) organization for security and co-operation

**Issues:** Transparency in the military field and arms control, joint actions to combat transnational terrorism and other challenges to security and co-operation

**Means:** Confidence-building measures and mutual security guarantees on the basis of a gradual approach

**Principles:** No use of force or threat of force, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and commitment to peaceful settlement of problems and disputes

The proposal is related to previous plans in the 1990s and 2003/2004, and reflects Russian concerns about the American dominance in the Gulf. Moreover, it shows the ambition to take on a stronger role in international politics and is seen as an important element of a strategy to stabilize the world energy market

Countries involved: Gulf countries and the international community (“concerned parties”); in a more recent statement, only the Gulf states, Russia and the US are to be included (Feb. 2009)

**Sources:**

http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/07/15/1121_type82912type84779_204155.shtml
http://en.rian.ru/world/20080430/106279107.html
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2854
http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/off_news/250808/newen2.htm
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<th>Authors/ Institution</th>
<th>Proposal</th>
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<td>E. Hokayem 2010</td>
<td>ASEAN approach based on principles of sovereignty and non-interference is model for future security arrangement in the Gulf. GCC states should proactively seek understanding with Iran over regional security affairs (in order not to be marginalized as result of possible US-Iranian grand bargain) <em>Elements of GCC-Iranian rapprochement</em>: Compromise on presence of foreign troops in the Gulf; non-aggression and conventional force reduction; comprehensive delineation of borders (related: Abu Musa and Tunbs international arbitration); WMD free zone in the Gulf (incl. GCC allies); GCC offering capital and know-how to modernize Iranian economy.</td>
<td>Hokayem, Emile 2010: Arab silence is not substitute for policy on a troubled Iran, in: The National, 27/01/2010. <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100127/OPINION/701269937/1080">http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100127/OPINION/701269937/1080</a></td>
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<td>M. Alani 2008</td>
<td>A Gulf NW/WMD Free Zone as a nucleus for regional security cooperation: Track II meetings started in late 2004 and initiated by the Gulf Research Center placed the Agenda of a WMDFZ on the regional political agenda. This subregional concept of a Gulf NW/WMDFZ would ultimately spread to the greater Middle East region and spill over to other elements of regional security. This WMDFZ would require an institutional structure to implement the treaty. These institutions could be developed to help expand security and military cooperation at the regional level.</td>
<td>Alani, Mustafa 2008: The Gulf NW and WMD Free Zone: A Track II Initiative, in: International Relations 22-3, pp. 358-362.</td>
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Building on the observation that Iran has become an important international actor with extreme relevance for regional security, the authors claim that the US role in the region can only change for the better if Iran is no longer viewed as a threat to be managed but as a partner in a ‘U.S.-Iranian grand bargain,’ comprehensive talks without preconditions. As the only way to promote American interests and those of its allies, such a bargain would follow the example of U.S.-China rapprochement initiated by Nixon in the 1970s and – among others – aim at legitimizing Iran’s positive role in the region.

This package deal – as opposed to any incremental solution – would entail as a central pillar the development of a cooperative approach to regional security. In accordance with that spirit, Iran would commit itself to ceasing its military supplies to any terrorist groups as well as its opposition to a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, Iran would need to cooperate positively with the U.S. with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan. In return, the U.S. would grant Iran comprehensive security guarantees, cease its politics of sanctions and engage in security, socio-economic and strategic dialogue with the Islamic republic. The emerging U.S.-Iranian cooperation in post-conflict Iraq would form the basis of a regional security forum for the Gulf, analogue, in the end, to the OSCE.

**CSCE model for the Middle East:** CSCE was established at the height of the confrontation between East and West in Europe, hence the model is applicable for Middle East, too.
- Establish the concept of common security (as opposed to zero-sum understanding of security)
- Conference should start from within the region and without preconditions (except the willingness to engage in dialogue)
- First steps: Decide which confidence building measures are possible?
- Listing the conflicts to be addressed & re-framing these conflicts so as to allow for identification of a common security approach
- Ultimate goal is WMD-free Middle East (Existing proposals could be reconsidered, e.g. UN General Assembly since 1974)
- Key is to include the core states of the Middle East (Egypt, Israel, Palestinian state, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman), but also Maghreb, Central /South Asia could be included
- External actors should play supportive role, key role for EU

