Beyond 2010
European Grand Strategy in a Global Age
European Foreign and Security Policy

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Beyond 2010

European Grand Strategy in a Global Age

Guetersloh, July 2007
The Berlin Declaration

“We are facing major challenges which do not stop at national borders. The European Union is our response to these challenges...We will fight terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration together. We stand up for liberties and civil rights also in the struggle against those who oppose them. Racism and xenophobia must never again be given any rein. We are committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the world and to ensuring that people do not become victims of war, terrorism and violence. The European Union wants to promote freedom and development in the world. We want to continue to drive back poverty, hunger and diseases. We want to take a leading role in that fight. We intend jointly to lead the way in energy policy and climate protection and make our contribution to averting the global threat of climate change”.

The Berlin Declaration on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome, Berlin, 25 March 2007
Preface

The third Venusberg Report pulls no punches. It is now or never for an effective EU foreign and security policy. The Berlin Declaration celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome clearly calls upon Europe to get a grip of world reality and urgently. Indeed, if Europe fails to play its part in closing the strategic gap between what Europe currently contributes to global stability and what its status and power demands of it the dangers faced by the European citizen will become acute. The new strategic cocktail created by the complex interaction of energy insecurity, a global belt of instability beyond state control, strategic terrorism and organised international crime represent the dark side of globalisation from which no-one can hide. Add to that the crisis in US leadership, the emergence of new powers, such as China and India uncertain as yet as to their world role, and the complex problems of Europe’s neighbouring regions in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa and the scale and scope of the challenge Europe faces becomes apparent. It is, therefore, time that Europe ended its obsession with internal structure and looked outward with true strategic vision. That is Europe’s leadership challenge today, not tomorrow. Indeed, the world will no longer wait for Europe to come to a strategic consensus at its own convenience. Therefore, only a truly comprehensive programme of strategic security engagement across the civil-military spectrum will enable Europe to fulfil the role for which ironically it is uniquely placed. That is the essence of Project European Security.

Fail and Europeans will lose any ability they now have to shape developments. Instead, a strategic power vacuum will be created that other actors will fill less enamoured of the utility of legitimate effective multilateralism. In such an environment Europeans will be faced with little alternative but to react. Europeans will once again face a dangerous balance of power similar to that which rendered Europe so vulnerable to shocks and alarms in the past. There will be little place for the just governance of the international order through global institutions, such as the United Nations (UN).

To what extent power can continue to reside with the states and what power must be aggregated to the level of the European Union (EU)? Indeed, whilst it is evident that member-states will remain in command of much of Europe’s security, is the national level where decisions can always be best made concerning the level, scope and organisation of cost-efficient strategic security? After all, no European state can be described as a truly Great Power in today’s world. At the very least striking a balance between security, liberty and economy will surely require of Europeans a greater sense of strategy, community and solidarity. Only through such solidarity will Europeans engage security in all its contemporary myriad forms with any hope of success.

Project European Security proposes a way forward. Only the EU can afford Europeans cost-effective European grand strategy across the security spectrum that Europeans so clearly need. Such a role does not imply a European super-state, merely an enhancement of the functional role the EU has played in the lives of Europeans since its inception back in the early 1950s. One
thing is clear; without far closer co-ordination between member-states, together with a far stronger security role for the Union, the European citizen will be far less secure in a world more dangerous by the day.

Project European Security is thus built upon what has become known as the Comprehensive Approach to security. Such an approach balances protection with projection and strategic security with human security by forging a new cost-effective strategic link between security and defence and civil and military tools and approaches. The aim is to leverage more strategic security effect for Europeans and to open the EU up to new strategic partnerships, whilst re-invigorating old partnerships. The transatlantic relationship will remain the cornerstone of European and world security and stability for the foreseeable future. However, it is only right and proper that Europeans seek a range of other strategic partnerships in pursuit of the global stability upon which their security rests.

However, whilst Project European Security proposes a better balance between hard and soft security, Europeans must not use the Comprehensive Approach with its strong civil security/soft security element, to once again shy away from hard military investments. Make no mistake, without a strong and credible strategic military component all the EU’s other tools, be they diplomatic, economic, social or cultural will be gravely weakened.

The objective of this report is thus to point the way forward to enable the EU to fulfil its undoubted potential as a global ‘one stop security shop’ for Europeans. Fifty years on since the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC) it is time Europeans restored the political momentum that so transformed Europe’s political landscape. To do that, Europeans, their states and the EU institutions must establish in partnership a long-term strategic vision that looks beyond 2010. That is the mission of the third Venusberg report.

The clock is ticking.

The Venusberg Group
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The Venusberg Group
Executive Summary

Why Now?

The Dark Side of Globalisation: The world today and the dark side of globalisation it has spawned demonstrate the dangers of an unconstrained ‘market-led’ approach to international relations. Unless some form of stronger political co-ordination is introduced by the leading powers globalisation could encourage destructive competition, open anarchy and an imbalance of power. At the European level a profound change of mindset is required. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU has been in existence since 1991. However, it was created in an age far more innocent than that which the Union and its citizens are now entering. It is time to look beyond 2010 and prepare Europeans to think and act globally.

Europe’s Global Responsibilities: Europe is today rich and powerful and as such is a global political actor. Global power breeds global responsibilities and demands Europe’s engagement in world security, not just in and around Europe. However, whilst Europeans must become far more hard-headed than of late as to why they intervene they must greatly enhance their collective ability to engage politically, diplomatically and, on occasions, militarily.

The Strategic Challenges Facing the EU

Strategic Challenges: Energy security will provide an essential dynamic for change in the global state system and Europe must face up to that. Indeed, the competition being engendered by the search for energy to fuel economic growth in much of the world is leading to new balances of power with all the dangers inherent therein. Equally, energy security and energy competition are not the only strategic challenges Europe must face. The dark side of globalisation is spawning new challenges in the form of strategic terrorism fuelled by radical Islam and international crime that exploit the increased movement of people, commodities and money. Moreover, old but massively destructive technologies are proliferating as states and non-state actors compete in a new and very dangerous form of black market. Increases in travel are raising the spectre of pandemics as the very nature of economic activity promotes destructive change in the environment.

The Leadership Plan

Broad Security Policy: The nature of today’s security environment and the complexities it generates is profoundly different. The emergence of new powers tends to confirm the traditional role of military security as a defining feature of power and its balance. However, the parallel and interactive development of non-state power and strategic human insecurity is complicating the task of the political leader and security planner alike. Today it is broad security policy, as opposed to defence policy, that is essential to the generation of strategic effect. Consequently, defence policy is but one subset of security policy and must be seen as
such. Therefore, to generate strategic effect a ‘joined up’ approach to security is vital coordinating all national, and where possible, transnational efforts in a complex security environment.

**Establishing Leadership:** In such a security environment leadership is at a premium. By far the biggest European security investors a strategic consensus between Britain, France and Germany is essential to the forging of effective European grand strategy. However, such leadership cannot and must not be exclusive. Indeed, whilst a leadership group is vital a balance must also be struck between leadership and representation and thus power and legitimacy. The EU is the natural setting for such balance.

**An EU Security Policy:** Leadership, vision and effect are linked by effective security policy. An EU Security Policy is thus required founded on four strategic tenets:

- The ability to cope early with a broad spectrum of threats from wherever they emerge;
- The establishment of true strategic partnerships with all like-minded states and institutions likewise committed to global stability;
- The reviving of the system of institutionalised global security through truly effective multilateralism; and
- The further strengthening of security in and around Europe.

**A European Strategic Comprehensive Approach:** EU Security Policy must be enabled by a European Strategic Comprehensive Approach (ESCA) to security that would combine both civil and military tools into strategic effect through the effective organisation of European states and institutions. Such an approach would entail the better and tighter organisation and coordination of national agencies of EU member-states with both external and internal security responsibilities. The EU must thus become a security hub capable of tackling broad strategic security issues.

