2009 TRANSATLANTIC ACADEMY REPORT ON immigration

NO SHORTCUTS: SELECTIVE MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION

Transatlantic Academy

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About the Transatlantic Academy

Founded by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Transatlantic Academy serves as a forum for a select group of scholars from both sides of the Atlantic and from different academic and policy disciplines to examine a single set of issues. Working together from a transatlantic and interdisciplinary perspective, Academy fellows use research, publications, and ideas to make policy-relevant contributions to policy debates facing the transatlantic community. In addition, the Academy has received early support from the Transatlantic Program of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany through funds of the European Recovery Program (ERP) of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. The Compagnia di San Paolo joined as a financial partner in May 2009.

NO SHORTCUTS:
SELECTIVE MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION

A REPORT TO THE TRANSATLANTIC ACADEMY
MAY 2009

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A NOTE FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

It is my pleasure to present the 2009 Report of the Transatlantic Academy Fellows *No Shortcuts: Selective Migration and Integration.* The Academy serves as a forum for a select group of scholars from both sides of the Atlantic, and from different academic and policy disciplines, to examine a single set of issues. Working together from a transatlantic and interdisciplinary perspective, Academy fellows use research, publications, and ideas to make policy-relevant contributions to policy debates facing the transatlantic community. The inaugural group of Academy fellows focused on immigration and integration. Their report is informed by their own academic research and by the short-term Bosch fellows, who were in residence at the Academy for one to two months and provided a practitioner's perspective.

Migration is one of the defining characteristics of the global era, which is characterized not only by a worldwide movement of goods and capital but also of people, ideas, and cultures. The competition for the best and the brightest is a key component in remaining competitive and innovative. However, it is not just ideas and skills that move, but real people who must adjust to new cultures and change both themselves and their host countries to which they have moved. Migration and immigration policy was selected as its opening theme of the Transatlantic Academy because of its importance to the societies of the transatlantic community. We also believe that both North Americans and Europeans can learn from each other in shaping their responses to this challenge.

The Academy acknowledges the support of its donors in making this study and the Academy possible. It was through their support that the fellows were able to spend ten months in Washington working in collaboration on this theme, including study trips to Arizona and Dublin, Ireland, and in shaping a number of workshops and discussions with academics, policy analysts, business people, journalists, and government officials both in North America and Europe.

Next year's fellows will study "Turkey and its Neighbors: Implications for the Transatlantic Relationship." Their research will examine the role of Turkey in the Black Sea and Middle East, and how that will influence Western policy in those regions. Fellows will also examine perceptions of this new role by key players in the region and in the transatlantic community.

Over the next year and beyond, we fully intend the Academy to be a vital center both in Washington and in Europe for serious discussion that will contribute to the transatlantic learning community.



Stephen Szabo
Executive Director
Transatlantic Academy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper examines the selective migration policies and assumptions about immigrant integration. Many arguments for selecting migrants on the basis of skills and education, particularly in Europe, have assumed that highly-skilled migrants can be easily integrated, whereas migrants with low skills need extensive public support and targeted integration policies. Does this assumption always hold true? Have countries with selective migration policies—for example, those that have long had point systems, such as Canada and Australia—avoided integration problems among the highly-skilled workers they have recruited? Are immigrants who enter under family reunification necessarily more difficult to integrate than those brought in through high-skill labor migration programs? We examine these questions by comparing immigration and integration policies and experiences of European and North American countries.

KEY FINDINGS:

- Attracting highly-qualified immigrants is not primarily a question of designing the right selection schemes.

- Point systems developed to screen and select the best immigrants, with the hope that they would integrate perfectly, have often been inefficient. Moreover, these point systems are less successful than market-based systems that rely on the actual needs of employers, irrespective of the level of qualifications.

- It is not so much the lower skilled that are drawn to extremist ideologies. Whereas the large majority of Muslim immigrants are well integrated and value democracy and tolerance, extremists recruit mostly from the rather educated people. Highly educated people can be drawn to extreme ideologies, be it nationalist, Islamist or—as in former times—totalitarian, while the lower skilled (and their descendents) can be more successful at mainstream political integration.

- Low-skilled migrants often use their social capital to engage the host society's political system in productive ways.

- Policymakers should consider focusing their efforts on integrating the pool of immigrants already in the country and avoid "brain waste."

- The collapse of the Western economic bubble will shrink the immigration bubble. These related booms are over. Consequently, not only the amount of migration but also the patterns of migration will change in the future.

- In the future, migration should not be conceived as a one-way street toward Europe and the United States but as a multiple and dynamic process in a world not only open to trade but also to the free movement of people looking for better chances in their life and offering countries of immigration competencies and energy that enrich them.

POLICY PROPOSALS FOR GOVERNMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY TO ACTIVELY OPEN UP POSSIBILITIES FOR INTEGRATING AND PARTICIPATION:

- Recognize diplomas from foreign countries and use the European Union as a model for coordination. EU regulations make educational qualifications in one country valid in all other countries and facilitate the circulation of highly-skilled migrants.

- Exploit diversity as a tool for competitiveness. Diverse populations can access diverse global markets. Diversity charters and tangible commitments from employers can encourage the spread of diversity in the workplace.

- More plaintiff-friendly legal remedies, like class-action lawsuits, should be introduced. These reforms would strengthen the ability of migrants to fight discrimination and would reduce the possibilities for discrimination.

- Governments should develop one-stop "integration offices," which address practical concerns like paying taxes, opening bank accounts, and finding employment, and keep their general integration measures such as language courses open for high-skilled migrants and/or create specific courses for them.

- Governments should work with many intermediary actors (e.g. professional organizations, voluntary organizations, community associations, local government) to promote activities that develop support networks and social capital for migrants.

INTRODUCTION

Since Chancellor Gerhard Schröder announced a German Green Card at the CEBIT in Hannover in 2000, to allow German firms to compete with the leading companies in California for IT specialists worldwide, a climate of competition for the best and the brightest migrants has developed in Europe and America. France's president, Nicolas Sarkozy, spoke of *immigration choisie,* and complained that America got the qualified migrants, Europe the unqualified. At the same time, he ordered plans for the expulsion of unwanted immigrants. In 2001, Germany's Independent Commission on Migration to Germany, led by Professor Rita Süssmuth, also acknowledged the international competition for the best talent. European activity, culminating in the "Blue Card" concept of the European Commission, even resulted in American concern that Europe might become more open than the United States, which therefore might lose its competitive edge. The wish to limit immigration to only well-qualified specialists, once criticized as a Japanese "anomaly" (Hollifield 1992, 15; Cornelius 1994, 383), had become mainstream. The competition for highly-skilled migrants carries with it the assumption that skilled immigrants are regarded as desirable and as unproblematic to integrate, whereas unskilled migrants are seen as problem groups that need state intervention. A broad international discussion on the design of the best selection systems has developed in traditional as well as new immigration countries.

In this paper, we discuss the problems of integration facing selected migrants in contrast to other migrants. We begin by looking into selective immigration policies, the concepts related to the new focus on elite migration, and the political discourse about it. Then we discuss transferability problems hindering professional migrants; analyze socioeconomic, political, and religious integration processes; and finally, we end with conclusions about policy options, with a particular focus on the problem of selectivity.

A new consensus about elite immigration has replaced older ideas. With few exceptions to the general rule, it is safe to say that European governments during the past four decades have had a rather ambivalent perspective on immigration, which has been considered a departure from the norm rather than an integral part of social dynamics. Despite having been a prominent fixture of European societies, immigration has sometimes been defined away as a "return" migration of diaspora members with privileged access to a country's nationality; a fleeting phenomenon (e.g., resulting from decolonization or refugee movements); or a temporary situation (a need for guest workers who return home at some point). In addition, immigration often has gone unnoticed because it concerned people who did not fall under the category of the "others" (e.g., EU nationals, Americans, Japanese). Insofar as any of these migrants became the subject of public concern, the issue often was framed around their "failure to integrate." In addition, political crises arose in a number of European states during the 1990s due to the arrival of hundreds of thousands people applying for political asylum; this happened first and foremost in Germany (there were 428,000 applications in 1992 alone).

The view that immigration is an anomaly has led many European governments to develop policies that aim to keep immigration under most guises to a minimum. Such restrictions are lifted only in instances in which international obligations such as the European Convention on Human Rights or the Geneva Refugee Convention would be violated (even though governments may interpret their obligations as minimally as possible) or the interests of the state (usually economic ones) dictate otherwise.

By the end of the new millennium, however, a gradual shift in the perception of migration could be observed. By and large, this new outlook has been

the outcome of demographic, economic, and—as a consequence—labor market developments in most European countries. These developments translate into an ongoing demand for people willing to perform menial work on the one hand, and on the other, a demand for specialists and skilled workers in general. As far as the first category of migrants is concerned, the stance has not fundamentally changed, and insofar as this leads to importing workers from third countries, there is still an assumption that it should be done in a very controlled manner aimed at the migrants' return to their home countries after a predetermined period of time. As for the second category of migrants, a much clearer shift in policy ambitions has become evident. After the German chancellor proclaimed that Germany should start a Green Card system (Kolb 2004), a public debate erupted about the need for a general overhaul of German refugee and immigration policies. This was a marked break with the past in a country whose leaders until then had always underlined that "Germany is not a country of immigration." Echoing debates on television and elsewhere in the media, a commentator in the leading weekly, *Die Zeit*, formulated this paradigmatic change as follows: "For the first time, the distinction was made between those migrants whom we need, and those who need us while escaping dictatorships, war, and poverty" (Klingst 2003, authors' translation).

Since then, this example has been followed by many, and a climate of competition for useful elite immigrants developed. This process is shown in detail in the next section. Following consultations after launching its green paper on an *EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration* in January 2005, the European Commission in its *Policy Plan for Legal Migration*, published by the end of that year, proposed to bundle all those member state initiatives into an EU-wide Green Card program (later renamed Blue Card), suggesting that coordinated actions in that domain would strengthen the competitive advantage of Europe over other potential destination countries or regions. And thus, Europe would be better able to achieve the ambition, as formulated in the 2000 Lisbon Agenda, of having turned the continent's economic systems into a unified knowledge-based economy by 2010.

Highly-skilled migrants are coveted and welcomed not only because they fit into economic growth agendas but also because their integration in the receiving societies is conceived to be unproblematic. Indeed, the debates about immigrant integration that have taken place over the past 30 years in many Western European countries that imported labor (often, initially as guest workers) are today seen as a great mistake, never to be repeated. It came about only when the structure of the labor markets changed, and immigrants suffered unemployment and were sometimes laid off before the indigenous workforce. Furthermore, this precarious situation often has persisted into the next generation. Children of former guest workers—although showing considerable emancipation compared to their parents—in many cases tend to lag behind in educational attainments and labor market participation relative to their native peers. These problems are exacerbated by a continuous immigration of family members, namely spouses whom the children and grandchildren of the initial guest workers marry and bring over from their family's country of origin. The fact that many of these first- and second-generation migrants are of Muslim background does not normally work in their favor when it comes to political questions regarding their integration.

Against this perspective, we should understand European countries' increased use of integration requirements and testing for those who seek to immigrate or become citizens. The new skills-based migration policies of some of these Western European countries try to avoid one major problem that had been identified in the socioeconomic integration of previous waves of immigrants: the lack of a substantial formal education. Thus, by selecting skilled migrants and requiring language skills and knowledge about the receiving society when migrants apply for permanent residence or naturalization, destination countries hope that those who make it through the selection will be more useful for the national labor markets and their social integration will be less problematic because they speak the language and favor a more modern lifestyle.

Despite the understanding that the United States, Canada, and Australia are "nations of immigrants," these countries also have a history of selectivity and exclusion. The U.S. 1924 Immigration Act restricted the number and origins of immigrants, with a bias for traditional source countries in northwestern Protestant Europe. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 opened immigration quotas worldwide, with disproportionately low quotas for large countries such as China and India. However, the immigration program with Mexico was discontinued, with the consequence that over the years a large informal immigration from Mexico to the United States built up. In addition, a confusing thicket of openings for special immigrant groups was constructed under the influence of ethnic groups, industries such as information technology and the health care sector, ideological and humanitarian organizations, family bonds of varying relevance, and a lottery that was intended to give everybody at least a theoretical chance. In that way, the United States also has a general nonimmigration policy with a variety of exceptions—even if these exceptions add up to a high level of immigration and are complemented by around 12 million informal immigrants, many of them with children who are U.S. citizens. These undocumented immigrants are largely seen as a problem group.