**References**


Massarrat, Mohssen (on behalf of the German section of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) 2007: Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit im Mittleren und Nahen Osten. [http://www.ippnw.de/print/frieden/konfliktregionen/kszmno.html](http://www.ippnw.de/print/frieden/konfliktregionen/kszmno.html)
| J. Russell | A new arrangement is needed because the Bush administration’s approach of a strong military and continued US presence in the region (including military bases) is unsustainable as it is not supported by the regional actors. It is also questionable to what extent the military resources at hand are suited to meet existing and emerging security challenges. Components of a new regional security structure: A strong GCC containing a security political foundation (possibly including a collective defense clause) as point of departure. Moreover, Iran would have to be integrated into a regional security arrangement. |
|-------------|
| G. Luciani & F. Neugart | Progressive establishment of a “Gulf Conference for Security and Cooperation” (GCSC), i.e. an “indigenous, Gulf-based security system with only a limited presence of external powers” The GCSC should be based on four principles: Inclusiveness (all Gulf states + relevant external actors); Comprehensiveness (broad concept of security); flexibility (different workings groups etc.); separation (no automatic linkage to other sub-regional security issues, e.g. the Israeli-Arab conflict) |
| B. Moeller | Having just entered the “Westphalian stage,” the Gulf region is facing severe difficulties in trying to move towards a collective security system. Obstacles include a lack of regional organizations and the non-complementarities of the national economies in the region. Until 2003, there had been a window of opportunity for the US to change the gulf security situation in such a way that a collective security system might have been possible. Abandoning the dual containment strategy diplomatically and a balanced package of arms control measurements might have led to a thorough stabilization and relaxation of the situation in the region. The destabilization of Iraq that followed the US-led invasion might have devastating effects for the whole region and calls for increased efforts to develop a solid gulf security architecture. This will not be possible without enhanced legitimacy of the Iraqi transition process and an expansion of the GCC, making it truly a regional organization. Moeller mentions the development of ASEAN as a possible model for security negotiations that would begin with an open exchange of opinions on reciprocal threat perceptions. |


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<th>Author</th>
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| C. G. Dunkerley 2004   | OSCE Lessons for the Gulf:                                            | - All actors must be included and enjoy equal status in the process  
  - Focus on modest, but concrete steps that have an impact (and not so much on political declarations light on substance)  
  - Verification and review mechanisms  
  - Not just resolution of border disputes, but positive goals beyond that  
  - Focus on the political process and not on the institutions (flexibility to allow adjustments and readjustments) |
| J. McMillan, R. Sokolsky, A. C. Winner 2003 | Given the rivalries, differing threat perceptions, and gaps in military capability, a unified and integrated security structure including Iran, Iraq and the GCC countries is not very plausible. Instead, a network of interlinked arrangements resembling the structure of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) seems more feasible. Scenarios to change the regional security practices:  
  - Individual countries convene *ad hoc* conferences on topics of common concern and invite all regional actors  
  - Formal or informal multilateral groups to address specific topics  
  - GCC develops structured plans for cooperation with Iran, Iraq, Yemen  
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<th>Author</th>
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<th>Scenario Description</th>
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| K. M. Pollack   | 2003 | Three scenarios for Persian gulf security:  
- US return to off-shore balancing  
- Establishing a formal defense alliance of US, GCC states and the new Iraq (Neither approach promising in terms of potential for success/sustainability)  
- Building a regional “security condominium in three steps: (a) Establishing a regional-security forum at which relevant issues could be debated and discussed, information exchanged and agreements framed; (b) confidence-building measures, such as notification of exercises, exchanges of observers, and information swaps; (c) Arms-control agreements that might include demilitarized zones, bans on destabilizing weapon systems, and balanced force reduction, ban on all WMD (incl. a multilateral (or international) inspection program to enforce compliance) | Pollack, Kenneth M. 2003: Securing the Gulf, in: Foreign Affairs 82 (4), pp. 2-7.               |
| J. Roshandel    | 2001 | A security regime “based on the necessity to coexist peacefully with neighbors and to live in peace, based on mutual respect, confidence, and protection” is of utmost importance for the Gulf states as costs for arms rocket. A non-aggression pact could be viewed as a beginning. This pact might be achieved by an academically informed NGO approach that finally prepares an international diplomatic effort. This needs to be accompanied by a defensive restructuring of the armed forces in the region (see also Moeller 2001). | Roshandel, Jalil 2001: Towards Cooperative Security in the Persian Gulf, in: B. Moeller (ed.): Oil and Water. Cooperative Security in the Persian Gulf. London, New York, pp. 248-271. |
| P. Jones        | 1998 | Members of an Expert Group brought together by SIPRI agreed on elements of a ‘Regional Security Regime’. A cooperative (as opposed to coordinated or collective) approach to security would focus on informally agreed upon ‘guiding principles for conduct’ developed on the Track II level which would foster a culture of peace in the Middle East Region (defined as the member states of the Arab League plus Israel and Iran). Thereby, a ‘sum-sum mentality’ would enable an inclusive process capable of overcoming the Middle East security dilemma. Following the concept of variable geometry, the regime would be inclusive, non-institutional, pragmatic and based on voluntary membership. Cooperation would be facilitated by a set of concrete Confidence- and security-building measures employing a comprehensive concept of ‘security,’ including non-military issues. A cornerstone of these developments would be the constitution of a regional WMDFZ. The Persian Gulf as a subregion would remain an important unit within the regional regime. Especially the control of conventional arms was identified as an issue best dealt with on a subregional level, while a WMDFZ was explicitly placed on the agenda of the region as a whole. | Jones, Peter 1998: Towards a Regional Security Regime for the Middle East: Issues and Options, Stockholm (SIPRI). books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRI98Jones.pdf |
### Further/alternative academic proposals (issue-oriented)