**A European Strategic Concept:** To further reinforce EU Security Policy the European Security Strategy (ESS) must be reinforced. The EU needs a genuine European strategic concept that explains to leader and citizen alike the what, the why, the when, the where and the how of Europe’s action in a world that is changing fast and becoming daily more dangerous.

**Effective Decision-Making in Crises:** EU decision-making must be reformed urgently to better enable it to act effectively and swiftly during crises. The EU therefore needs a strong leadership focal point. An EU Foreign Minister together with an EU Foreign Service, backed by a potent Intelligence capability could perform such a role. The Solidarity Clause although agreed politically must be reinforced to communicate to European citizens and strategic partners alike the will and determination of the EU. It is time therefore to re-launch certain elements of the failed Constitutional Treaty consistent with pragmatic grand strategy.

**A Security and Defence Group:** A Security and Defence Group is needed under the authority of the European Council, possibly itself under the Chairmanship of the new Foreign Minister. The Group would comprise the major EU powers as permanent members and would be reinforced by smaller member-states rotating their membership. Such a Group would re-establish the primacy
of the member-states by overseeing all of the Union’s security activities and ensure a more direct relationship between state security structures, national parliaments and the strategic security activities of the Union. The Group could evolve in time into an EU Security Council.

**Better Internal Organisation:** The EU needs to be better organised internally. Commissioners should head challenge clusters alongside their Council counterparts to properly consider effective responses to all the challenges faced by the EU. Such Challenge Clusters could take place and in conjunction with ‘lead’ countries, thus honouring in spirit Pioneer Groups and structured co-operation. Challenge Clusters would be task-oriented working groups charged with looking at specific security issues, such as climate change, water shortage, the changing demand for food, population growth etc.

**EU Strategic Directorate:** To support the Security and Defence Group the member-states should bring together both the Council and those elements of the Commission responsible for security and defence into a new combined Strategic Directorate. The Political and Security Committee (PSC), General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) could be subsumed within a new EU Strategic Affairs Committee.

**The Strategic Partnership Plan**

**New Strategic Partnerships:** To foster global stability effective strategic external relations will be pivotal. The EU must forge close strategic partnerships with all powerful actors, both states and institutions. These powers must include emergent and re-emergent states such as Russia, China, Japan and India, as well as cornerstone regional powers such as Brazil, South Africa, South Korea and Australia. Such partnerships would reinforce the centre-piece of an EU Security Policy, effective multilateralism, by making the EU an indispensable strand in a web of stabilising regional partnerships. This would both reinforce Europe’s political legitimacy and effectiveness and enhance global stability.

**A New Transatlantic Triangle:** The transatlantic relationship is in need of modernisation. A new relationship is required founded on an EU-US-NATO triangle to enable Europeans as strategic actors. To keep the US engaged in securing Europe’s strategic neighbourhood remains an essential European interest. The relationship between the EU and NATO must, therefore, be strengthened and deepened to afford Europeans credible political options in the face of complexity. Moreover, Europeans that can act autonomously is an essential American interest because stronger Europeans will be better allies. In return, the US will continue to provide the strategic defence guarantee through NATO necessary to ensure that both protection of and projection by Europeans is underpinned by increased strategic self-confidence. To that end, the EU must develop a direct strategic relationship with the US founded on the European Strategic Comprehensive Approach, with particular emphasis on internal security.

Europeans will be unlikely to project legitimate security power if they are unable to adequately protect European territory. Therefore, as a matter of some urgency it is time to consider autonomous EU territorial security incorporating five elements: missile defence, deterrence, conventional defence, airspace sovereignty and consequence management.
The Defence Plan

A European Defence Strategy: The role of effective and relevant armed forces in the crafting of EU Security Policy is vital if the EU is to realise the rapid and further development of a strategic European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) beyond Headline Goal 2010. A European Defence Strategy is, therefore, needed as a matter of urgency. Such a strategy will endow ESDP with the tools, instruments and personnel to look forward and thus identify long-term trends without constraint. To that end, the EU must enjoy the planning freedom to plan for a secure strategic future effectively and sustainably with the reasonable expectation of funding and resources from across the Union as part of sustained, value-for-money strategic defence investment.

In the near-term a European Defence Strategy would focus on the following enhancements:

- The Petersberg Tasks are now fifteen years old. Rescue and humanitarian tasks, crisis management and the role of combat troops in peacemaking were very different tasks in 1992 compared with 2007. Not only is the operational environment very different, but the sheer complexity of modern operations demands an urgent re-appraisal of the tasks and the forces and capabilities required to deal with them;
- The better sharing of Intelligence is a sine qua non for effective and credible European military operations. Further improvements in the sharing of Intelligence and sensitive information are needed; and
- Cost-effective military equipment is a basic requirement of an effective ESDP. The only way Europeans can obtain the military equipment they need at affordable prices over a reasonable timeframe is to further consolidate the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB). The European Defence Agency (EDA) needs to be strengthened and given a much stronger initiation and co-ordination role.

European forces: Europe needs far greater numbers of forces able and capable of both undertaking sustained advanced expeditionary coalition operations and act as the focal point for sustained stabilisation. In time all Europe’s forces must be able to undertake all the missions required of them. Initially, particular emphasis must be placed on the development of robust, projectable forces. Such forces need to be strengthened at the top end by Special Forces and at the bottom end by gendarmerie forces capable of taking robust stabilisation missions. Over time all European forces must be capable of operating across the full conflict spectrum.

The Solidarity Plan

Re-building Popular Solidarity: Strong public support is vital. Project European Security must therefore communicate a fundamental security message to the European people. The message is clear; strong economic prosperity, social stability and environmental sustainability can only be found through enhanced European security. Indeed such a Solidarity Plan must help to re-establish the link between world security and European security that is in danger of being severed.
1. Fifty Years On…

Fact
Today the European Union has 27 states with 500 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

1.1 Europe in a Changing World

Fifty years on from the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) Europe is transformed. Europe today must, therefore, answer a question both simple and complex; what role Europe in the world?

Energy security is a case in point. Indeed, securing the sources of energy, guaranteeing its supply, protecting the sea lanes upon which it moves and reducing Europe’s dependence on others are fundamental to the future well-being of Europeans. Consequently, energy is a vital interest for Europeans. However, Europe’s unsteady response thus far to the security dilemma posed by its energy needs demonstrates all too clearly both a lack of strategic thinking and the profound unease many Europeans feel in taking legitimate action to protect vital interests. It is an unease that forces many Europeans to descend into excessive institutionalism at the expense of legitimate effect. Make no mistake, Europe indeed has legitimate interests and Europeans must take relevant security steps to protect them.

Put simply, if European interests are to be realised far more autonomous strategic effect must be generated than hitherto. There is an intimate relationship between power, strategy, organisation, resources and decision-making. National security policies provide an over-arching rationale for the organisation of all national means in pursuit of security – through economic, diplomatic, cultural and military means. However, no European state can generate sufficient means to cope with the challenges all Europeans face. Europe, therefore, needs an aggregated grand strategy at the European level. Hitherto European strategy, such as it is, has been little more than an add-on to American strategy. That is not to under-estimate the service that Americans have done Europe these fifty years past. However, the profound stress from which those Europeans currently engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq suffer not only reflects a basic lack of military and indeed broader security capabilities but also the need to undertake American strategy with European resources. Indeed, it is debatable if there is such a phenomenon as sound strategy in Europe today. Strategy is governed not simply by what is needed to be done, but by the resources, structures and cultures, together with the level of commitment. Given today’s security environment the need for
Europeans to generate strategic effect through a genuinely European foreign and security policy remains compelling, whatever the short term political problems the Union might face. Effective multilateralism must therefore become more than a bureaucratic convention. It must form the basis for a new and truly global European security creed built upon twenty-first century European security policy necessarily focussed on the EU.