A closer look at all the new selective migration schemes actually shows many similarities with past guest worker programs. Once again, it is assumed that because the labor market integration of these (now highly skilled) migrants seems unproblematic, the overall integration of this group is not an issue. The objective of this study, therefore, is to review the existing selective migration schemes and discuss their effectiveness not only with regard to selecting the best and the brightest, but also with regard to the socieconomic and political integration of these skilled migrants.

Selectivity is not a new phenomenon in Europe or the United States. What is new is the economic focus on immigration, the perception of competition for the best immigrants, and the development of specific systems to optimize the selection. These issues are developed in the next section.

1. OVERVIEW OF SELECTED MIGRATION POLICIES

Selective labor migration policies are proliferating among migrant destination countries of the developed world. By now most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devleopment (OECD) member states have devised special visas and programs to actively recruit the migration of scientists, highly-skilled engineers, medical professionals, computer programmers, and information technology professionals from developing countries such as India and China (as well as from each other). Such migration policies may be explicit in the case of states that have adopted point systems to select permanent migrants, or they may be more implicit with the introduction of temporary high-skill migrant visas and/or the use of labor market criteria for certain skills in the determination of visa applications. This section reviews selective migration policies in Canada, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Ireland.

CANADA

Canada's selective migration policy goes back to immigration recruitment policies predating World War II. However, the explicit selective migration strategy based on a point system began in the 1960s and was implemented in 1967 with the creation of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, along with immigration regulations that set out a point system that sorts applicants according to age, education, language ability, and skills (Green and Green 1999; Triadafilopoulos 2008). Canada's 1976 Immigration Act established three categories of admission: family, humanitarian (refugees), and "independent" applicants selected by a point system. It required the government to plan immigration levels on an annual basis and made immigration and planning immigration a shared responsibility with the provinces—with a further special devolution of selecting economic immigrants to Quebec (O'Shea 2009). The act's new immigration regulations, which went into force in 1978, allocated a maximum number of 80 points in seven categories and added bonus points for those with job offers or occupations on a designated occupations list. Individuals who surpassed 50 points became eligible to gain permanent residency (see Table 1).

In the 1990s, Canadian immigration authorities developed what has come to be known as the "human capital model," with the objective of attracting "well-trained flexible individuals… who have experience in the labor-force." These individuals should be able to "adapt to rapidly changing labor market circumstances" (Hiebert 2006, cited in Hawthorne 2006). The point system was recalibrated in 1993 to give more points for education and greater weight to post-secondary education in the number of points given. Then in 1998, the government issued a white paper that explicitly called for a selection process that would emphasize "human capital" factors of education, language ability, and experience in any skilled occupation, and would eliminate assessments of labor market demand (O'Shea 2009). The "human capital model" was subsequently realized with the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that put in place the current point system (see Table 1). The current system allocates a maximum number of 100 points, with 67 points as the numerical threshold to gain permanent residency under the independent admissions category. The human capital factors of education and language comprise almost half (49) of the 100 possible points in the system, whereas work experience and a job offer account for less than a third.

In 1996, the Canadian government set a policy that came to be known as the "60/40 split," whereby immigration authorities set recruitment targets that would yield 60 percent of immigration through the economic stream and the remainder from family reunification and refugees (O'Shea 2009). Immigration authorities have largely met this target, as immigrants selected through the point system comprised roughly

Table 1: Canadian Point System		
	1978	2002 to Present
Factors	**Maximum Points**	
Age	10	10
Education	12	25
Language Ability	10	24
Occupational Demand	15	—
Specific Vocational Preparation	15	—
Experience	8	21
Personal Suitability	10	—
Adaptability[1]	—	10
Bonus Factors		
Arranged Employment/Designated Employment	10	—
Relative in Canada (depends on closeness of relation)	35 to 50	—
Total possible points (including bonus factors)	140	100
Pass Mark	50	67

1 Five points for having one or more relatives living in Canada.

Source: O'Shea 2009

between 55 percent and 60 percent of the 200,000 to 250,000 immigrants that arrived in Canada each year in the subsequent decade (CIC 2006).

Despite its success in attracting a relatively large proportion of highly-educated migrants, the Canadian government recently changed its immigration policies to move away from the "human capital model." Over the past few years, concerns have grown over pending applications to the skilled-worker migration program that grew to 500,000, representing a backlog awaiting decision for up to 68 months (O'Shea 2009). There has also been mounting evidence that highly-educated migrants have not been fully using their education and skills in the jobs that they have managed to get (see discussion below).

In 2007, the Canadian government responded by introducing the new Canadian Experience Class, which gives priority to applications for those who have been working in Canada on temporary visas for at least two years as well as for foreign students who have completed their degrees in Canada. These priority visas would be processed within 12 months, and each visa granted would make one less available to the existing backlog of applicants who had achieved the point system numerical threshold of 67 without Canadian work experience or Canadian university education. Hence, the proportion of temporary highly-skilled workers admitted has increased dramatically, making Canada's migrant flow more closely resemble that of the United States, where highly-skilled migrants enter on temporary visas and then adjust their status to permanent residence. In February 2008, the government introduced legislation as part of the budget that restricted processing of new applications to those who had at least one year of experience in "occupations in demand" as identified in a list of 38 occupations, had a job offer, or were already working or studying in Canada. It is estimated that only 20 percent of the applications received since the cutoff date of February 27, 2008, meet this criterion and the remaining 80 percent of applications will be returned (O'Shea 2008). With the introduction of this requirement, the Canadian point system may still appear to be skewed toward human capital factors, but in practice, it follows systems using occupational skills lists.

UNITED STATES

The U.S. government has not pursued an explicit selective migration strategy based on a point system, but certain provisions of U.S. immigration law have long encouraged both permanent and temporary high-skilled migration. However, immigration is dependent on a job offer for the potential migrant by an employer, who by virtue of that offer in effect selects individual migrants within the broad policy guidelines and criteria established by the U.S. government to encourage immigration of the highly skilled. The Immigration Act of 1990 nearly tripled permanent resident permits ("green cards") for immigrants who are sponsored by employers up to an annual limit of 140,000. The 1990 act also replaced the existing H-1 visa program, which enabled migrants of "distinguished merit or ability" to fill temporary jobs as long as they established intent to return home, with a new H-1B visa (capped at 65,000) that enabled employers to offer permanent jobs to migrants in "specialty occupations" on a three-year, one-time renewable visa after which migrants could adjust their status to permanent resident. By opening permanent jobs to temporary visa holders, the program gave much more flexibility to employers to hire migrants for any job that might come open in the future. High-tech professionals and engineers acquired an increasing share of employer-sponsored green cards and H-1B visas as the 1990s tech boom took off.

During the mid 1990s, U.S. policymakers considered explicit selective migration strategies advocated by academics (Borjas 1990), policy think tanks (Papademetriou and Yale-Loehr 1996), and the nonpartisan U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (USCIR 1995, xix–xxi). As Congress considered this explicit selective migration strategy in 1996, legislative provisions for altering legal immigration policy were split off from those directed at illegal migration and only the latter were enacted into law.

Subsequent legislation enacted in 1998 and 2000 expanded the H-1B program, increasing the quota of visas from 65,000 to 115,000 in 1999 and then to 195,000 in 2001; however, the legislation then expired after three years, returning the quota to 65,000 in 2004. In 2005, Congress created an "advanced degrees exemption" that allocates 20,000 additional H-1B visas for applicants with advanced degrees from U.S. universities. The number of H-1B visa holders increased from 240,947 in 1998 to 431,853 in 2006 (DHS 2006, Table 26). In the first five business days of April 2008, employers filed some 163,000 applications for the 65,000 H-1B visas to be issued for the 2009 fiscal year. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services then randomly selected applications for processing to meet the quota. The economic crisis has clearly dampened demand for highly-skilled workers, as only 45,000 applications for the 65,000 H-1B visas available for the 2010 fiscal year had been received as of April 27, 2009.

The H-1B program has increased the share of highly-skilled workers not only within temporary migration flows but also, as H-1B visa holders have adjusted to permanent resident status, permanent immigration flows. Many of those leaving their H-1B status within the total six-year term did not necessarily leave the United States—rather, between 20 percent and 50 percent of H-1B visa holders adjusted their status to permanent resident alien (received a "green card") every year of the 1990s (Lowell 2000). The net effect is that there has been a flow of highly-skilled migrants who essentially immigrate to the United States first on a temporary visa and then, after three or six years, get a green card.

Given that then Senator Barack Obama supported the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (U.S. Senate 2007) and the Democratic Party platform has called for passage of comprehensive immigration reform in the first year of the Obama administration, an attempt to resurrect some version of the proposal by the new administration and Congress is likely. The bill had many provisions to increase skilled migration but died in the Senate on June 28, 2007. Had this legislation been enacted into law, it would have: authorized more temporary high-skilled migration under the H-1B visa; exempted from the annual H-1B visa cap those who have earned a master's or higher

degree from an accredited U.S. university; made it easier for more foreign graduate students studying in the United States and other temporary migrants with advanced degrees to adjust their status to permanent resident alien; increased the number of employment-based permanent immigrant visas ("green cards") to 450,000; and, perhaps most significantly, introduced a point system for selecting more permanent immigrants on the basis of education and skills. Interestingly, the confidential March 28, 2007, White House PowerPoint presentation to key Congressional leaders that introduced the point system provision into the reform package specifically referenced the Canadian and Australian immigration systems as models (White House 2007). With the collapse of the U.S. real estate market, the financial market crisis, and the severe economic recession, the politics of comprehensive immigration reform become daunting. Nevertheless, the Obama administration announced that it would endeavor to enact comprehensive immigration reform within its first year, and the Senate began hearings at the end of April 2009.

GERMANY

In August 2000, the German government introduced the Green Card program for foreign information technology workers in which up to 20,000 three- to five-year work permits would be issued. The government argued that the program was necessary in order to keep pace with the American IT industry, and it explicitly targeted Indian programmers. The results of the German Green Card program were decidedly mixed. The wave of IT workers that many German policymakers had anticipated did not materialize. The Indian computer programmers who should have been attracted by the program primarily opted to go to the United States instead (the H-1B cap had just been lifted at the time), where they had greater options for adjusting to permanent residency status and opening their own businesses (Werner 2001, 323).

In July 2001, the German government announced plans to introduce legislation that would expand the numbers of temporary worker and trainee positions as well as introduce a Canadian-style point system for allowing foreigners to become permanent residents. The initiative was postponed after the September 11 attacks on the United States, but the Schröder government introduced immigration legislation that passed in the lower house of the German Parliament in December 2001 and then, in February 2002, passed by a controversial razor-thin margin in the upper house. The vote triggered a successful constitutional challenge by the opposition, which postponed immigration reforms.

Finally, in 2004, the German Parliament enacted Germany's first Immigration Act, which permits permanent residence to immigrants at the outset of arriving in Germany but only for "highly qualified persons" and their family members. A ban on employer recruitment of "unqualified persons and persons with low qualifications" remains, but the act establishes an exemption on the recruitment of qualified persons "when there is a public interest in an individual taking up employment" (German Interior Ministry 2004). The act now allows foreign students to remain in Germany after completing their studies for up to one year in order to find employment. In 2006, Germany attracted 53,600 international students. This number was slightly less than that of the previous year but substantially higher compared to the year 2000, when only 45,700 students arrived (OECD 2008, 245). As of November 2007, their employment is furthermore exempt from labor market testing, provided their job is in line with their education (OECD 2008: 244). Finally, the act provides permanent residence permits for the "self-employed" if they invest at least one million euros and generate at least ten new jobs in Germany. Although an explicit selective migration policy was abandoned when the point-system proposal did not survive in the final legislation, the above-mentioned provisions constitute Germany's implicit selective migration policy.