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<th>Author</th>
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<td>P. Jones</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Maritime or naval CBMs (e.g. based on INSCSEA agreements) are a prerequisite for avoiding unintended confrontations at sea. An INSCSEA arrangement that includes the Iranian Revolutionary Guards could build upon the experiences that the Gulf states had while participating in the Middle Eastern ACRS INSCSEA. Informal discussions on maritime CBMs could thus be the starting point for more in-depth, official debate.</td>
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| W. Posch | 2006 | - The breakdown of Iraq has revived the ‘Greater West Asian Crisis’ and the issue of politicized religious/ethnic identities will be of major importance  
- Right now, any security architecture is not compatible with GCC, US, and Iranian strategies  
- A gradualist/incremental approach is more promising. This would consist of occasional cooperation on four levels:  
  1) Cooperation between the EU and regional actors in Civilian Crisis Management could bring together GCC, EU and Iran  
  2) An ‘Iraqi Neighborhood Initiative’, including the EU and the USA would be the only way of managing Iraq and could be a forum that brings together both USA and Iran  
  3) An international convention dealing with naval incidents in the Gulf and especially in the Strait of Hormuz could prevent a catastrophe and build confidence  
  4) Iran and the USA need to cooperate on Counter Narcotics Measures – either directly or via the UN |


The reality of Gulf security remains balance-of-power politics, given the competing security interests of the nation-states in the region. The Gulf is an area marked more by diversities than commonalities, so the nation-states of the Gulf would not come to the defense of a threatened state.

But the theoretic concept of “collective security” falls far short of a real escape from the balance-of-power politics. Therefore, proposals applying to “collective security” would fail in the Persian Gulf. Even though the GCC may pay lip service to the notion “one for all and all for one,” Gulf states are unlikely to welcome intervention from the other Gulf states.

Furthermore, measures like arms control and confidence building used as “baby steps” in order to reach a formal institution (like CSCE) will not work in the Persian Gulf. First, Europe’s experiences do not match the political military realities in the Persian Gulf. Second, these measures (arms control etc.) did not bring the transition in Europe, neither would they in the Gulf. Internal changes in the Soviet Union, namely the statesmanship of Mikhail Gorbachev, brought the real acceleration for the security transformation in Europe, so internal transformation has to occur in Iran.

Last, a collective security institution would be difficult to limit geographically.

**Counterproposal:** Prudent management of the balance-of-power system that relies on tools such as political-military contacts, confidence-building measures etc. While the future contours of the Persian Gulf security will resemble those of the past decades (rivalry, competition, backing by the US), Iran and the US would be the key actors. The US should act as balancing power, through “lily pad” and over-the-horizon presence in the Gulf: Deployment of small, ready-to-activate military access points in numerous host countries totalling 20,000 military personnel.