The need for such a policy is reinforced by two basic truisms. First, Europeans cannot hide from the effects of global instability. They are too rich and powerful for that. Indeed, by joining the EU the smaller member-states not only gain the security benefits of the bigger, but also share their security responsibilities. Second, only as Europe can Europeans generate strategic effect. For these compelling reasons Europe’s leaders need to re-visit key elements of Europe’s external relations envisaged in the now defunct Constitutional Treaty. Given the urgency of the need to enhance Europe’s security credibility and the fact of a Union at twenty-seven, EU decision-making must be reformed and all aspects of external relations better harmonised quickly. The EU therefore needs a strong leadership focal point. At the very least, the EU requires a Foreign Minister together with an EU Foreign Service backed by an efficient and potent Intelligence capability. The Solidarity Clause, although agreed politically must be enacted, and be seen to be enacted, to reinforce to European citizens and strategic partners alike the will and determination of Europeans to engage a complex world effectively through the EU.

Relevant security policy requires a strong strategic concept. An EU Strategic Concept would build upon the 2003 European Security Strategy by adding additional tasks to the mission of the EU and promote the better organisation and co-ordination of all national agencies of EU member-states with external responsibilities, under the aegis of a much strengthened Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). To that end, a new mechanism is needed to forge strategic effect beyond the vital role of armed forces in broad security through the rapid enhancement of new civilian instruments and capabilities – the European Strategic Comprehensive Approach.

Why the EU? It is uniquely placed to generate the broad strategic effect that contemporary security entails.

1.2 Project European Security

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy has been in existence since 1991. However, it was created in an age far more innocent than that which the Union and its citizens are now entering. Indeed, with so many EU member-states crafting new security policy founded on both a comprehensive civil-military concept and the harmonisation of external and internal approach to security, the efforts of the Union and its member-states must be better harmonised. The
EU is a strategic Comprehensive Approach to security in waiting and therefore uniquely placed to lead Europe back to a global role founded on legitimate and effective multilateralism.

Today, it is broad security policy, incorporating all national means, as opposed to defence policy, that is the centre of gravity of global effect both offensive and defensive. Indeed, defence policy, although important, is but one subset of security policy and must be seen as such. Therefore, to generate such effect a ‘joined up’ approach to security it is vital all national and trans-national efforts are effectively co-ordinated.

However, the paradox of EU security and defence is that whilst tighter co-operation would help close Europe’s strategic security gap the resistance of member-states to the transfer of security sovereignty guarantees a gap that is dangerously wide and growing more so. Trust, or the lack of it, is at the heart of this most profound of dilemmas. Indeed, the first steps on the road to a Strategic Comprehensive Approach must necessarily involve internal confidence-building between member-states that has been badly shaken by the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.

To that end, Europeans need a galvanising strategic security initiative that can harmonise all Europe’s security efforts through better strategic awareness, relevant institutional reform, serious capability and capacity-building and the raising of public awareness. Project European Security would require nothing short of a political breakthrough if Europe is to be transformed from a regional into a global security actor. Indeed, the need for such breakthrough policy grows by the day:

- To restore those security elements of the now defunct Constitutional Treaty without which the security of EU citizens is becoming progressively weaker;
- To reinvigorate the CFSP which was created in a different age and reflects the anachronistic assumptions of that age;
- To act as a focal point for a cost-effective global security strategy capable of generating real civil-military security effect – the European Strategic Comprehensive Approach;
- To bridge the gap between the current European Security Strategy and a European Strategic Concept and thus establish robust security planning guidelines and security investment benchmarks;
- To elaborate a European Defence Strategy and the post-2010 military task-list;
- To get Europeans thinking globally and strategically; and
- To engage European citizens with an agenda for action.

In the world of today the dark side of globalisation demonstrates the dangers of an unconstrained ‘market-led’ approach to international relations. Unless,
some form of political regulation is introduced by the leading powers the dark side of globalisation will lead to destructive competition, open anarchy and an imbalance of power that will inevitably and inexorably undermine the institutional order of world security to the detriment of all.

1.3 Europe’s Interests

The December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, made a simple statement of fact with profound implications: the Union has “25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP) and… a wide range of instruments at its disposal”. Today, the EU has twenty-seven states with some five hundred million people. This is important. Economic power is the font of all power and Europe cannot escape the responsibility of that power.

By definition, therefore, Europeans are global actors, with global responsibilities, albeit poorly organised at times to the point of dysfunction. Like it or not, Europe as Europe must have the capability and capacities to protect its political and economic interests. This includes an ability to influence the strategic choices of other actors, primarily through economic and diplomatic action, but also on occasions through credible military coercion if no other solution can be found. That is the harsh reality of a harsh world and it is one about which European leaders must be far more candid with their peoples than hitherto.

The changing nature of threats identified by the European Security Strategy reinforces this point. The ESS identified five threat areas all of which have intensified since 2003 and all of which are global in reach and scope; terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. Unfortunately, acting upon the ESS has been prevented by the woolly strategic thinking that still pervades much of Europe. Consequently, the ESS lacks any real utility as the basis for strategic planning. Ultimately, such inaction reflects a dangerous lack of consensus over the nature and extent of Europe’s just interests, what they are, how they can be pursued and the relative priority that should be accorded to them. There are three basic categories of European interests which should necessarily establish those priorities and which in turn demand three levels of political and security response and investment:

- **Europe’s Vital Interests** are those interests critical to the functioning of Europe’s political, economic and social structures. If threatened such interests must be secured by all possible means, incorporating the full spectrum of military capabilities, including nuclear deterrence.
- **Europe’s Essential Interests** are those interests essential but not critical to the functioning of vital European systems and structures. However,
securing such interests does not normally require the full scale of diplomatic and economic means in the first instance. Military force can be used in their defence if it is believed that the loss of such interests will in time undermine vital interests.

- **Europe’s General or Milieu Interests** are those interests that define the aspirations of an actor to shape the international order. Europe has such aspirations. Indeed, modern Europe is built upon such aspirations. These are formal and informal codes of conduct driven by long-range goals concerning the future position of the international environment, especially the structure of the international system, future opponents or allies, hegemony or independence, etc.

However, the securing of such interests is only credible if the relationship between the security environment and the tools required to influence it are themselves credible to friend and foe alike. That is Europe’s critical weakness. Indeed, the nature of the security environment, the pace of change and the complexities it generates creates a very profound difference with more classical ages. Whilst the emergence of new powers tends to confirm the traditional role of military security as a defining feature of power and its balance, the parallel and interactive development of non-state power and strategic human insecurity is changing the traditional security concept, the task of the political leader and the nature and role of the planner alike.

Today, no European state alone can generate the kind of strategic effect necessary to cope with the nature and extent of complex strategic change. Therefore, the question then becomes how best to organise the trans-national effort. Traditionally, Europeans have tended to organise around three alternative trans-national groupings; the transatlantic, the European and the ad hoc. However, much time, energy, and therefore effect, has been lost in the sheer process of coalition or regime building. A European Strategic Comprehensive Approach would not only improve the practical organisation of effect, but also enhance and accelerate the political process by providing a template or framework for tight co-operation between states and institutions and thus help to formalise an expansion of the political options vital to engaging complexity. Indeed, the political identity of coalitions and regimes in a complex world is almost as important as the capabilities and capacities invested in them.

Why should the EU play such an important role in the security of Europe? After all, there are other institutions, such as NATO, and in any case Europe contains four of the world’s most powerful states. The contemporary security dilemma is posed by the fact that all power is relative and further complicated by the interaction between complexity, power and legitimacy. The EU is unique in that unlike other security institutions its instruments cover the whole gamut of state security activity. As a collection of democracies committed to uphold the principle of UN-sanctioned security the EU is to a limited extent auto-legitimising. Thus,
the EU as an effective global security actor is far more likely to convince its member-states of the right to act, as well as the need to act. Moreover, with economic, diplomatic, aid and development, legal and military tools at hand, the EU possesses all the attributes to forge a new and vital tool for the engagement of complex security.