UNITED KINGDOM

Soon after Germany initiated its Green Card program, the United Kingdom's then Immigration Minister Barbara Roche, made a speech in which she argued, "We are in competition for the brightest and best talents—the entrepreneurs, the scientists, the high

Table 2: U.K. Point System	
Factor	**Maximum Points**
Age	20
Education	50
Language	High threshold of English required of all
Previous earnings at recent employment	45
Total possible points	115
Pass Mark	75

Source: http://www.ukvisas.gov.uk/en/howtoapply/infs/inf21pbsgeneralmigrant#14537581

technology specialists who make the global economy tick. In order to seize the opportunities of the knowledge economy, and to play a constructive part in shaping these huge changes, we need to explore carefully their implications for immigration policy" (Home Office 2000). In October 2001, the British government announced plans for a Highly Skilled Migrant Programme, which was designed to attract "highly mobile people with special talents that are required in a modern economy" (MN 2002) with one-year permits that can be renewed indefinitely. The program was established in January 2002 and implemented a selection process based on a point system with criteria such as age and years of education.

In March 2006, the U.K. Home Office outlined a point system for permanent immigration of highly-skilled migrants who apply as individuals or skilled workers with a job offer from employers (Home Office 2006). Launched in February 2008, the point system (see Table 2) "combines more than 80 pre-existing work and study routes into the United Kingdom into five tiers; points are awarded on workers' skills to reflect aptitude, experience, age and also the demand for those skills any given sector" (Home Office 2008). Like Canada, the United Kingdom places a high value on human capital attributes such as education and age, which represent more than half of the total maximum of 115 points. Additional points are given for previous earnings at a recent employment (up to 45 points for earning the equivalent of £45,000) rather than specific skills. Those who meet a threshold of 75 points are eligible for a visa to work and live in the United Kingdom.[2]

FRANCE

On July 16, 1998,[3] the French Minister of Labor Martine Aubry allowed French businesses to recruit foreign IT workers to help combat the millennium bug. By the beginning of 2004, 6,374 systems engineers had acquired a permanent residence permit. In the meantime, a circular of January 15, 2002 signed by the two socialist ministers of Interior and Social Affairs (Daniel Vaillant and Elizabeth Guigou) opened the labor market to all foreign graduate students with an exception for students of developed countries citizenships, who had to prove that their job was part of a co-development project. On January 12, 2004, the instruction on foreign IT workers was repealed by Francois Fillon, the new labor minister.[4] The number of work permits fell from 8,811 in 2001, to 7,462 in 2002, to 6,500 in 2003.[5]

Inspired by U.S. and Canadian policies, the French government also unveiled legislation in 2006 that would facilitate the migration of the highly skilled while making immigration more difficult for the

2 Guidance–Points Based System Tier 1, General Migrant (INF 21), accessed May 19, 2009. http://www.ukvisas.gov.uk/en/howtoapply/infs/inf21pbsgeneralmigrant #14537581

3 Circular DPM/DM 2-3, No. 98-429, July 16, 1998, relating to the recruitment of foreign IT workers.

4 Circular DPM/DMI 2, No. 2004-12, January 13, 2004.

5 Patrick Weil, "Immigration: A flexible Framework for a Plural Europe," in Anthony Giddens, Patrick Diamond, and Roger Liddle, *Global Europe, Social Europe*. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, p. 229–243.

unskilled. Nicolas Sarkozy, then France's interior minister and now president, argued that "neither France nor her European partners can be satisfied with a situation in which huge numbers of the developing countires' elite go to the United States and Canada, whilst the European continent receives underskilled immigrants."[6] We no longer want immigration that is inflicted [on us]," he said. "We want selected immigration. The system of integration the French way no longer works."[7] The new law establishes a three-year "skills and talents" residence permit aimed at attracting scientists, IT experts, and artists who, as Sarkozy put it, could "contribute to the economic dynamism of our country."[8]

The Immigration and Integration Act of July 24, 2006, created three new types of three-year residence permits: for highly-skilled workers, for those who are sponsored by French employers, and for seasonal workers. Foreign students who graduate with a French master's degree will have up to six months after graduation in order to find a job, after which they will be given a work permit. Judging from the annual inflows, France is increasingly attractive to international students. In 2000, their number stood at 36,100; six years later, it was 47,300 (OECD 2008, 243).

The law furthermore states that work permits for migrants seeking employment in a number of occupations are no longer conditional on a labor market test. Presently (as of the end of 2008), this pertains to 30 occupations listed on France's Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Mutually-Supportive Development website. Most of the occupations listed are of a very specific nature; others seem to require high levels of IT knowledge.[9]

IRELAND

Ireland was a country of net emigration until 1996, but its booming economy has drawn home Irish citizens from abroad as well as non-Irish immigrants to feed Ireland's hunger for more workers. Beginning in the early 1990s, Irish employers hired immigrants though a work permit scheme. Work permits are valid for an initial period of two years; can be renewed for a further three years; and after five years, can be renewed indefinitely. Permits are available only to migrants with skills listed on an occupational list, and employers must advertise the position through Ireland's National Training and Employment Authority and in local newspapers.

Demand continued to grow, and in March 2000 an interdepartmental policy-planning group estimated that over the next seven years Ireland would receive 200,000 immigrants (including returning Irish citizens). Not surprisingly, Ireland was then among the very few countries (together with Sweden and the United Kingdom) to unconditionally open up their labor market for migrants from the ten countries joining the European Union in May 2004. Ireland's National Training and Employment Authority actively recruited in Central and East European countries by sending staff to universities armed with promotional DVDs. The government expected to be able to fulfill a large part of its labor market demands through this liberal approach and considered immigration from countries outside the European Economic Area acceptable only if these newcomers brought skills not sufficiently present within the common EU labor market (Murray 2005).

From the mid 1990s onward, immigration had brought considerable amounts of skills to Ireland. Overall, immigrants were at least twice as likely to hold a third-level degree as native Irish. If migrants originated in another EU country (prior to the 2004 extension), their skill levels were higher still (Barrett 2005, Table 9). However, the opening up of the Irish labor market to the new member states did not lead to higher levels of skills; in actual fact, migrants arriving from Central Europe constitute the only category with skill levels below those of the Irish natives (Barrett et al. 2008, 9).

6 M. Nicolas Sarkozy, "Ministre d'Etat, Minister of the Interior and Town and Country Planning," *Le Figaro*. Retrieved on May 18, 2009 at: www.ambafrance-uk.org

7 Interview with Nicolas Sarkozy, *Journal du dimanche*, February 5, 2006. English version published as "Sarkozy unveils new laws to expel foreign workers," *Telegraph,* February 7, 2006. Retrieved on May 18, 2009 at: www.telegraph.co.uk

8 D. Straus, "Immigration. Le plan Sarkozy pour choisir les immigrés," LCI/ TF1, February 5, 2006. Retrieved on May 18, 2009 at: http://tf1.lci.fr/infos/france/0,,3282619,00-plan-sarkozy-pour-choisir-immigres-.html

9 For a full list see http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/article.php?id_article=407. Accessed April 30, 2009.

In January 2007, the Irish government launched a new Green Card Scheme offering two-year temporary work visas for highly-skilled workers from non-European Economic Area countries. Work permits are available for those in a wide range of desired occupations such as information technology, engineering, and health care, with annual salaries of €60,000 and above. A narrower list of occupations has a lower €30,000 salary threshold. There is no labor market test for the positions and no need for employers to advertise in newspapers. Green Card holders will be eligible for permanent or long-term residence and may bring dependents immediately (Martin 2007).

In April 2007, the Irish government introduced a Third Level Graduate Scheme aimed at retaining university graduates from third countries. They are allowed to look for employment for up to six months upon graduation. They then either apply for a work permit or a Green Card (OECD 2008, 250). Meanwhile, the economic crisis that started in 2008 has hit the Irish economy particularly hard. Construction (accounting for 14 percent of the Irish GDP in 2008) has come to a halt, this year unemployment is expected to reach 10 percent, and net-migration has turned negative (MN 2009). Even though this does not necessarily have an equally devastating impact on the need for on highly-skilled workers, the Ireland Business and Economic Council reports little or no current enthusiasm among its members for the Green Card Scheme.[10]

Most OECD member states have adopted selective migration policies, but they vary in their approaches. Some, like Canada and the United Kingdom, have opted for explicit policies based on point systems that select permanent immigrants, while others, such as the United States, Germany, and Ireland have opted for demand-driven approaches that offer more temporary work visas. Although Canada's point system has shaped immigration flows so that a majority of permanent immigrants enter on the basis of skills determined by point systems, the share of those who gained entry into the United States based on skills becomes comparable when one adds temporary visas. In 2004, employment-based permanent resident "green cards" were given to 72,550 immigrants and 82,780 dependents (DHS 2005a). In addition, there were 386,821 H-1B visa holders and 314,484 intracompany transferees entering on L-1 visas[11] (a category that firms often use to bring in high-tech workers, especially in years when the H-1B visa cap has been reached). In the end, the implicit selective migration strategy of the United States yields more highly-skilled workers than do all of the point-system programs of other countries combined.

If successful recruitment of the highly skilled over time is measured in terms of a more highly educated foreign-born population (noncitizen immigrants and immigrants who have naturalized), the picture is somewhat different. A greater percentage of the foreign-born population of Canada has tertiary education than that of the United States (see Table 3).

Despite destination states' best efforts, skilled migrants may not necessarily respond to receiving-state selective migration strategies. The lopsided flows of highly-skilled migrants to the United States, in comparison to flows to EU member states and even Canada, demonstrate that explicit selective migration policies of states with highly-regulated labor markets might not be as effective in generating the expected flows of the highly skilled as less-explicit selective migration strategies embodied in piecemeal temporary visa programs within countries that have more liberal labor markets and liberal immigration policies in general.

10 Interview with director of policy at the Ireland Business and Economic Council on March 24, 2009.

11 DHS 2005, Table 26.

Table 3: Number of foreign-born persons with tertiary education and percentage of educated among foreign-born					
		Tertiary Education		Ph.D.	
	Foreign-born	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Canada	5,717,015	2,033,490	35.6%	69,300	1.2%
U.S.	34,634,791	8,204,473	23.7%	443,152	1.3%
Germany	8,855,622	1,372,254	15.5%	n/a	n/a
U.K.	3,944,654	1,374,370	34.8%	n/a	n/a
France	5,600,198	1,011,424	18.1%	n/a	n/a
Ireland	313,712	128,762	41.0%	3,655	1.2%

Source: OECD 2004, foreign-born statistics from 2001

2. POLITICAL RATIONALE FOR SELECTED IMMIGRATION

As the overview of the selective migration schemes in the previous section has shown, northwestern EU member states have, unlike Canada and the United States, only recently started to introduce immigration policies that favor the selection of highly-skilled immigrants. Instead, the immigration to northwestern EU member states has largely been a phenomenon of low-skilled guest workers and their family members who came to Western Europe to work in labor-intensive industries that later on massively reduced their demand in the workforce. With the simultaneous emergence of an economy increasingly in demand of skills and knowledge, and an integration policy largely incapable of ensuring that the children of the former guest workers would acquire such skills and knowledge, the unemployment rate among immigrants and their children has strongly risen. Statistics from the past 20 years, show that immigrants from third countries settled in northwestern European member states are two to four times more likely to be unemployed than the nonimmigrant population or immigrants from other EU member states.

This situation has raised concern among policymakers and finally led to increased activism among Western European governments that, since the end of the 1990s, have issued a series of state-run integration measures aimed at improving the language skills of newly arrived and unemployed immigrants. Interestingly, in most countries these integration programs explicitly exclude immigrants arriving through the selective migration schemes from their target group, thereby arguing that highly-skilled migrants are not in need of state integration support. Apparently, this presumed smoothness and independence from state support is what policymakers expect to be the difference between the integration process of previous guest workers and their families and that of the coveted skilled migrants. As the following section will demonstrate, an analysis of the challenges faced by social integration policies aiming to improve the human capital of immigrants not selected by skills helps to clarify why selective migration schemes possess attractiveness beyond mere labor market considerations.