| R. L. Russell 2005 | The reality of Gulf security remains balance-of-power politics, given the competing security interests of the nation-states in the region. The Gulf is an area marked more by diversities than commonalities, so the nation-states of the Gulf would not come to the defense of a threatened state. But the theoretic concept of “collective security” falls far short of a real escape from the balance-of-power politics. Therefore, proposals applying to “collective security” would fail in the Persian Gulf. Even though the GCC may pay lip service to the notion “one for all and all for one,” Gulf states are unlikely to welcome intervention from the other Gulf states. Furthermore, measures like arms control and confidence building used as “baby steps” in order to reach a formal institution (like CSCE) will not work in the Persian Gulf. First, Europe’s experiences do not match the political military realities in the Persian Gulf. Second, these measures (arms control etc.) did not bring the transition in Europe, neither would they in the Gulf. Internal changes in the Soviet Union, namely the statesmanship of Mikhail Gorbachev, brought the real acceleration for the security transformation in Europe, so internal transformation has to occur in Iran. Last, a collective security institution would be difficult to limit geographically. **Counterproposal:** Prudent management of the balance-of-power system that relies on tools such as political-military contacts, confidence-building measures etc. While the future contours of the Persian Gulf security will resemble those of the past decades (rivalry, competition, backing by the US), Iran and the US would be the key actors. The US should act as balancing power, through “lily pad” and over-the-horizon presence in the Gulf: Deployment of small, ready-to-activate military access points in numerous host countries totalling 20,000 military personnel. | Russell, Richard L. 2005: The Persian Gulf’s Collective-Security Mirage, in: Middle East Policy 11 (4), pp.77-88 |
There are four aspects that would have to be addressed by a regional security system: Iran-Arab relations; Iran-US relations; US regional policy/dominance (also a concern for external actors such as China or Russia); US and the regional policy toward Iraq.

- Principled, multilateral strategy for engagement including all relevant parties in the region (GCC countries, Iran, Iraq and Yemen);
- A new approach is also needed because more countries are interested in energy security and countering terrorism is ineffective when working within a balance of power approach;
- In particular, external actors such as China, India or Russia show greater interest to get involved and would change the strategic landscape; hence new security architecture should be inclusive;
- Possible topics for cooperation (in addition to counterterrorism): environmental issues and peaceful nuclear energy, socio-economic issues; in addition, a regional military-level dialogue is needed.

The idea of borrowing from the European historical experience in the Gulf region is problematic because even within existing organizations such as the GCC, the regional states have highly divergent interests. An OSCE style ‘top-down approach’, creating a forum for all regional actors could thus prove to be inferior to and less practical than a bottom-up approach strengthening existing bilateral relations. Simultaneously, threat reduction programs need to be revitalized to enable the establishment of a WMDFZ and finally a full-blown security architecture.
A. Rathmell, Th. Krasik, D. Gompert 2003

**Diagnosis:** Gulf security has been run according to the principles of realpolitik, but without the preconditions to make such an approach successful (namely a balance between the three poles Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia/GCC and acceptance of the status quo by these powers). Argues for the establishment of a regional balance of power between Iran, Iraq and the GCC countries that takes into account their military and strategic concerns and gives them a stake in the status quo.

Strong role for US and EU (but not specified what role for other external actors such as China, India, Russia). The paper concludes that even though a US military umbrella is the prerequisite for any Gulf security system, a unilateral approach would be unworkable. Instead, a Europe that is capable of backing up its ‘soft power’ with hard military power will have to be a future partner of US regional engagement. Its efforts to promote good governance and economic integration in the Middle East might become the cornerstone of a future security system.

This system will be constructed from three interlocking elements:

- **Balance of Power:** The military needs of Iraq, Iran, and the GCC need to be satisfied to such an extent that they are neither dissatisfied with the status quo nor are capable of outweighing a combination of the other Gulf states.

- **Reform:** Regional political, economic, social and defense structures need to be reformed even if it comes to short-term destabilizations. This transformation must aim for pluralism and the acceptance of dissent.

- **Multilateralism:** The US and the EU need to exert leadership in any multilateral approach to tackle Gulf security issues.

Throughout the process of conceptualizing a security system, the US needs to engage in dialogue with Iran, taking serious its security concerns, and designing a security system that is inclusive and not anti-Iranian.

| S. Lotfian 2002 | - More attention has to be paid to democratization of the regional states, an issue that has been neglected because the enlargement of the “political theatre” would have meant an increased unpredictability in the oil and arms market;  
- Not only elites' attitudes, but also the support of the public for their foreign policy posture, are important; state-society relation and the role of democratization for foreign policy has to be explored  
- National interests and the condition of the states must be taken into account  
- Promotion of democratic change  
- So far lack of weapon standardization and cost-saving joint purchase of weapons, as well as differences on the perceived external threat; this development has made important multilateral military cooperation unreachable by the GCC  
- Agreement on arms limitation, preventing of the placement of WMD and nuclear free zone  
- Confidence-building measures and exploration of common interests  