However, the welding of those instruments into an effective strategic tool has thus far by and large failed. To that end the CFSP must be better able to aggregate, co-ordinate and project the combined efforts of all the EU’s institutions and member-states the world over. Unfortunately, both CFSP and ESDP are in danger of becoming metaphors for the patent and dangerous lack of European belief in its world role. Without such belief decline and danger is only a question of time. Fail to act and the next decade could witness the demise not just of European security leadership, but also that of the West, with the price for such failure being paid ultimately by European citizens.

The EU and its member-states must therefore make a quantum leap in security vision and effect by re-assessing Europe’s global responsibilities. Such security transformation will only be realised through the creation of an EU Security Policy able and credible in a world very different to that of the early 1990s. Only then will CFSP and ESDP be fit for purpose.

The clock is ticking.
2. Europe’s World: The Dark Side of Globalisation

Facts

According to the World Bank the demand for energy will increase by over 50% by 2035 and 80% of that will be met by fossil fuels. According to the European Security Strategy, “Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030”.

2.1 A World of Change and Complexity

Europe’s world is awash with change as the dark side of globalisation spars with the good. It is not as yet a world too far gone to avoid strategic conflict, but unless Europeans wake up to the nature and extent of negative change in the world much of the positive change that Europeans have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War will be undone. The problem for Europeans is not just the nature and extent of strategic change, but where to focus what will always be limited resources in a world of unlimited insecurity. It is all the more strange therefore that so much of Europe’s limited resources have been expended in pursuit of vague but hugely costly commitments, such as humanitarian interventionism.

The sheer complexity of the world that Europeans must engage in demands a sober analysis and thereafter a strong understanding of priorities. Indeed, implicit in the dark side of globalisation is a re-ordering of relationships that challenges organised state power to its core. One the one hand, there is the march of economic interdependence and the re-structuring of international politics therein. On the other hand, the many losers from globalisation seek redress often in the form of anti-state religious or ethnic fundamentalism. Today, the very inter-connectedness that makes the contemporary international system what it is has become so sensitised that disruptive shocks are magnified, be they political or economic. With those shocks complacent assumptions about the robustness of state power are placed under the most profound of pressures. Europe’s mission is, therefore, not only to help with the stabilisation of power, but to do so through the championing of legitimate institutions and thus by extension the rescuing of the state.

At the same time Europeans cannot do everything. A global belt of instability stretches around the world’s midriff. This belt is composed of problem states or ungoverned territories further complicating security in which black holes of insecurity beyond state control witness terrorists and criminals acting with virtual impunity. The belt stretches from Central America to the Sahara, from the greater Middle East to the ‘Stans’ of Central Asia and then on into the
South-East Asian archipelagos. However, for planners responding to the threats posed by such instability there is a profound challenge. Moreover, instability is not what it was. Paradoxically, instability today breeds a new form of power as anarchy, technology, terrorism, international crime merge. Failed or revisionist states, strategic terrorists, and organised mafias all seek refuge therein to exploit the global belt of instability given the protection it affords them. It is the paradox of the age the West built that the very market-based globalisation it created taken to extremes spawns anarchy and with it the progressive ‘democratisation’ of mass destruction in places beyond its control in which ever smaller groups gain access to ever more destructive technologies. It is therefore a profound irony that so many of the world’s largest energy reserves are to be found in therein. For example, precisely because oil and gas pipelines and main shipping routes run through it piracy has re-emerged as a major threat to the sea lanes upon which global trade relies, and with it Europe’s economic prosperity. Europeans must therefore be better able to act within the belt where and when such risks become a threat.

Indeed, that is the dilemma confronting Europe’s security planners as they survey a world in which new powers are emerging in parallel with all the other challenges outlined above. All such threats and challenges tax and will tax European resources and its available strategic choices thereafter. In such a world the best can be the enemy of the good and making choices as to which ‘priority’ to favour becomes a profoundly important and profoundly political process. Get it wrong and the dissipation of strategic effect becomes rapid and dangerous. What constitutes vital, essential and general European interests is thus the sine qua non of the European security policy dilemma. Hard-headed choices need to be made. A brief survey of Europe’s world reinforces the conundrum and, indeed, the need for such choices.

2.2 Vital Interest: Energy Security

The emergence of China, India and the energy-fuelled re-emergence of Russia, together with growth elsewhere in the developing world, is inexorably driving up the demand for energy at a time when the rate of discovery of new fossil fuels has peaked and is projected to decline rapidly. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is succinct; “Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030”. Most of Europe’s energy will come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa creating an indelible link between European security, energy security and instability. The World Bank reinforces this basic tenet of contemporary reality and estimates that the demand for energy will increase by 50% by 2035 with 80% of that demand being met by fossil fuels. Put simply, the ingredients clearly exist for dangerous state competition to re-emerge. In such circumstances Europe has an important role to play in renovating and reinvigorating the system of
institutionalised security governance the democratic West spent a century and two world wars creating. Indeed, it remains a political truism of international relations that only effective and legitimate institutions can prevent and offset the extremes of state behaviour.

Thus energy security will provide an essential dynamic for change in the global state system and Europe must face up to that. Indeed, nothing short of a European grand strategy on energy will suffice if security of supply, security of transportation and environmental security are to be organised effectively in a manner consistent with a fair and balanced approach to the needs of all states in the international community. With the best will in the world the increasingly desperate search for stable supplies of energy by all the world's leading powers could lead to miscalculation if not carefully managed and the EU must be at the forefront of efforts to institutionalise solutions to the energy security dilemma.

Equally, Europe must not be afraid of competing. The United States is also competing for energy. Indeed, the US is the world's greatest consumer of oil. America's determination to secure its energy future reflects both the fact and nature of competition that Europeans seemingly find so hard to grasp. Long used to removing overt competition from their daily interactions many EU member-states have become poor competitors on the world stage too often rejecting the very notion of competition in international affairs. That must end. Whilst the object of European grand strategy must be to curb excessive and dangerous competition through the support of functioning global and regional institutions too many Europeans seem to reject the need for a Europe that can compete.

Such competition will certainly change the structure of international relations. The oil market is tightening which, for the first time since the 1970s, affords the producers price-setting power with profound security implications for Europe. Indeed, such is the volatility of today's oil and gas market that over time the Union's economic performance will undoubtedly suffer if a balanced relationship between producer and consumer cannot be re-established with profound implications for Europe's social and political stability.

Today, every producer, however small, is a significant political actor helping to accelerate change in the world power balance and a return to the power politics of blocs. In 2004 Russia became the world's leading producer of oil and gas. This has already greatly enhanced Russia's international position. It is no coincidence that Russia is considering a gas equivalent of OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) that would enhance the political benefits Russia is reaping as an energy rich state and reinforce a leadership role for Moscow that has profound implications for the EU. Unfortunately, the cutting of oil and gas supplies to Ukraine and Georgia in 2005, and again to Belarus in 2006, not only demonstrated Moscow's willingness to use energy as a political lever, but the vulnerability of much of
Europe to such behaviour. Vulnerability which will only be alleviated if Russia can be persuaded to regard pipelines in much the same way as Europeans regard motorways, air lanes or sea lanes – open to all users. At the very least Moscow must understand that there will be a real political price to be paid for attempting to use energy to coerce Europeans.

The Undermining of Institutions

Europeans must, therefore, balance their rightly value-based approach to international relations with hard political realism if they are to compete effectively. The forging of such a balance in no way suggests European militarism or a Europe that will tip over into paranoia. However, the world is no longer one which the West controls by what it regards as its right and that means more risk. To that end Europeans must distinguish between legitimate and dangerous competition. Indeed, it is the avoidance of dangerous competition for which Europeans must strive. China and Russia have different concepts of the national interest, and very different views about world politics, including the roles played by multilateral organisations and international law, compared with that of the EU and its member-states. In particular, the concept of strategic partnership means different things in Beijing and Moscow than in Brussels. China is boosting strategic partnerships with countries such as Angola, Cuba, Nigeria, Sudan, and Venezuela primarily to meet its energy needs, following a well-established European and American tradition. China’s need for energy and its willingness to take energy from almost any regime is making it difficult to reach consensus in the UN Security Council (UNSC) over how best to deal with problem states and thus undermining the UN. Both Darfur and Iran are cases in point. Indeed, the permissive attitude of Beijing toward Iran’s nuclear ambitions does not augur well for the effective institutional governance of such dangers.