IMPLEMENTING AND EVALUATING SOCIAL POLICIES

Developed since the end of the 1990s and aimed at improving migrants' human capital, integration programs have been set up in the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Belgium (Flanders), France, and other EU member states. The objective of these programs is to prevent the costs of nonintegration (Loeffelholz and Thränhardt 1996) that arise in comprehensive welfare states as the result of unemployment. By offering language and civic education classes, these programs try to improve the human capital of newly arrived as well as settled migrants, and thereby to increase their attractiveness on the labor market.

The Netherlands was the first EU member state to begin setting up an obligatory qualification program for immigrants at the end of the 1990s. Up to 600 hours of language courses and approximately 30 hours of civic education courses about Dutch society and life in the Netherlands were supposed to help immigrants get around in daily and professional life. In 1996, this program was first organized under the general social legislation, obliging immigrants who received welfare to participate in the program, which was supposed to increase their chances of being

integrated into the labor market. Later on, in 1998, a special law on the integration of immigrants entered into force in the Netherlands that also obliged immigrants not receiving welfare (usually because they were sponsored by their spouse) to participate in the program. In Germany, a similar training program for migrants was introduced in 2005[12] along with a general labor market reform that obliged unemployed welfare beneficiaries to also accept unattractive jobs if those were the only ones available, and to participate in training measures to improve their attractiveness on the labor market. The slogan coined to describe this labor market reform—*Fordern und Fördern*—also applies to the reform in German integration policy, meaning that the state provides support but also demands efforts. From this perspective, the recent changes in integration policy that have been introduced in several EU member states (and especially in those member states with a strong welfare system), which usually make language learning and civic education mandatory, can be seen as being part of a general reform of the welfare system (Bommes 2006; Mohr 2005).

However, the countries that set up such programs for immigrant integration soon realized that their expectations of these programs were too high. Many low-skilled participants needed far more course hours to reach a certain level of language skills than were actually provided for by the program or, because of a general lack of education, they made no measurable progress at all. The evaluations of the Dutch and German integration programs (Regioplan 2002; Rambøll Management 2006) showed that the participants who managed to achieve the language skills hoped for were those who had a better initial level of education and qualification, whereas the real target group, i.e., the less-qualified immigrants, showed only very little or moderate progress.

As a reaction to the discovery that qualifying low-skilled immigrants who are already in the country is a long, time-consuming, and expensive process, several governments—among them the Dutch, German, and French governments—turned toward an alternative strategy, which was the introduction of selective migration schemes (Michalowski 2007).

TURNING TOWARD SELECTIVE POLICIES

The degree to which current European enthusiasm for skilled migrants is related to the difficult experiences of previous integration and training measures for low-skilled immigrants can be judged by the fact that EU member states decided to not only introduce selective migration schemes for labor migrants, but also develop ways to attract and keep foreign students in the country. European member states—and this holds especially true for Germany, France, and the Netherlands—have also introduced policies that select family migrants who are better skilled as well as more willing and able to learn the host country's language.[13] This means that prospective family migrants while still in their country of origin have to prove their language skills as well as, in some cases, their knowledge of the prospective host society. The selection operated through these integration requirements is twofold in the sense that 1) only migrants who have received basic school education and are able to read and write have a reasonable chance to pass the test, and 2) only candidates who are motivated enough to acquire some basic language skills before even moving to the country[14] are likely to pass the test.

The underlying logic of this approach is very clear and has even been made explicit by politicians such as Sarkozy, who openly declared that his objective was to reduce significantly the immigration of (low-skilled) family migrants while increasing the number of skilled labor migrants. Slogans such as "selected migration, successful integration" (*immigration choisie, intégration réussie*) and distinctions between "chosen" and "endured" immigration clearly point to the idea that

12 Long political debates that started with a first proposal of a new law on immigration, integration, and asylum in 2001 retarded the implementation of the program.

13 Sometimes these policies are justified by referring to schemes of selective migration control that are operated in countries such as Canada or Australia. However, this is not a valid comparison, since in these countries, policies that screen for skills apply, not to family migrants but to prospective labor migrants.

14 In addition, at least in the Dutch case, these language skills may have to be acquired through self-study, since the Dutch government does not have a Dutch culture and language institute abroad comparable to the German Goethe Institute or the French Alliance Française.

current problems of immigrant integration in France are due to the past and present immigration of unskilled laborers and their families.

Thus, unskilled migrants have been blamed for unsuccessful labor market integration as well as for high consumption of state transfers. This is why, even though there are large disparities in the outcomes, studies on the costs and benefits of immigration in northwestern European countries all seem to agree in saying that skilled migrants represent a positive balance for the system (Sachverständigenrat 2004; Roodenburg et al. 2003; Loeffelholz/Bauer/Haisken-DeNew 2004; Sinn, 2001; Lange et al. 2003).

The result is that European governments compete for skilled migrants because they are expected to represent a positive fiscal balance and not need much state support for their integration process. In fact, some state-run integration programs for newcomers are significantly reduced in size when addressing highly-skilled migrants. Belgium's program provides 240 hours of language instruction for low-skilled migrants and 120 hours for highly-skilled migrants. In addition, it explicitly states that highly-skilled workers who do not work in Belgium for more than four years (a period that can be extended once) do not belong to the target group if they dispose of a certain yearly income. A similar regulation is in place in Germany, where the executive order for the German Immigration Act, in effect as of 2005, actually stipulates that highly-skilled migrants who have no obvious need for integration (*erkennbar geringen Integrationsbedarf*)—a group that is defined as being in possession of a university degree or working in a profession that usually requires a university degree, and not needing help from the state to integrate—are not even entitled to participate in the state-organized integration course for newly arrived immigrants.

In addition, several European member states do not oblige immigrants from certain countries of origin such as Japan or the United States to participate in these integration programs because these countries profit from visa-waiver programs and are generally deemed to provide unproblematic skilled migrants. However, as the following section will show, the selection of highly-skilled migrants[15] alone does not guarantee a smooth integration process.

15 The media publicized an event where a member of senior management of a Japanese auto firm in Germany had been inadvertently asked to present himself at the aliens'office for an evaluation of his language skills to determine whether or not he had to follow the obligatory integration program. The event was criticized as an example of the absurdity of obliging foreign CEOs to participate in integration programs.

3. SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF ELITE MIGRANTS

SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION

As previously mentioned, one of the objectives of this paper is to challenge the assumption that the integration of migrants selected for skills can be taken for granted. Indeed, even the labor market integration of migrants selected for skills is not per se guaranteed, as can be seen in discussions about the so-called "brain waste" in classical immigration countries, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia that use selective migration schemes.

Skilled immigrants do not necessarily occupy a position in their destination country that suits their level of schooling. In addition, the years of schooling they followed in their country of origin do not pay off as well as years of schooling in the destination country do; and, in general, skilled migrants tend to earn less than nonimmigrant skilled persons. However, the main focus of this short overview is not so much the precise labor market achievements of skilled immigrants in different destination countries, but rather, the reasons for those achievements given in the existing literature. These arguments can be grouped around three large issues: 1) the transferability of skills; 2) the social capital of immigrants such as language skills, knowledge of the destination country's institutions, and social networks; and 3) discrimination.

TRANSFERABILITY OF SKILLS

In the existing literature, much of the debate concerns the question of how well skills can be transferred from the migrant's country of origin to the receiving country. A common phenomenon is that a year of schooling undergone in the immigrant's country of origin does not pay off as much as a year of schooling received in the country of destination. For example, in a survey based on the 2000 U.S. Census, Chiswick and Miller (2005) have shown that, contrary to native-born workers, who have a payoff to schooling of 10.6 percent, the payoff to schooling for the foreign-born is only 5.3 percent. In addition, the authors found substantial variation according to the birthplace group, ranging from a particularly low return (2 percent) on years of education for migrants who received their education in Mexico to an 11 percent return for migrants from the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. In earlier research, Chiswick (1978) had explained similar results in reference to foreign-borns' social capital (being raised in a home less familiar with the language and institutions of the United States), with labor market discrimination against immigrants that increases with the level of schooling, and with what he called the "self-selection of immigrants," meaning that immigrants accept jobs with lower pay.[16]

Trying to push these explanations a bit further, Chiswick and Miller (2005) argue that the transferability of human capital skills might be another reason why schooling in countries of origin pays off less than schooling received in the receiving country. The authors find that migrants can transfer their schooling received abroad without losses in pay only if their skills match exactly the requirements of the job occupied. Mismatches in skills and requirements, on the contrary, are costly—at least for migrants who do not come from an English-speaking developed

16 See Renee Reichl Luthra's study on H-1Bs in the American labor market. In addition to the wage-related argument, which, according to Luthra, is not always applicable in the U.S. case, H-1Bs are attractive for employers because—besides having flexibility and the most up-to-date skills—these skilled migrants in the United States have lower expectations with regard to working conditions and benefits.

country. These findings, which have been confirmed by Alan Barrett, Séamus McGuiness, and Martin O'Brien (2008) in their study of the situation of migrants from new European member states in Ireland, suggest that selective migration schemes would work better if they were demand-driven rather than based on human capital. In fact, the findings by Barrett et al. (2008) suggest that the differences in earnings between immigrants from new member states and other migrants ranging from 10 percent to 18 percent (depending on the controls used) are almost nonexistent for migrants who are low-skilled and/or have a low income, but are more pronounced for foreign-born workers with high skills and/or higher incomes. This seems a logical consequence of the fact that high skills are the result of a process of specialization that increases the risk of a mismatch between skills and professional requirements. Again, the authors conclude that the transferability of human capital is particularly difficult for highly-skilled migrants in Ireland and one of the major reasons for the immigrant–native earnings gap.

Through a qualitative study based on interviews with 19 highly-skilled immigrants from Eastern Europe in Denmark, Anika Liversage (2009) contributes to this discussion about the transferability of skills by pointing out that there are five different paths of labor market integration: re-entry (entering one's former profession), ascent (entering lower-level work and moving from there to higher-level occupations over time), re-education (entering higher-level work based on getting a new education), remigration (migrating back to the country of origin or to another immigrant destination), and marginalization (remaining in unemployment or in low-level positions).

Liversage found that the path of re-entry is primarily tied to specific professions and thus embedded in the "historical time of specific labor market needs," which means that a re-entry into the former profession is more likely for migrants with skills from "hard" sciences such as engineering and medicine, while the social sciences and the humanities make re-entry more difficult. If a person is unable to enter his or her former profession, another path is to enter unskilled or semi-skilled work and ascend from there into better labor market positions. In this path, existing skills are used in a flexible way to work one's way up in the labor market. Other skilled migrants whose qualifications are not easily transferable actually consider the option of re-education. According to the author, this is a particularly attractive choice for migrants with skills in the humanities and the social sciences. Finally, unemployment and remigration seem to occur when unemployment rates are high, the migrant's skills do not match the needs of the labor market, and when the migrant feels too old for re-education or is not flexible enough for the path of ascent. Again, this study underlines that the transferability of skills is problematic, in particular for migrants who have not been trained in skills that directly match the needs of the labor market.

SOCIAL CAPITAL OF IMMIGRANTS

Not many studies focus explicitly on the social capital of immigrants, although it is sometimes mentioned that immigrants may not have a good knowledge of how the labor market works in the receiving society. Still, one very interesting study by Guillermina Jasso and Mark Rosenzweig (1995) points exactly to the relevance of social networks for labor market integration. In a comparison of the economic integration of migrants screened for skills versus that of family migrants—both groups having arrived in the United States in 1977 and applied for naturalization 13 years later—Jasso and Rosenzweig came to the surprising result that in the long run family migrants are more successful than migrants screened for skills. The authors attribute this result to the efficiency of the "screening process" that takes place within families when they decide to bring over a new family member,[17] as well as to the strength of family networks in the destination country, support that is not available to migrants screened for skills unless, as it is the case in Canada, the existence of family ties in the country of destination is integrated into the selective migration scheme.