The result is a re-emergence of classical power politics, power blocs and a more narrow view of vital interests that could well come to dominate world politics in the near future if Europe does not champion an alternative approach. The marginalisation of the UN is already undermining the moral and rule-based effective multilateralism favoured by the Union. At the very least, a Europe-wide energy grand strategy is needed that combines the governance of supply and demand with energy security.

2.3 Vital Interest: Combatting Strategic Terrorism, International Crime and the Democratisation of Mass Destruction

Nor are Europe’s competitor states the sole source of concern. Indeed, regime change seems more likely amongst Europe’s state allies in the global belt of instability than amongst potential adversaries. Pakistan is a case in point. The future of Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf is at best uncertain. A takeover of the country by Islamic fundamentalists cannot be ruled out. As a nuclear power such an event would make the challenge posed by North Korea pale into
insignificance. Moreover, as Al Qaeda has its main operating base in the uncontrolled and uncontrollable north-west regions of Pakistan, strategic terrorism would receive the most deadly of gifts if Pakistan’s atomic bomb fell into the hands of fundamentalists. Europeans cannot ignore such dangers. Unfortunately, the challenge to state order from fundamentalists is not just a spectre in Pakistan. Important energy allies, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are also vulnerable to collapse. With the loss of key energy partners Europe would undoubtedly face a profound threat to its economic future. Today, Europeans would be able to do very little as key state partners are either replaced by adversaries or more security black holes.

Black holes exist in a number of failed and weak states and provide the perfect production and distribution hubs for drugs, weapons, dirty money, conflict diamonds and human trafficking. Indeed, the relationship between terrorism and crime is close precisely because the anarchy that emerges from the dark side of globalisation affords both the opportunities and commodities through which to make a very great deal of money. It also creates safe havens from which to fund operations and groups within European society sympathetic to their goals and as such represents a clear danger to Europe.

Furthermore, as globalisation fuels the democratisation of mass destruction it also complicates efforts by the West to intervene, stabilise and reconstruct. Islamic terrorists will get their hands on weapons of mass destruction, be they in their chemical, nuclear or biological form. That is the inexorable logic of the dark side of globalisation in which anyone can get anything given time, money and contacts. Europeans had better understand that and quickly. Recent history reinforces that chilling prospect. There have been at least ten plots in Europe involving chemical and biological weapons. In March 2001 terrorists attempted to release Sarin in the European Parliament in Strasbourg in an effort to kill the six hundred and twenty-five parliamentarians therein. In April 2004 American and British Intelligence agents foiled a chemical bomb plot in Europe by a group sympathetic to the aims of Al Qaeda. Whilst it is unlikely radiological weapons would inflict massive casualties or mass destruction such attacks could turn European cities into no-go areas. Put simply, the use of weapons of mass destruction/disruption will happen in time and Europe is in the front-line.

### 2.4 Vital Interest: Preventing WMD Proliferation and Dealing with Iran and its Nuclear Ambitions

WMD proliferation is too often viewed as abstract by many Europeans. No more. Nuclear technology is over sixty years old, missile technology older. The very market process at the heart of globalisation and the imperative for commodity exchange it promotes will witness acceleration in the proliferation of old, but massively destructive technologies. In such an environment whilst it
is prudent to maintain non-proliferation regimes such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. Prudence also demands a more proactive set of policies. The US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a start, but Europeans must once again grasp the importance of deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence, as a cornerstone of their security policy and recognise that intervention has its place in EU Security Policy. Iran’s nuclear ambitions reinforce the need for deterrence.

Residing in Europe’s regional neighbourhood, and one of the world’s major oil suppliers, with the second or third largest proven reserves, Iran is committed to a programme of nuclear research that could become weaponised. The EU3 (Britain, France and Germany) have striven with some limited success to wean Iran off such ambitions. However, Iran has successfully used oil as a political instrument to divide the international community. Whilst UN Security Council Resolution 1747 of March 2007 is to be welcomed, the limited extent of the sanctions imposed on Tehran demonstrates the extent to which the international community is divided.

Europeans must have no illusions about Iran, its strategy or its methods. Tehran has regularly targeted Western interests in the Middle East by supporting groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. The latter having fought a war against Israel in the summer of 2006 with both overt and covert Iranian backing. Iran is determined to become the dominant regional power. To that end it seeks to force the US and its allies out of Iraq by supporting the insurgency therein and to increase the pressure on Israel over time. Tehran also seeks to keep Arab states weak and divided. Iran’s repeated ignoring of UN Security Council declarations and resolutions underlines the seriousness with which it is prepared to pursue its ambitions.

2.5 Vital Interest: Preventing and Managing Pandemics

Avian or Bird flu has not as yet mutated into a virulent form that could lead to mass human casualties. However, the very real possibility exists. Indeed, such a pandemic may well be the first true test of Europe’s consequence management systems and homeland security. In the worst case scenario, large numbers of key people could be struck down or killed leading to significant weakening of Europe’s ability to respond to such a crisis. Indeed, the threat to critical personnel from such a pandemic would equate to an attack on critical infrastructure by strategic terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction. To that end, Europeans must begin preparations for back-up systems at the European, national and regional levels to build redundancy into critical systems. For that reason pandemics must be considered a threat to Europe’s vital interests.
2.6 Essential Interest: The Stability and Development of Africa

Europeans are already present in strength in Africa. Unfortunately, Africa demonstrates the extent to which Europeans too often confuse values with interests. Even though most African states have been independent states for almost as long as they were European colonies, colonialism continues to warp both African and European policies and perspectives. Put simply, Europeans need to be far more hard-headed about why Africa is of such importance to them in the broader geo-strategic context. To that end they need a clear set of criteria underpinning European policy therein and not retreat when the first misplaced accusation of imperialism or racism is levelled against them.

Clearly, Europe’s engagement in Africa is an essential element in European security given Africa’s geographic, political and economic proximity to Europe. Blessed with so much human potential too much of Africa has been for too long mired in the helplessness of failure and corruption. Indeed, for too long African leaders have hidden behind the veil of past colonialism to mask their own failings. Europeans can and must help but only Africans can end their addiction to the past if they are to move on and build the functioning societies that Africans deserve.

The EU has undertaken several stabilisation and reconstruction missions in Africa. Even though, with the exception of West Africa and Sudan, there are very few important African suppliers of energy and other raw materials. Certainly, the successful conclusion of Operation Artemis in Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (May – June 2003) has helped to boost Europe’s strategic self-confidence and that of others who look to Europe for providing stability in a new security age. It is for that reason that the EU is involved in the search for solutions to the ongoing political and humanitarian crises in the DRC and Darfur. Europeans are also making efforts to eradicate AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. Europe has the resources and expertise to improve the lives of millions in Africa and certainly Europe should take practical steps to that end, such as easing the impact of European farming subsidies on African farmers. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Europe’s leading role in the G8 initiative were but first steps. Indeed, European leadership will be critical in driving forward the development agenda, not least because failure will further impact European society. For example, human trafficking and the challenge posed by international criminals to Europeans reinforce the need to act. The March 2007 Action Plan on Human Trafficking is evidence of European intent but it must be further reinforced by both resources and determination. However, it is ultimately Africans who must resolve the challenges faced by Africa and European policy must be found on that principle.
2.7 Essential Interest: Environmental Security

Much has been made of the need for improved environmental security. Climate change comes in various forms, but its consequences for food production, freshwater stress, sea-level rise and extreme weather (e.g.; heat waves, flooding etc.) are profound and proven. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggests that by 2020 up to two hundred and fifty million Africans will be exposed to acute water stress. In the coastal areas of Asia, particularly the heavily-populated mega-delta regions, the risk of flooding is growing. Both phenomena could lead to significant new migration flows. Nor is Europe immune from such threats. Climate change could lead to inland flash flooding, increased coastal flooding and erosion, and a range of health risks triggered by heat waves. For example, the estimated cost of the 2003 heat wave in Europe amounted to some ten billion Euros.

Equally, combatting climate change and global warming provides Europe with a chance to lead by political, technological and innovative example thus demonstrating the centrality of institutions to what by definition must be a global effort. Moreover, whilst climate change and global warming are not the focus of this report the strategic thinking and action necessary to contest them will prove vital for getting Europeans to operate at the global level.

2.8 General Interest: Human Security

So much of contemporary global stability is linked to human security. Indeed, whilst geopolitics has been traditionally driven by states the emergence of the global belt of instability and black holes has created a new intimacy between the security of the individual, the state and the world that is novel and complex. There is, of course, a profound relationship between stability, human security and human rights. Sadly, gross violations of human rights continue to scar much of the world.

The facts speak for themselves. According to Conflict Barometer 2006 there were two hundred and seventy-eight political conflicts. Six of these were wars with twenty-nine severe crises. These thirty-five conflicts involved massive violence and intense human suffering. Eighty-three conflicts were classified as crises, but still involved violence. Some one hundred and eighteen violent conflicts scarred the world in 2006. Today there are currently 8.4 million refugees and as many as 23.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).

However, legitimate interest in the well-being of people important to Europe’s own security is one thing choosing where and how to act another. That is why Europe as one spoke in favour of the reform of the United Nations which a united Europe firmly believes is the cornerstone of security with dignity in a world in which security cannot be effective without being
legitimate. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is for Europeans not some meaningless political slogan but the very essence of all that the Europe is founded upon. However, the tension between ambitions, aspirations and resources reinforces the centrality of concerted action and legitimate institutions at the heart of EU Security Policy.

2.9 General Interest: Effective Disaster Response

A brief glance at the figures tells a compelling story about the impact of natural disasters upon world security and the demands such disasters make upon Europe. According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies from 1972 to 1996 around one hundred and forty million people have been affected by disaster, such as earthquakes, drought and famine, floods, hurricanes, landslides and volcanoes, usually in developing countries. During this period some one hundred and twenty-three thousand people were killed annually. Moreover, the trend in natural disasters is clearly upwards. The International Disaster Database demonstrates the ever increasing number of natural disasters. In 1975 less that one hundred natural disasters were reported worldwide. This number exploded in 2000 to more than five hundred. Last year the number was again close to five hundred. In 2004 a tsunami killed more than two hundred thousand people in southwest Asia, and in 2005 an earthquake in Pakistan killed more than seventy thousand people.

It was noticeable the crucial role European military capabilities played in humanitarian and rescue operations. Indeed, whilst it is a mark of progress that people expect more from security actors such as the European Union such ‘feel good’ operations also create challenges. For Europe’s over-pressed armed forces responding to such natural disasters also creates a profound dilemma. Consequence management and effective disaster response beyond Europe have thus become important components in Europe’s security role. However, only when Europe’s own disaster response capabilities and capacities, including armed forces, are not needed to serve Europe’s vital and essential interests should they be made available to others. Thus, the case for greater European capacities and capabilities is compelling. Europeans must continue to play a leading role in the alleviation of suffering but Europe’s leaders need to make hard choices about what and how Europeans can best help alleviate such suffering. These choices will reinforce the need for a set of criteria that can govern Europe’s engagement in the world. Any such criteria must necessarily be based on a clear understanding of the relative priorities generated by Europe’s vital, essential and general interests.
2.10 Combatting the Dark Side of Globalisation

Europe’s World

What Europe stands for is important in this world. Indeed, the very edifice Europeans have created as the European Union is value-based. Moreover, Europe’s so-called general or milieu interests are intrinsically linked to its vital interests. However, there are limits and those limits impose choices. Put simply, Europeans must be careful not to confuse values with interests. Such confusion is the essence of woolly European strategic thinking that too often either leads to the dissipation of Europe’s limited civil and military security resources in pursuit of vague but laudable goals or intimidates Europeans into taking no action at all and thus to withdraw from a world they see as too complex and too big for them to handle.

European Values and Interests

Europe’s world and the dark side of globalisation demands a more nuanced, professional and hard-headed approach in which the better organisation of what Europe has is devoted to the more effective pursuit of what Europe can and must achieve. When the projection of European values can clearly be demonstrated to support European interests then Europeans must act. If not then Europeans must demur. Strategic modesty will be as important as strategic capability in Europe’s world, but excessive modesty can be equally dangerous.

The clock is ticking.
3. A Situation Report on European Security

Facts
In March 2004 191 Europeans were murdered in an attack on commuters in Madrid. In July 2005, 52 Europeans were murdered in an attack on commuters in London.

3.1 Sovereignty and Security

The construction of Europe is something of which Europeans can rightly be proud. In five decades they have developed an innovative and complex set of rules and policies that tie them together and guarantee regional peace and stability. Rapprochement between nations that were at war so frequently remains unprecedented and a source of inspiration for others the world over. It is important that Europeans do not lose sight of this achievement.

Furthermore, the power of the individual European state, however large, would appear to be reaching limits when it comes to managing the new pan-global challenges of the 21st century. Power is, after all, relative. As the European Security Strategy (ESS) states, “no single state is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own”. The ESS is itself part of the problem. It should be the political statement of intent by EU member-states to engineer a common approach to mutual threats and shared interests. However, the grip that the state retains on both the strategic imagination of individuals and identities remains strong. The very real danger exists therefore that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will become a failed attempt to balance strong state identity with the need to generate a critical mass of cost-effective, transnational security. The situation is further complicated by those who seek to use security as an anvil upon which to forge a European political identity above and beyond that of the state. Thus, there is an urgent need to separate questions of security and identity if Europeans are to generate global security effect.

Certainly, a new balance will have to be struck between sovereignty and security if the EU is to develop into a ‘one-stop shop’ for Europe’s strategic security in a complex world as logic would suggest it should. At no stage in Europe’s development has the official approach to political integration proposed the absolute transfer of state sovereignty to a supranational European level. Indeed, limited transfers of sovereignty have only ever taken place when European states have been convinced that such transfers, far from weakening the state, would enhance both state power and influence. Thus, the development of Europe’s security role has been pragmatic and incremental. However, the pace and extent of strategic change and the need for European
grand strategy requires a far more effective mechanism for the rapid and ordered aggregation of European power to overcome the multi-faceted challenges that lie ahead. Pragmatism must continue, but incrementalism seems patently to have failed.

Clearly, if Europeans are to be strong global actors then the European Union must have the instruments, resources and systems to be able to act effectively and decisively. It is time therefore to move beyond the loss of political momentum that followed the stalling of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. The world is getting too dangerous for Europe's internal debate to remain academic and semantic. The number of states involved and the heterogeneity of interests in an EU of twenty-seven plus is and will reinforce political paralysis unless organised far more effectively and rapidly so. Consequently, enhancement of EU effectiveness must now be the focus of a determined effort to prepare Europe's institutions for a strong security role.

3.2 Progress Thus Far

Europe can only begin its preparations for a strategic future through a cold, hard assessment of what is available to it. Some progress has been made since 2004. in those areas vital to Europe's future role as a global actor; better conceptual thinking, the further refining of institutions, some development of security capabilities, both military and civilian, the relationship between internal and external security and the gaining of much-needed experience in the implementation of operations. However, given the tragic events in Madrid and London it is all the more surprising that the EU and Europeans continue to punch beneath their security weight – dangerously so.