17 It should be kept in mind that the absence of a comprehensive welfare system in the United States increases the necessity for families to screen new family members for their capacity to contribute to their household income.

DISCRIMINATION

Finally, several studies focus on de facto discrimination that might occur in the job market when employers are not willing to take the risk of employing a person with a foreign diploma (or—a factor that is not mentioned by these studies—a person with an accent).

In research on the recognition of immigrant qualifications in Australia and its relationship to relative wage outcomes, Chapman and Iredale (1993) try to explain why the transfer of skills acquired abroad is difficult. Based on a 1988 data set from the Australian government, Chapman and Iredale found that only around 39 percent of skilled immigrants chose to subject their overseas qualifications to Australian assessment and that of these; only 42 percent were recognized as being equivalent to their Australian counterpart. Immigrants from non-English-speaking countries were more likely to ask for diploma assessment and also more likely to see their request refused. Chapman and Iredale also confirmed Chiswick and Miller's finding from the United States that schooling abroad pays off less than schooling in the country of destination, especially if the country of origin is non-English-speaking.

Another interesting finding of Chapman and Iredale's study was that immigrants receive much larger wage returns from Australian qualifications than from qualifications earned overseas, which suggests that, at least in the Australian context, it might be a better strategy to keep students qualified in Australia in the country than to bring in skilled migrants trained abroad. In fact, even though the authors conclude that systematic discrimination of foreign highly-skilled workers is not a satisfying explanation—since foreign highly-skilled workers who acquire additional Australian credentials see their wage level increase—there seems to be a rejection of qualifications acquired abroad. Chapman and Iredale point to four mutually exclusive explanations: 1) Australian employers ignore the value of a foreign diploma to a point that "it does not seem to matter if an immigrant from a non-English-speaking country has a Ph.D. or has dropped out of high school. The wage outcomes are close to identical" (Chapman and Iredale 1993, 379); 2) the greater the skill acquired, the less transferable it is internationally; 3) the quality of domestic training actually is higher than that of the training abroad; or 4) domestic Australian groups may be operating to protect themselves from labor supply competition. While explanations two and three suggest that training and retaining foreign students is a more promising strategy than attracting highly-skilled migrants from abroad, explanations one and four underline that the success of selective migration schemes depends not only on the qualifications of the migrants, but also on the openness of the receiving labor market.

This latter conclusion about the openness of the receiving labor market is also supported by Eden Nicole Thompson (2000) in her research (based on Canadian census data from 1991 and 1996) on the occupational skill distributions among immigrants from different regions of origin compared with native-born residents. Her paper found that the level of education, the major field of study, and the knowledge of Canada's official languages were key determinants in finding high-skilled employment. In addition, the region of origin and the education acquired in a certain region of origin are found to have a strong influence on the likelihood of being employed in high-skilled work. As was the case for Australia (Chapman and Iredale 1993), Thompson found that skills acquired abroad pay off less than skills acquired in Canada even though, contrary to the Australian case, foreign diplomas do increase the likelihood of finding skilled employment. When looking for an explanation for the phenomenon that foreign diplomas pay off less, she suggested that Canadian employers may be poorly informed about foreign certificates, and may adopt a risk-averse attitude by preferentially hiring domestically educated workers.[18]

Regarding the occupational skill level of immigrants and native-born residents, Thompson found that immigrants from traditional source regions such as North America and Northern Europe are consistently represented

18 Thompson (2000) also mentioned the possibility that the productivity of migrants trained abroad might actually be lower than that of persons trained in Canada.

in skilled occupations to a greater extent than are native-born residents, whereas immigrant groups from Southern Europe, South Asia, East and Southeast Asia, and Central America, South America, the Caribbean, and Bermuda are consistently employed in skilled work to a lesser extent than are native-born residents. Thus, Thompson concluded that qualifications tend to be systematically undervalued if acquired in these latter places compared to North America and Northern Europe. This, as well as the finding that being a member of a visible minority results in a significantly lower likelihood of being employed in skilled occupations, underlines once more that selecting the best and the brightest alone is not a winning strategy if resistances and discriminatory practices in the national labor market are not countered.

POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Here we broaden our analysis to consider the complex issue of migrant integration into the host society's political system. In doing so, we add further evidence that the integration of highly-skilled migrants is not always smooth. Moreover, our research suggests that in some circumstances low-skilled migrants sometimes may be more successful than high-skilled migrants at engaging mainstream host-society politics.

We begin by examining political participation and presenting evidence that socioeconomic resources do not always lead to high participation rates among highly-skilled migrants. Second, we turn to political representation and find that migrants with socioeconomic disadvantages have sometimes been more successful than highly-skilled migrants at integrating political parties and getting elected to office. Finally, we review the initial trajectory of Muslim political organization in Europe. Muslims are one of the most stigmatized migrant groups in contemporary Europe, and the history of their political organization in the last half-century suggests that—at least in some crucial circumstances—high levels of educational attainment are no guarantee of readiness to quietly adopt European norms.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political participation includes both formal activities such as voting and lobbying, as well as informal ones such as protesting and working with community organizations. Standard academic literature emphasizes multiple influences on political participation rates, including the political mobilization context, social capital, and socioeconomic resources. However, there is evidence that these influences might operate differently for immigrant and immigrant-origin communities. In particular, immigrant communities with high levels of socioeconomic resources may have low participation rates, whereas immigrant communities with low levels of socioeconomic resources may have high participation rates.

Asian Americans are an often-cited example of immigrants for whom socioeconomic status is not a significant predictor of political participation.[19] For the most part, Asian Americans have high levels of educational and occupational attainment but have fairly low levels of political participation. Explanations for this dynamic usually focus on Asian-American migrants' traumatic experiences with democracy in their home countries or their difficulty with the English language and socialization into American culture. Moreover, natives often criticize highly skilled Asian-American migrants for being too self-segregating. These experiences suggest that being a highly-skilled migrant is not sufficient for facilitating full engagement with mainstream society.

At the other end of the spectrum are Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain. Numerous studies over the past 30 years indicate that these groups have some of the highest voter turnout rates in the United Kingdom, despite being primarily low-skilled migrants and having some of the worst socioeconomic outcomes.[20] Turnout for these groups is consistently high across socioeconomic levels, with some evidence that low-skilled Pakistanis and Bangladeshis may even be more likely to vote than highly-skilled migrants. One explanation for these dynamics is that

19 See for example: Pei-Te Lien 1997.

20 See for examples: Muhammed Anwar 1980; Muhammed Anwar 1988; Daivd Cutts, Edward Fieldhouse, Kingsley Purdam, David Steel, and Mark Tranmer 2007; Michel Le Lohé 1998; and Kingsley Purdham, Edward Fieldhouse, Andrew Russell, and Virinder Kalra 2002.

dense Pakistani and Bangladeshi networks (often based on religious and kinship ties) are particularly effective at mobilizing voters in neighborhoods with large concentrations of co-ethnic voters.[21]

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

Migrant-origin political representatives are an important indicator of access to the host country's power structure. In recent decades, migrants in Western Europe and the United States have been increasingly successful at getting elected to office as they adopt host country citizenship and participate more in the political system. Some might imagine that highly-skilled migrants would have natural advantages in comparison to low-skilled migrants for accessing elected office. However, evidence from several countries suggests that this is not necessarily the case.

Group-level variation

Some might expect migrant groups with more highly-skilled individuals to be better equipped than socioeconomically disadvantaged groups for electing political representatives. Yet, evidence from Western Europe and the United States suggests the opposite. Groups with more low-skilled migrants may be better positioned to access elected office because of their greater incentives to form networks that can pressure political parties.

The United States is thought to enjoy an advantage with integrating its Muslim minority in part because of Americans' greater comfort level with religion. In a country with well-established traditions of conspicuous expressions of religious faith, as well as the recent embrace of "visible" ethnic and racial diversity, the sight of Muslim piety—whether of women wearing headscarves or of permit requests for mosque construction—is more easily accepted. If the coincidence of economically disadvantaged, religiously and ethnically different populations has reinforced systemic discrimination in Europe, then the relatively privileged socioeconomic status of many Muslim Americans, on the other hand, has led U.S. public opinion to disassociate ethnicity, race, religion, and class. Moreover, Muslims are quite ethnically diverse in the United States, with significant proportions of South Asians, Arabs, North Africans, Southeast Asians, and nonimmigrant African-American Muslims. In Europe, ethnic groups tend to be clustered, e.g., North Africans in France, South Asians in the United Kingdom, and Turks in Germany and Austria. After immigration quotas were lifted in 1965, many wealthy Muslims settled permanently in the United States. Nonetheless, members of this comparatively wealthy and well-educated group have not made significant inroads into electoral politics: the first Muslim American was elected to the U.S. Congress in 2006, and he is not of immigrant background.[22]

In the United States, Mexicans and Filipinos are two of the largest migrant groups with migration histories that date back several generations since the 19th century but with very different integration profiles. Filipinos are one of the most economically successful migrant groups in American society, whereas Mexicans suffer from some of the most severe socioeconomic disadvantages. In addition, Filipinos tend to arrive with greater English-language fluency and are viewed as more likely than Mexicans to assimilate into mainstream American culture.[23] These two integration profiles might lead one to believe that Filipinos would be more successful at accessing elected office, but the opposite has been the case. Even when taking into account Mexicans' larger population size, they have been more likely than Filipinos to get elected to the U.S. House of Representatives and to state and local offices because of their stronger ethnic networks. In comparison, Filipino activists have found it difficult to mobilize the community to support co-ethnic candidates. Even though many

21 See Rafaela Dancygier 2007.

22 See http://ellison.house.gov/

23 For more on the two groups see Brian Duncan and Stephen Trejo, 2007. "Ethnic Identification, Intermarriage, and Unmeasured Progress by Mexican Americans," in George Borjas, ed., *Mexican Immigration to the United States.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 227–69. Tomás Jiménez, 2008. "Mexican-Immigrant Replenishment and the Continuing Significance of Ethnicity and Race." *American Journal of Sociology* 113(6): 1527-1567, Le, C.N. 2008. "Interracial Dating & Marriage: U.S.-Raised Asian Americans" *Asian-Nation: The Landscape of Asian America.* Retrieved on December 3, 2008 at: http://www.asian-nation.org/interracial2.html. Antonio Pido, 1985. *The Filipinos in America*. Staten Island: Center for Migration Studies.

Filipinos face significant workplace discrimination across all levels of educational background, their individualized and highly-skilled integration path makes it more difficult to engage in common political struggles (Batalova and Fix 2008).

In Britain, although Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have some of the worst socioeconomic outcomes they have been some of the most successful migrant groups at getting elected to municipal councils. In fact, since the 1990s Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have been over-represented on many municipal councils in cities with large ethnic minority populations (Le Lohé 1998; Maxwell 2008). In comparison, other migrant groups with better socioeconomic outcomes have been unable to achieve the same level of success. One explanation for Pakistani and Bangladeshi electoral success is their high voter turnout rates, as mentioned earlier. In addition, Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants have used their socially excluded and socioeconomically disadvantaged status as a resource for mobilizing the community around common imperatives (e.g., better social welfare services or special concessions for their religious community). These networks have been extraordinarily effective at electing representatives and forcing political elites to respond to their concerns, even without wielding financial leverage.

Similar results can be found in the Netherlands, where there is almost no correspondence between economic and political outcomes among migrants. Moroccan and Turkish migrants have the highest unemployment rates and some of the worst educational and occupational outcomes of all groups in the Netherlands. In comparison, Surinamese and Antillean migrants are more likely to have university education and be employed in middle-class occupations. Despite these socioeconomic differences, each group has been successful at becoming proportionately represented in Parliament relative to their percentage of the Dutch population (Michon/Tillie/van Heelsum 2007). On the local level, dense ethnic networks among Moroccan and Turkish migrants have been able to mobilize voters with higher turnout rates and elect more political representatives to local councils. In comparison, Surinamese and Antillean migrant communities are more likely to be highly skilled, but are also less well-organized and less engaged in mainstream politics (Tillie 2004).