The ESS remains the foundation of strategic conceptual thinking essential to the development of a European grand strategy. To that end, the ESS rightly posits that “the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked”. The EU seeks to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and making Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice. All well and good. To achieve these vital objectives, the EU proposes action on four simultaneous tracks - prevention, protection, response and pursuit. This is important because it would be difficult to imagine a Europe able to project if Europe is not simultaneously able to protect.

To that end, several initiatives have been launched to reinforce the ESS. The 2004 Action Plan and the 2004 Hague Programme, together with the 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy are all good starts and undoubtedly enhance Europe’s protection against terrorism. Although the EU’s most influential leverage tool, aid and development, still needs to be far more closely linked to European strategic objectives as laid out by the ESS. Unfortunately, all these
initiatives highlight the abiding dilemma of the organisation of European security; the relationship between the Council, the Commission and the member-states.

The EU already possesses a formidable institutional structure that should in principle be able to aggregate and magnify Europe's role in the world. At the top of the hierarchy sits the European Council and the EU High Representative (EUHR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The growing role and influence of the Council and the High Representative is evident in the number of Special Representatives with responsibilities inter alia for the Sudan, the Middle East peace process and the South Caucasus.

Furthermore, the institutional aspects of EU crisis management are gradually but steadily developing. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) provides strategic guidance both before and during crises, supported by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) which in turn is supported by the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). This includes the Civ-Mil Cell designed to ensure an effective interface between civilian and military crisis management. In addition, EU forces can in principle be supported by a Situation Centre (SitCen) and an EU Satellite Centre (SatCen) that interprets data from both military and civilian satellites for use by EU decision-makers and commanders in the field, albeit at a relatively low level of both competence and service.

In parallel the European Commission is developing an ever stronger security role. RELEX, the Commission's External Relations Directorate is slowly developing into something akin to an EU Foreign Service. In addition, through its funding of security research across the broad range of conflict prevention the Commission is also helping to shape the future of Europe's security. Moreover, the increased importance of homeland security is reflected in the strengthened role of transnational police and justice organisations such as Europol and Eurojust.

### 3.3 Military and Civilian Operations and Capabilities

The EU is also expanding its operational footprint and accelerating its operational tempo in a dozen operations spanning three continents. Military operations are underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD Congo). There are police missions in the Palestinian territories (EUPOL COPPS) and Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa), and again in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A rule of law mission is underway in Iraq (EUJUST Lex) and security sector reform (SSR) is being carried out again in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC DR Congo). Additionally, the EU is preparing to enhance its role in Kosovo and to support peace efforts in Afghanistan. Furthermore, European states are themselves involved in many more operations beyond the competence of the Union.
Much of this activity is a direct result of the Headline Goal process. In June 2004 Headline Goal 2010 (HG 2010) was endorsed by the European Council. HG 2010 was itself built on the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal by committing the EU to “be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union.”. This required of the Union, and thus the member-states, the ability to fulfil the full spectrum of crisis management from humanitarian and rescue tasks to peacemaking by combat forces. Given the tight defence budgets with which most member-states must contend, and the consequent shrinking of significant parts of their military capabilities since the end of the Cold War, the emphasis has been on limited intensification of military co-operation and where possible minor military integration. Thus, interoperability between forces, deployability of forces and sustainability of those forces whilst engaged on crisis management operations has been at the forefront of efforts, as well as the definition of agreed common rules of engagement (RoE).

Furthermore, the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) is an important component of EU crisis management. Endorsed by the European Council in December 2004, CHG 2008 stipulated that a “coherent use of Community and civilian ESDP instruments is of key importance for a qualitative improvement of the EU's capacity to act.” The main focus of action has been to improve the EU's ability to reinforce post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. Priority areas include effective policing, strengthening the rule of law, improving civil administration and civil protection. In addition, the EU is reinforcing its ability to undertake monitoring missions and, over the longer-term, to play a more effective role in security sector reform, support for disarmament and demobilisation and re-integration processes in conflict-ridden societies as well as strengthening the ability of weak and failing states to absorb aid and development. However, there is a marked deficit in the number of personnel available for civilian missions and which needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

3.4 A Work in Progress

However, much of this ‘progress’ belongs to a different age and a different mindset. Indeed, CFSP is a function of 1990s crisis management and the world has moved and is moving on apace. Therefore, an awful lot more needs to be done and quickly to turn Europeans, and by extension the European Union, into an actor capable of fulfilling its global role and thus its security responsibilities to its citizens. Put simply Europe lacks anything like sufficient security investment, capacity and capabilities, be they civil or military. Whilst copious amounts of words and much paper has been expended far more needs to be done to create an effective institutional mechanism that welds Intelligence, international criminal law and interdiction into a credible
deterrent and thereafter a viable platform for the projection of strategic security effect. Critically, the Union lacks unified political will and, therefore, a unified EU security system and efficient decision-making body reinforced by a functioning joint Commission-Council Directorate. Above all, both Europeans and the European Union are critically deficient in civilian and military capabilities and capacities that would give credible meaning to any such institutional structure.

Indeed, far from the institutionalisation of European security leading to more effective European operations, too many member-states seem to be retreating into institutionalism for its own sake. Not surprisingly this has led to sharp criticism, not just from key partners such as the United States, but from many within the EU. The very real danger exists today that the institutional cart will be placed before the policy and capability horses if this non-approach to grand strategy is not brought to an end and quickly.

Furthermore, for all its importance as a precedent the ESS is at best a limited document that reflects as much a lack of strategic vision as evidence of a common perception of global threats and opportunities. Indeed, the ESS must be seen for what it is; a pre-strategic concept. Consequently, the EU’s strategic vision is still dangerously under-developed and thus any coherent expression as to where, when, why, how and with what the Union will act. Such uncertainty is actively preventing Europeans from preparing for action, let alone taking it. Critically, the ESS provides little or no direction or guidance to EU security planners, both civilian and military. It is therefore in urgent need of further elaboration if it is to become what it should be; a European Strategic Concept that strengthens the role of the EU based on the principle that the security whole is stronger than the sum of its parts and which harmonises the efforts of the member-states as a clearing house for the generation of strategic effect.

3.5 Work Urgently Required

As a consequence, both CFSP and ESDP are essentially reactive and founded on regional rather than strategic security assumptions and principles. ESDP, in particular, has been driven to a considerable extent by regional events, particularly those in the Western Balkans. Consequently, ESDP has become fixated on small wars in Europe, even as Europe’s interests demand of the EU both a global security vision and a comprehensive strategic response. If there is one cogent message today’s security environment communicates it is that Europeans have no choice but to extend both the reach and intensity of their security co-operation. To that end, the political question over the nature of Europe’s political organisation and identity – political integration versus intergovernmentalism – must be separated from the simple and urgent need to make Europe a credible global security actor. In other words, key decisions
and commitments required to develop a workable and capable European security and defence posture cannot wait a further ten years, but must be taken today. Therefore, work is urgently required if Europeans are to close the gap between strategic European interests and the defence thereof, and a credible grand strategy.

3.6 Strategic Partnerships

There are four pillars upon which a European grand strategy would necessarily have been founded; strategic partnerships, the transatlantic relationship, relevant strategic capabilities and capacities and public support. However, all four areas are in need of strengthening. If the EU is to be a strategic actor such ambition must be reflected in the strategic partnerships it develops with other such actors. Strong on rhetoric but weak on substance EU strategic partnerships seem all too reflective of the EU’s status as a world actor. The ESS makes it abundantly clear; the EU must forge special bonds with the powerful - Russia, Japan, China, India and, of course, the US. Institutionally, the EU also states that it seeks a similar partnership with NATO. And yet, as all those involved will attest, the EU-NATO relationship is one of the most dysfunctional in Brussels as competing national policies prevent anything but the most superficial of engagements. That must end.