To some extent, the greater propensity of low-skilled migrants to mobilize politically reflects their need for government assistance. Some highly-skilled migrants may not need to engage in politics because their occupational status affords them a secure place in society. Regardless of the reasons for these differences, the larger picture suggests that there are no clear and automatic connections between socioeconomic status and political integration.

Recruitment

Across Europe, there are many practical stumbling blocks to achieving political integration of the descendants of high-skilled *or* low-skilled migrants. Political leaders across Europe pay lip service to diversity—and naturally, almost every party is interested in minorities' votes (even Jean-Marie Le Pen paid a visit to the *banlieue* during the 2007 French presidential campaign). But the concrete efforts that political parties have undertaken to diversify their candidate lists are few and far between. The ironic underside of Cem Özdemir's victory in fall 2008 as Green Party chairman in Germany, for example, was his absence from a good position on the parliamentary candidate slate from his political base in Baden Württemberg. Similarly, the appointment of Malek Boutih as national secretary for social affairs of the French Socialist Party in 2003 was a landmark occasion. But even though he is clearly of parliamentary timber, the party never took the practical steps to get him elected. Some observers have noted acrimoniously that one white French Socialist politician who "cried upon hearing the beautiful news" of Barack Obama's victory in the November 2008 elections did not hesitate to be "parachuted" several years earlier into a minority-heavy electoral district outside of Paris after losing her parliamentary seat in Vaucluse.[24] And she did so

24 "Pas d'Obeurmania dans les partis," Oumma TV, http://www.oummatv.tv/Pas-d-Obeurmania-dans-les-partis

Table 4: French-Elected Officeholders of Non-European Origin			
	2004	2008	Total
Parliamentary deputy	0	1	577
Senator	2	4	321
European Parliament deputy	3	n/a	77
Regional councillor	44	n/a	1,719
Municipal councillor	1,069 (3.18%)	1,844 (6.68%)	142,000
General councillor (cantons)	32	n/a	3,804

Source: "Elus d'origine non-européenne en France métropolitaine" ["Elected officials of non-European origin in metropolitan France"], Suffrage universel (http://users.skynet.be/suffrage-universel/fr/frmiel.htm); Malika Ahmed,"Les arabes et le référendum" ["Arabs and the referendum"], May 18, 2005 (www.sezame.info).

Source for 2008 data: In 2008, 1,844 were city council members, 495 were deputies to the mayor, and four were mayors. The study relied on a survey of surnames in cities with more than 9,000 residents. Source: Haut Conseil à l'intégration study published in Marie-Christine Tabet, "Diversité: encore peu d'élus," *Journal du Dimanche,* January 18, 2009. Retrieved at: http://www.lejdd.fr/cmc/politique/200903/diversite-encore-peu-d-elus_180223.html

without thinking twice about taking the place, in the words of one commentator, of all "Mamadous and Fatimas" in the neighborhood who might have represented their district themselves.

The small number of individual politicians of minority background who have entered the fray of national politics—and the recentness of enfranchised citizens of Muslim and immigrant origin—makes it wise to avoid sweeping generalizations on this topic at this early stage. This segment will examine the state of political integration of immigrants of Muslim background in France and Germany. At present, a structural obstacle of clubby and risk-averse party machines confronts minority candidates of all socioeconomic backgrounds—even well-connected wealthy entrepreneurs or individuals with the right diplomas.

France

In France, where the political class prides itself on a "color-blind" approach to minority integration, the extremely small numbers of candidates of "visibly diverse" origin point to evidence of persistent discrimination, or at least of a situation in which party leadership believe there is little to be gained by promoting minority candidates (Laurence et. al. 2009). The percentage of "diversity" candidates elected, by political party, stands at a low-water mark: 8.71 percent in the Socialist Party and 3.44 percent in the governing UMP party (Tabet 2009). Martine Aubry, the recently elected general secretary of the French Socialist Party, has announced her intention to put "visible minorities" in 20 percent of the party's elected positions. Sarkozy has even threatened to cut the subsidies of political parties who do not expand the diversity of their candidate pool.

There have been some small signs of progress. In 2002, there were 123 "diversity" candidates out of 8,000 running for Parliament in the first round of elections (Laurence and Vaïsse 2006). In 2008, political parties nominated 2,000 such candidates out of 520,000 running for city council slots.[25] Of 254 cities with 30,000 or more residents, "diversity" candidates accounted for 7 percent—half of them in an electable position—of the total number of politicians up for consideration by the electorate. In French cities with 20,000 or more residents, 6 percent of candidates were from "diverse" backgrounds, and less than half of them were in an electable position. In 900 French cities with more than 10,000 residents, approximately 130 "diversity" candidates actually led a party's electoral list: 30 were from the centrist Mouvement démocrate (0.08 percent); 20 were from the Socialist Party (0.05 percent); 16 were from the governing UMP (0.04 percent); 15 ran on assorted Left tickets (0.04 percent); and eight hailed from the Green Party (0.02 percent).[26] But these milestones seem particularly small when one considers that there is only a single black member of the National Assembly (George Pau-Langevin, a Socialist from Paris), who won a hard-fought election in 2007. There

25 Municipales: les chiffres qui contestent la diversité. Retrieved at: http://www.20minutes.fr/article/217690/Politique-Municipales-les-chiffres-qui-contestent-la-diversite.php

26 Municipales: les chiffres qui contestent la diversité. Retrieved at: http://www.20minutes.fr/article/217690/Politique-Municipales-les-chiffres-qui-contestent-la-diversite.php

are a total of 17 black members of the lower house of Parliament (i.e., 3 percent), but the rest of them hail from France's overseas territories and domains (Dom-Tom). Four senators of North African origin have been seated by political parties (the French Senate is indirectly elected) (Vaïsse 2009).

One of the major stumbling blocks to achieving a more "representative" sampling of political elites in France, the European country with the largest Muslim population, is the lack of precise population data. Sarkozy named a Diversity and Equal Opportunities Commissioner Yazid Sabeg in 2008, who has initiated a series of proposed reforms that would fundamentally change the way France counts and categorizes ethnic minorities (Sabeg 2009). If France were to engage in new endeavors that went beyond simple "antidiscrimination" measures—such as aiming for "parity" or concrete goals in terms of the number of visible minorities on parties' candidate lists—this could lead to a creeping revolution in minority politics across Europe, and a departure from the territorial and socioeconomic bases on which most states currently pursue equality.

Germany

Although some children of immigrants have joined political parties and other civil society organizations in Germany, they remain a lonely few. A handful of naturalized Turkish Germans have made their way up in local and national politics, including visible positions in the Bundestag (though none has yet joined a government cabinet) (Laurence 2007). There have been a few noteworthy rallying cries from integration-minded German-Turkish politicians—in particular, within the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP)—"to learn from the USA," "to learn from the Latinos in the United States," and "to create political representation for Muslims" (Daimagüler 2001; Maziyek 2006; Özdemir 2003).

Nearly all the parties now have a Turkish or Muslim section that seeks to recruit citizens of immigrant origin to their respective causes: the Arab Social Democrats (*Arabische Sozialdemokraten*, A-SPD) in Berlin; the Greens have *Immigrün;* the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has the German-Turkish Forum (*Deutsch-türkisches Forum*), which counts 400 members; and, finally, the FDP set up a Liberal German-Turkish group (*Liberale Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung*). These bodies were established by minority members of the parties as a way of signaling their respective parties' friendliness to voters with an immigrant background. These members also serve as the de facto spokespeople for their parties on integration issues (and, only on occasion, on unrelated matters such as foreign policy, the economy, or the environment).

A small but significant core of party members from Turkish and Muslim backgrounds have risen the ranks to become elected officials in local, national, and European parliaments. Özdemir (B90/Greens), a member of the European Parliament who served two terms in the Bundestag (1994–2002)—and also the first German of Turkish origin to reach national office, as well as the first to become chairman of a national political party—is the most prominent of these and could return to hold a high position in the German government.

The current Bundestag includes five members of Turkish origin and one of Iranian origin: Lale Akgün (SPD, Cologne), a psychologist who earlier worked for immigration offices in North Rhine–Westphalia; Ekin Deligöz (B90/Greens, Bavaria) a Bundestag member since 1998; Omid Nouripour (B90/Greens, Hessen), who took over as representative of Joschka Fischer's former constituency in 2006; Hakkı Keskin (Left Party/Linkspartei, Berlin), a community college instructor and immigrant activist who was a Social Democratic Party (SPD) member until 2005; Sevim Dagdelen (Left Party/Linkspartei, North Rhine–Westphalia), who had a career as a journalist; and Hüseyin-Kenan Aydin (Left Party/Linkspartei, North Rhine–Westphalia), a former trade union leader from IG Metall. German parties also have sent three deputies of Turkish origin to the European Parliament: Cem Özdemir (B90/Greens); Ozan Ceyhun (SPD), who led a national get-out-the-vote effort for his party in 2002; and Vural Öger (SPD), an entrepreneur who served on the government's Immigration Commission in 2000.

In addition, several young Turkish Germans hold national-level party positions and are visible participants in national political debates, such as Bülent Arslan (CDU), who is leader of his party's German-Turkish Forum (DTF); Giyasettin Sayan, a spokeswoman for the Left Party; Emine Demirbüken-Wegner (CDU), who was a longtime local foreigners' commissioner in Berlin; and Mehmet Daimagüler (FDP), a former member of his party's executive board. These individuals who participate in national debate are complemented by a handful of local officials in land-level parliaments.

Muslims' political integration

Even though political parties across Europe have been actively seeking the support of minority voters, there are several hurdles impeding timely integration of Muslims of any economic or educational background into the parties themselves. Very few individuals of Muslim background have gained access to elite leadership positions in political parties or eligible positions on party ballots. This situation is in part the legacy of earlier obstacles to naturalization that have led a high percentage of adult Muslims to retain their original citizenship; as resident aliens they are disenfranchised. But it is also the simple reflection of a youthful population. If one excludes minors from the European Muslim population, a relatively small number of majority-age citizens (approximately one-third) remains. The number of elected and appointed political representatives and members of government hailing from these milieus is not trivial, but it is quite modest. Roughly one generation after the permanent settlement of immigrant laborers (1973–1974), the children of migrant workers of Muslim background have reached elected office at all levels of government. In the past decade, elections in which candidates of Muslim origin ran have produced, roughly: 300 local councillors in the United Kingdom; ten to 15 national legislators apiece in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; and a handful of cabinet members in France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Roughly half of Europe's nearly 17 million Muslims are still foreign nationals, and only half of those who are citizens of European states are of majority age and thus able to vote. The full impact of Germany's 1999 nationality reform, for example, will not be felt until the 2020s. For now, Muslim electorates are easily outnumbered by "far right" electorates. In France, Muslim voters are thought to number between 1.5 million and two million, whereas in Germany, estimates range from 600,000 to 750,000. Although opinion polls in the first years of the 21st century show Muslim respondents firmly within the Socialist or Labor camps in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, Muslims' political views tend to be socially conservative, economically liberal, and dovish on foreign policy. The most dramatic demographic change will be perceptible in the German electorate in the next generation. In the 2005 elections, less than one in five Muslims in Germany enjoyed the right to vote. But by 2030, the 1999 citizenship law reform granting citizenship rights to children born to foreigners (so long as one parent was legally resident) will have added 50,000 to 100,000 newborn citizens a year. The first real generation of native-born German Muslims will begin voting in 2017. In France, the 1.5 million to two million voters of Muslim background who had voted in national elections by 2007 will double to three or four million by the year 2030, thus accounting for just under one of every ten French voters.

Does more education and knowledge of the local language make for easier social and political integration for migrants? The limited evidence available at present suggests a more complicated picture.[27] There is a certain irony to the fact that contemporary high-skilled migration schemes emerged in political debate at a time when the continued immigration—and the integration of second and third generations—originating in Muslim-majority countries had become increasingly controversial. Put crudely, some countries may be trying to avoid further immigration from the Muslim-majority world by favoring an influx of high-skilled migrants from other parts of the globe. Yet, unless there is specific attention paid to the

27 This discussion intentionally leaves aside the "worst cases" of known terrorists—from the Hamburg Cell (Egyptian/Saudi) to Düsseldorf Cell (Lebanese) to Glasgow cell (Pakistani); nor does it enter into the special circumstances of political asylum granted to dissidents of autocratic regimes in North Africa and the broader Middle East ("Londonistan"). Scholars have nonetheless noted the frequently high levels of education of terrorists of all stripes (e.g., Martha Crenshaw, "The causes of terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No.4, pp. 379–99).

social and political affinities of newly arriving groups, governments could find themselves faced with unexpected developments. In a sense, it was the arrival of well-educated and high-skilled migrants—who in many cases were de facto political refugees—that helped create a tense environment around the topic of Muslim immigration to begin with.

While high-skilled Muslim migrants have become some of the more difficult political actors in Western Europe, Muslim migrants with working-class backgrounds have become some of the most politically successful. Özdemir's elevation to German Green Party chair and Ahmed Aboutaleb's formal election to the mayoralty of Rotterdam in fall 2008 were each important milestones in the integration of non-Western migrants in Europe. On the face of it, the two men have little in common—one is a Southern German of Turkish origin, and the other is Dutch with Moroccan parents. Whereas Özdemir is religiously non-practicing and married a woman of Catholic background, Aboutaleb is an outwardly pious man and the son of an imam. What they do share, however, is the fact that their parents were guest workers.

The number of parliamentarians and governmental cabinet members and other political appointees in Western Europe is still quite small. To date, only a handful of individuals have risen to Europe's Muslim political elite.[28] But an interesting takeaway point, however anecdotal it must be at this early stage, is that those who are often viewed as the having the most "difficult-to-integrate" profiles—e.g., hardscrabble ancestry from poorly educated Anatolian mountain villages—have produced a set of "model" trajectories for the second- and third-generation immigrants from Turkey and North Africa. In addition to Özdemir in Germany and Aboutaleb in the Netherlands, the recent French governmental cabinet (2007–2009) included three women of Muslim background: Fadéla Amara, Rachida Dati, and Ramatoulade Yade. Amara and Dati rose from modest origins to the heights of the republic—but they were appointed from above by the French president, although they may eventually go on to successful careers in elective office as a result of their promotion.

Incredibly, almost no contemporary Muslim associational and federation leaders from religious milieus arrived as labor migrants. Rather, the high-skilled migrants who came to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s and took on religious leadership roles arrived as students pursuing advanced degrees in engineering, architecture, and medicine, among other fields of study. The fact that many of these turned out to be religious hard-liners is largely the product of the specific historical conjuncture of the postcolonial Middle East and North Africa: Universities were often the sites of religious agitation against secularist regimes, and the Muslim Brotherhood—whose diffuse network provided much of Europe's first-generation Muslim leadership—is itself predominantly a white-collar association.[29]

Much of the confrontational nature of recent interactions between "Islam" and "the West" can be traced to the presence of these networks in Europe. From the extreme reactions of community leaders to Pope Benedict XVI's speech at the University of Regensburg in 2006, to a generalized and intense anti-Zionism, many Islamist spokesmen have demonstrated a propensity toward censorship. They object to images of the Prophet Muhammad in British novels, Italian frescoes, and Danish caricatures, or in operas in Geneva and Berlin. They encourage "modesty" among young women, and push for their right to wear headscarves and skip physical education class. To some observers, these public figures appear to be promoting the Islamization of Europe.

The creation of these Islamist organizational networks in Europe owes much, indirectly, to the transnational proselytism of the Muslim World League and the exile of the various branches of Muslim Brotherhood.

28 For an excellent study of Muslim elites in Europe, see Jytte Klausen (2005) *The Islamic Challenge,* Oxford University Press.

29 Muslim Brotherhood members constitute a majority in 22 professional unions in Egypt, including those of doctors, engineers, pharmacists, scientists, dentists, veterinarians, lawyers and most university student unions; they also have a strong presence amongst the professional organizations of journalists, farmers, businessmen and university professors. Fabrice Maulion, *L'organisation des frères musulmans* (Université Panthéon-Assas, December 2004) p. 198; See also Samir Amghar and Amel Boubekeur, "Islamist Parties in the Maghreb and their Links with the EU," *Euromesco*, October 2006, p. 55.

No labor or economic migrants accompanied these envoys and dissidents from Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states, who during the 1960s and 1970s in Europe encountered a combination of inviting refugee policies and undefined Islam policies. The dissidents escaping repressive regimes came to pursue advanced degrees and frequently created Muslim student associations to campaign for religious rights—e.g., the French Association of Islamic Students (AEIF 1963) and the German Union of Muslim Student Organizations in Europe (UMSO 1963)—at a time when labor migrants (from North Africa, Turkey, Pakistan, and India) were mostly engaged in struggles for labor and civic rights. Indeed many of today's religious associations and adult Muslim leaders in Europe can trace their lineage this way, from the Italian Unione delle Comunitò e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (UCOII) to the French Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF) to the German and Dutch branches of the Institut für Gesundheitsökonomie Medizin und Gesellschaft (IGMG). Amghar (2008) writes of "the stratification of the Western Islamist sphere of influence, in response to the repressive policies of Arab and Muslim regimes and the waves of students arriving in Europe to pursue higher study. These two social groups [political refugees and students] were to constitute the central core of Western Islamism and were behind the creation of branches of these political parties in exile" (Amghar 2008; Dreano 2004; Vidino 2008). These leaders have in turn created or modernized youth sections of their current associations.

From the 1960s through the late 1990s, many well-educated Islamists sought de facto political refuge from situations they fled at home, leading to what Olivier Roy has called the gradual delocalization of Islamist activity. "They left behind semi-authoritarian political situations—marked by the strong-armed tactics of many Arab heads of state—about which Western host countries raised few objections." During those four decades, a number of developments left migrant-origin Muslim populations in European countries open to the discourses of political Islam. At first, Europe became a new base for operations, where political designs could be hatched against autocratic regimes at home. But over time, Islamist leadership came to view the European Muslim population as an object of proselytism and re-Islamization. As Maréchal (2008) observes, "Members and sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood have migrated from Arab countries to Europe as political exiles or students since the end of the 1950s. At first, they organized inward-facing groups. But since the 1980s, they became a powerful force acting within the community as a whole: they established mosques, Muslim student organizations, Islamic charities and centers, national bodies, etc. aiming at a full representation of Muslims within the European countries" (Maréchal 2008).

The legacies of high-skilled migration, therefore, are more mixed than one might imagine at first glance. Ironically, this migration pattern is indirectly responsible for the advent of the European Muslim Brotherhood as it is known today—"a movement mostly composed of a variety of secretive informal networks with low membership count but nevertheless quite influential" (Maréchal 2008, 36). This brand of religious conservatism is not necessarily an insuperable challenge for Europeans' political institutions, and in fact Islamists have shown a willingness to moderate their religious demands in response to outreach from states' religion offices across Europe. But this experience should at least give pause to those who argue that high-skilled migrants are shrinking wallflowers.

There is no suggestion here that Islam and extremism are inextricably linked. But it should be noted that toleration of the religious and ethnic differences of high-skilled migrants after they have arrived may also be key social factors in the ability of counties to attract the highly skilled (Florida and Tinagli 2004).

HIGH-SKILL MIGRATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM

Unlike many of the other countries discussed in this section, Ireland has become a country of immigration only in the past decade. From 2000 to 2004, the country experienced an 87 percent increase in immigration. In the 2006 Census, non-Irish nationals comprised around 10 percent of the Irish population (420,000). Much of this group consisted of migrants from the U.K. and other EU countries (276,000). The effects of the economic downturn have already led many of these migrants to return home, which is the natural function of a single European market—the migrants came for work and, when there is none, they can now leave without hesitation, in part because they are free to return to Ireland should conditions change. But non-EU migration (144,000) has played an important role in the growth of the Celtic Tiger, since the early 1980s. Unlike EU migrants who are free to come and go, non-EU migrants have no incentive to return home. When the economic drawbridge came up this time, Ireland discovered it had a newly religious and ethnically diverse population on their hands.

Ireland experienced an exponential growth of its Muslim community in the decade between 1996 and 2006, in large part due to the immigration of high-skilled medical professionals—doctors, surgeons, and nurses—some of whom came to attend the Royal College of Surgeons in Dublin. Non-EU immigrants worked in the health care sector at a rate of 20.8 percent—twice the rate of the next largest group (United Kingdom: 11.8 percent). More than half of Muslims in Ireland received tertiary-level education. Both Irish officials and Muslim community leaders point out that high-skilled migration is the least likely to pose integration problems, and they underscore the natural affinities between Ireland and Islam. Ireland is not a country with a colonial history—on the contrary its mentality is that of an oppressed previously colonized island—thus, there is no "postcolonial baggage." Moreover, observers have suggested there is an alignment of views between Muslims and the Irish regarding foreign policy in the Middle East.[30] However, as with other established immigration countries, there does not appear to be an automatic connection between socioeconomic and political integration.

In terms of gender balance, this recent migration inflow closely resembled the initial phase of Muslim migration to Europe—except that the men arriving were often highly skilled and not manual laborers. At first glance, this would seem to be a free pass—after all, aren't integration problems largely the result of rural migrants who bring with them their customs and have difficulty adapting to urban life in Europe? Muslims' patterns of migration to Ireland thus differ importantly from their migrations to other European countries. Ireland had received a small number of high-skilled immigrants, university students, and political refugees from the Muslim world in the 1950s and 1960s, but there was never a major influx of manual laborers. As of 1991 the census showed the number of Muslims to be 3,873 (the actual number in 1991 was estimated at 6,000), and the 2006 Census showed 32,539 (the actual number in 2008 was estimated to be approximately 40,000), roughly half of them living in Dublin.[31] Ireland thus experienced a 1,000 percent growth in its Muslim population from 1991 to 2006,[32] but this is still a tiny fraction, making up less than 1 percent of the overall Irish population.

30 Unattributed, "Cowen condemns Israeli offensive," *The African Voice* (Dublin), January edition 2009, p.4.

31 The 32,000 includes roughly 2,000 of Irish nationality; 7,000 of African descent; and 12,000 other Asian. These included: 5,000 Pakistanis (the only Muslim-majority nation to have more than 1,000 nationals in Ireland); the other 27,000 were cobbled together from Albania, Algeria, Bosnia/h, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, and Turkey (200-1,000). Perhaps 2,000 or so Muslim Nigerians. See Volume 5—Ethnic or Cultural Background. Retrieved at: http://beyond2020.cso.ie/Census/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=75495; Census 2006: Non-Irish Nationals Living in Ireland, http://www.cso.ie/census/documents/NON%20IRISH%20NATONALS%20LIVING%20IN%20IRELAND.pdf

32 Official statistics show a shift from a largely single male to an increasingly family-based population: 19,147 in 2002 and in 2006, a nearly 70 percent increase in four years. The 2006 breakdown of 32,539 Muslims showed 19,372 men and 13,167 women. Roughly half of the adult Muslim population is gainfully employed (just under one-sixth are students); and more than 80 percent of those are employers, managers, and higher professional; 1,765 in health and related work; and 2,522 in personal and childcare. See Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO) Census 2006, Volume 13—Religion. Retrieved at: http://www.cso.ie/census/census2006results/volume_13/volume_13_religion.pdf

But with growing restrictions on immigration to the Emerald Isle in the wake of an economic downturn, Ireland's Muslim population has transformed quickly from an overwhelmingly male population to a population of men, women, and children. In the space of a decade, Ireland is home to roughly 36 mosques, 14 imams, and a single Muslim school—and the country's third religion is now Islam (after Roman Catholicism and the Church of Ireland). Because of the nature of Islam's institutional development in Ireland, the country provides an interesting case study of what might happen in the absence of healthy competition between Islamic networks for official state recognition. The country has seen the implantation of representatives of political Islam whose views go unchecked by the usual counterbalance: the embassies of sending states. Because there was no influx of labor migrants, there is no significant activity of "homeland" religion channeled through consular and diplomatic networks. The embassies that show an interest in the religious practice of Muslim diasporas elsewhere in Europe may not promote full political integration, but they do tend to offset the more strenuous claims-making activities of Islamist groups by exerting pressure on host governments to find an equilibrium between competing styles of religious dialogue.

The Irish government is still overwhelmed by the rapid development of immigration, and integration policies remain undeveloped. In particular, its policy on Islam appears to be seriously lagging behind. The government appears content to recognize an integration-oriented but conservative interpretation of religion channeled through a handful of Dublin-based mosques. The Islamic Foundation of Ireland and the South Circular Road Mosque have received support from the Saudi king and the Kuwaiti Ministry of Islamic Affairs, and the Islamic Cultural Center of Ireland (ICCI) receives the majority of its funding from the Al-Maktoum Foundation. The ICCI runs the country's lone Islamic school (the Muslim National School in Dublin), which now has around 300 students. It is recognized by the Department of Education and receives public funds like other religious schools to help pay the salaries of 13 full-time curriculum instructors and five part-time Muslim teachers, as well as partial operating expenses. More unusually, the mosque at the ICCI serves as the headquarters of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), a body meant to speak to Europe's 15 to 20 million Muslims but that is based in a country with just 40,000 or so Muslims. The ECFR leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi regularly visits the mosque.

Former President of Ireland Mary Robinson and Sheikh Hamdan Al Maktoum opened the ICCI with great fanfare in November 1996. Then-Taoiseach Bertie Ahern addressed the ICCI on its 10th anniversary in 2006, and spoke proudly of the Irish-Muslim community: "I would wish to place on record again an expression of official appreciation of the financial support received from abroad by our Islamic community in developing and maintaining these facilities." The Irish Council of Imams, consisting of the 14 official imams in Ireland, was a response to the Taoiseach's request for a "structured dialogue" in addition to the creation of a broad-based community council.[33]

As one official from the Irish Immigration and Naturalization Service said in an interview in March 2009, certain religious freedom issues such as the wearing of headscarves were "cosmetic" in nature and unlikely to provoke conflict in a country with a rich Catholic heritage. But the official pointed to potential difficulties ahead:

> *Muslim immigration is the elephant in the room. Clearly there are long-term security issues, and the government wishes to avoid going down the road of France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. The Dutch experience shows the danger of the development of enclaves and linguistic issues. No one here wants to have a potentially alienated group within the country.*

The relatively uncritical stance adopted by the Irish government with regard to its religious interlocutors, and the free rein it grants to political Islam, are likely to become more complicated over time. They also may be of some consequence to the United Kingdom and its more than two million Muslims, with whom Ireland shares a relatively open border.

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33 "Remarks by the Taoiseach, Mr Bertie Ahern TD, on meeting with members of the Irish Islamic community on the 10th anniversary of the opening of the ICCI at Clonskeagh, Dublin," www.taoiseach.gov.ie. "Islam and Muslims in Ireland." Retrieved at: http://www.muslimtents.com/islamindublin/ireland.htm. Interview with Integration Ministry Officials, March 23, 2009.

4. CONCLUSION

Attracting highly-qualified immigrants is not primarily a question of properly designed selection schemes (Doomernik/Koslowski/Thränhardt 2009), as is often claimed in public discourse and in academic papers. And those selectively chosen immigrants are not always easily employed in appropriate positions and integrated into receiving societies. One problem is that planned selection can suffer from time lags in which labor market demand changes rapidly, as happened with the international IT sector in 2001, after the German government introduced its IT Green Card program (Kolb 2004). Another difficulty is that often credentials are not accepted, causing highly-qualified scientists to drive taxis or wash dishes. In addition, where social networks are influential or social behavioral standards are expected in high-level jobs, people from outside such cultural spheres can be excluded—even if they are citizens.

Immigrant professionals entering the labor market are at a disadvantage because of exclusionary mechanisms based on national or state exam systems or professional standards that rest on deeply entrenched traditions developed over time, and often codified in laws, by-laws, statutes, or professional standards. One obvious reason for such hurdles is that these jobs are highly desirable and thus are defended by indigenous groups who do not want to share with newcomers and can rely on vested professional traditions and established social networks. These obstacles are especially difficult to overcome for immigrants allowed to enter a country without a concrete job offer, and selective migration schemes that do not have a specific connection to employment are faced with problems of integrating immigrants into the labor market. Point systems developed to screen and select the best immigrants, with the hope that they would integrate perfectly, have often been inefficient and less successful than market-based systems that rely on the actual needs of employers, irrespective of the level of qualifications.

Moreover, as the examples in the preceding section demonstrate, it is not necessarily the less educated people that are drawn to extreme ideologies, whether they be nationalistic, Islamist, or—as in earlier times—totalitarian. This is not a new discussion, as Julien Benda's book *La trahison des clercs* (1927/2006)—written before the apocalypse of the totalitarian systems in Germany, Russia, China, Cambodia, and other countries—demonstrates—not for immigrants but for indigenous intellectuals. Thus, present Islamist tendencies among Arab academics are not a singular phenomenon, as the discussion à la Huntington (1992) in Western elite circles could suggest. The other idea popular in Western countries these days, that it is only the uneducated peasant immigrant who can present problems and must be educated or tested, is also problematic. There are productive, integrative political grass roots processes in which well-qualified people do not seem inclined to participate as much as working-class people, and the same difference can be observed with regard to trade union activity (Penninx and Roosblad 2001). Other examples are the German company councils in which immigrants have an important and integrative role (Hinken 2001).

Migrants should and will contribute economically to the growth of the global economy and the quality of life. However, policymakers should not neglect integrating the pool of immigrants already in the country. This can be done by creating an open playing field for everybody, giving adjustment assistance to open up ways to integrate, in the interest not only of concerned immigrants, but also of the country as a whole, which should try to profit from its pool of highly-qualified people as much as possible. "Brain waste," the loss of human capital upon transfer to another country, is a loss that can be prevented. It is the damaging side of immigration, in contrast to the triple-win situation for both sending and receiving

countries as well as the migrants themselves that is presented in so many studies these days. "Brain waste" hurts all three parties involved, and creates tensions and feelings of nonacceptance that can translate into the political sphere.[34]

Here is the place where governments and civil societies should become active. They need not put the immigrants under protective programs, but they should open up possibilities for integration and to participation. In this respect, the European Union is a good model, as EU regulations make educational qualifications in one country valid in all other countries so that a Polish doctor today can work in an EU country. However, what is problematic about the EU model is that this doctor's Ukrainian colleague cannot easily come to work in the EU—irrespective of his or her abilities. Consequently, many doctors from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries immigrating to Germany were not working, even when the country needed doctors and began to import them from other EU countries. Just for example a state program in Brandenburg, Germany, brought some of these doctors to the hospitals that needed them, after they had been out of their profession for years (Integrationsbeauftragte 2009, 3.3.2). Such openings require "strong enduring drilling of hard planks, with passion as well as judgment" *(ein starkes langsames Bohren von harten Brettern mit Leidenschaft und Augenmaß zugleich),* to quote Max Weber's famous definition of politics. They require working with many intermediate actors, going into the jungle of regulations at the national and state levels or of "private government" by professional organizations or business associations, in hot pursuit of the opening of inner borders. Such opening, of course, has to be balanced with the legitimate interest of a given community for professional standards, specific traditions, and community values.

These opening processes can find support from companies, cities, regions, or countries that want to become more competitive through greater diversity. The opening must not be achieved against the interest of these entities and the people working with them, but rather, in their own common interest. Diversity charters and commitments can help to strengthen these ideas of opening up, and set them against the inclination of insiders to monopolize given resources and positions.

Anti-discrimination policies, legislation, and institutions corresponding to these processes must then protect all with respect to ethnicity, gender, origin, or other categories against arbitrary practices and legitimize their struggle to overcome such difficulties, some of them deeply rooted in society. Such protection sometimes requires addressing potential conflict with regulations and mechanisms for conflict resolution. It gives the outsiders a pathway for pursuing their legitimate interests, and its existence works as a preventive or deterrent. Anti-discrimination policies should rest on societal consensus; otherwise they could have counterproductive consequences. Thus, they should be connected to the policies outlined above, and be backed up by political and societal authorities. Proactive policies for leveling the playing field and eliminating discrimination can contribute to integrating society and promoting the common good. Moreover, civil society can help create networks that can become productive as social capital and translate into economic and political capital, as well as to educational success for the next generation.

When we look into intergenerational change, again the picture is not as simple as public discourse often presents it. It is clear that the children of elite migrants have better chances for quality education and full development of their talents than do poor immigrants, particularly those without legal status. But the number of these children is quite limited, due to the low percentage of highly-educated migrants in the population. And it is not just elite parents who have gifted children and provide them with support and encouragement. Certain groups of people with few resources have developed astounding success rates for their children in the educational system. Important examples are the Vietnamese, Korean, and Chinese immigrant groups in

34 In Germany and other European countries, the "academic proletariat" of the 1920s and 1930s, well-trained younger professionals not finding adequate positions, were core groups in the fascist movements.

various Western countries; the Jewish immigrants from Russia to the United States and other countries before World War I; the Japanese immigrants to the Americas before and after World War II; and the Spanish and Croatian immigrants in Germany. Educational success varies widely among immigrant groups and among different countries. Successful immigrant groups and successful destination countries demonstrate what can be achieved. The Vietnamese immigrants of former East Germany are one new, fascinating example. Without many material resources, and with the parents' often very limited abilities in the language of their new land, they nonetheless motivate their children to achieve astounding results at school (Weiss/Kindelberger 2007). Immigrants do not just bring social capital with them and adapt it in their new country. Bringing up their children, they also create it.

The "battle for the brains" and the competition among developed countries for the best-qualified immigrants from the developing world was based on the shining example of a long boom in the United States, and particularly the IT boom. This historically singular high-growth era rested on foundations that have proven to be shaky: a disproportionate deficit in foreign trade, financed by other countries (particularly China, which undervalued its currency); an unbalanced import boom that kept prices down; an American budget deficit tied to Chinese and other banks buying up U.S. bonds; American consumers overspending and creating more demand than could be sustained; and a long-term surge in housing and property prices. All of this led to the illusion of permanent and unprecedented growth that needed more and more workers on all levels, particularly well-trained and well-paid specialists in industrial jobs and low-paid and largely informal immigrants outside the protection of a growing American welfare system Americans shunned lower-paying jobs, American productive industry shrank, and today the manufacturing sector is smaller than the medical sector. These related booms are over. Consequently, in the future not only the amount of migration, but also the patterns of migration will change.

However, even though the long global boom of the last decades is at its end and we face deep crises, the world economy is now much more integrated. The rising Asian powers, as well as countries like Brazil and Turkey, are not just sources of migration; they also need specialists, and are able to reward them well. Moreover, Russia and other CIS countries, even more than Western Europe, face shrinking populations and therefore need more and more immigration of all sorts. Thus, migration in the future cannot and should not be conceived as a one-way street toward Europe and the United States. Migration is now a multifaceted and dynamic process in a world open not only to trade, but also to more and more free movement of people looking for better opportunities and offering countries of immigration competences and energies that enrich them. Circular migration and multiple-life-phase migrations will become more important. Since the economic crisis makes planning, which is the rationale behind the various point systems, more and more difficult—and liberal democratic states cannot successfully execute large-scale deportations of people rooted in the country without caring about human costs and violating their founding principles (Angenendt 2009; Hollifield 1992)—systems and environments devised to make it easier for people to move back and forth are preferable to the build-up of border and control systems (Global Commission 2005). In such a new competitive world, where the old industrial powers are not necessarily dominant, it becomes even more important to give everybody the chance to contribute as much as he or she can to the economy and society.

It is not only the highly educated and skilled immigrants who are desirable but also other socioeconomic strata that can bring important momentum. The highly skilled are not immune to problems of adaptability and integration. States' planning, control, and organizational capacities are limited, and all countries are open to sudden changes in a world economy that can make planning concepts obsolete overnight. Taking into account their limited capacities, states should rely as much as possible on the self-interest and collective abilities of migrants, and should create environments in which immigrants' activities can freely develop and further the common good.

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2008–2009 TRANSATLANTIC ACADEMY FELLOWS BIOGRAPHIES

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