To some extent the EU-NATO impasse is extended to other strategic partnerships. Consequently, the EU’s strategic partnerships have become an exercise in strategic political correctness that too often prevents a frank discussion of the many issues that not only bring states together, but drive them apart. Indeed, the very inability of the EU to confront uncomfortable issues underlines the basic weakness at the heart of the CFSP. It is a profound unwillingness to recognise that one day the EU might have to confront other big powers and that in the worst of all worlds that confrontation might turn military. Put simply, the EU, unlike any other actor, is not permitted to plan and prepare for worst case consequences and until it is the EU will remain a strategic lightweight.

These failings are particularly apparent with respect to the EU’s strategic partnership with Russia. There are profound differences with Russia over democracy, human rights and the rule of law; the very values upon which the EU is built. It is no coincidence that in 2005 the conclusion of the so-called “four common spaces” between the EU and Russia took two years to negotiate. However, whilst the most protracted negotiations concerned the common space on external security and the common space of freedom, security and justice, the common space on research, education, culture and the economic space faced few problems. The Russians have a very much clearer notion of interests than many Europeans, even if their method of pursuing them often leaves much to be desired. Indeed, Moscow’s threat to withdraw from the
Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty and to once again target Europe with nuclear warheads is yet another mark of an unhelpful Russian attitude that Europeans must reject as one.

Unfortunately, European countries mostly shy away from outspoken criticism of Russia, even though they are profoundly sensitive to Russia’s recent internal political developments, the diluting of democracy and its conduct of an ever more assertive foreign policy. Europeans must accept that Russia’s re-invigorated foreign policy, and its political and economic governance are closely intertwined. Indeed, having regained control over oil and gas production the Kremlin is steadfastly fashioning energy into a strategic lever. Make no mistake; Europe’s increasing reliance on Russian energy reinforces the need not only for an EU energy policy, but long-term efforts to obtain energy from a wide range of sources as possible to avoid over-reliance on any one actor. The quarrels between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and Russia and Belarus in 2007 that led to supply reductions in several EU countries must serve as a warning to Europe.

Much has been made of the emergence of China as a world economic power and regional military power. And yet, Europeans also seem to lack any coherent policy for dealing with China. The European Commission’s October 2006 “Communication on China” did at least begin to address some of Europe’s legitimate concerns. China is the second largest trading partner of the EU, behind the United States, whilst for China the EU is the most important trading partner. However, the scale and pace of the trade deficit the Europeans face with China is alarming. In 2005 the deficit stood at €106bn, the greatest trade deficit the EU has with a third country. While the European Commission is working on further improving the access of European companies and European investment into China, the Chinese continue to criticise what they call the protectionist policy of the EU. Thus, although it was the EU that strongly supported China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Europeans seem to gain precious little return on such political investment.

This is important because in various European strategy papers, as well as in the Chinese government’s own 2003 EU Policy Paper, profound differences of perception are acknowledged. Consequently, the need to strengthen the existing dialogue on these vital matters must continue as part of strenuous European efforts to create a more balanced relationship – trade included – in which Europeans talk frankly with their Chinese counterpoints and with a single voice.

3.7 The Transatlantic Relationship

The transatlantic relationship is in need of modernisation. The defeat of the Republicans in the November 2006 mid-term elections was due in large part to concerns of the American people about the course of American foreign and security policy. The war in Iraq has become particularly unpopular, followed
shortly thereafter by the war in Afghanistan. Consequently, the United States is unsure as to its future direction, where it should focus its leadership and how it should generate the effect that such leadership requires. However, for all its many failings American strategic leadership remains vital in a world awash with uncertainty and instability. Equally, it is evident that the old assumptions upon which the transatlantic relationship was founded are no longer valid. A truly strategic Europe would thus provide a modernised transatlantic relationship with strategic options and not just for Europeans, but also North Americans. It is therefore all the more regrettable that current low levels of security and defence investment in Europe continue to suggest a Europe still committed to resentful ‘followership’ of an unsure US, rather than a mature partnership between partners committed to an active policy of engagement.

Clearly, the transatlantic relationship, like the world in which it resides, must change and transform to reflect the political state of its members and their needs in a complex world. Since the end of the Cold War, the transatlantic relationship has been focussed on what by historic standards are the minutiae of grand strategy. For all their televised tragedy conflicts in the Balkans did not represent the stuff of transatlanticism. Indeed, the transatlantic relationship has never been very good at dealing with small picture security, but then what collective security system has? Rather, the transatlantic relationship was founded to deal with high politics and big security and, as events in Iran and North Korea demonstrate, the likelihood of big security challenges in the near future is clear and present. The question that fixates Europeans and North Americans alike as the true nature of twenty-first security begins to be revealed is will the change that is ever more apparent in the world lead to a modernisation of the transatlantic relationship? Unfortunately, no such modernisation can take place in the absence of a truly capable and relevant European strategic security actor.

### 3.8 Strategic Capabilities and Capacities

The EU’s military capabilities development process Headline Goal 2010 is replete with the contradictions inherent in the current state of ESDP. The ambition is clear “Building on the Helsinki Headline and capability goals and recognising the existing shortfalls that still need to be addressed, Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the full spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. This includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. Moreover, Headline Goal 2010 goes on to state that: “As indicated by the European Security Strategy this might also include joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combatting terrorism and security sector reform”. In other words, a direct link is established
through the European Security Strategy (ESS) between the EU’s stated security and defence ambitions, the strategic environment in which the EU resides and what Europe needs to do collectively to bring positive influence to bear.

The centre-piece is the EU Battle Groups, the basic building blocks of a modular military crisis management, first response, and operational capability. Designed to be some 1500 strong and capable of acting as a stand alone force Battle Groups are land-focused forces capable of rapid reinforcement and development and can be supported by air, naval and Special Forces if needs be. Designed to undertake a range of missions including the separation of parties to a conflict, conflict prevention, evacuation, humanitarian assistance and stabilisation and reconstruction Battle Groups are meant to be robust force packages. It is envisaged that 7-9 Battle Groups will be available by the end of 2007 and 14 will be available by 2009 even though only two will be operational at any one time and their use will always remain subject to member-state approval. However, Battle Groups are not standing forces and will be disbanded after their operational rotation. This is a failing because many of those same forces could be tasked by other missions and institutions and it is questionable the extent to which they will ever be deployed.

Furthermore, Capability Improvements Chart I/2006 states that of sixty-four Capability Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits covering Land, Maritime, Air, Mobility and ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance), seven have been formally solved, four are showing signs of improvement and fifty-three have not changed over the 2002-2005 period identified in the Catalogue and according to the Catalogue. Performance is to say the least modest. Unfortunately, without a credible ESDP the CFSP itself is more an exercise in political rhetoric than a meaningful contribution to European security, let alone world security. Moreover, even if Headline Goal 2010 is achieved will it afford Europeans the security they need in the world of today or the Europe of yesterday?

The contradictions do not stop with Headline Goal 2010. The need for common funding underpinned by new budgetary mechanisms is urgent. The funding of ESDP operations is a case study in the avoidance of responsibility. The costs of ESDP missions in principle “lie where they fall”, i.e. each participating member-state pays for the equipment and personnel it deploys abroad on operations. Even though some of the bigger nations have been reluctant to promote common funding for fear of losing control over operations the current system in fact places a disproportionate burden on ESDP coalition leaders. Indeed, it is both a recipe for free-riding from some of the smaller member-states and for a lack of accountability for some of the bigger. Clearly, common funding would impose some constraints upon leadership. Equally, it would also strengthen the commitment of all EU member-states to operations across the mission spectrum from advanced expeditionary coalition warfare, through stabilisation and reconstruction to consequence management.
This is important because the committed states not only have to pay more in financial terms, but their young men and women bear a disproportionate amount of the risk and too often pay for it with their lives. This dilemma even extends within operations as too many member-states seek to give the impression of activity, but through deliberately crafted and limited rules of engagement (RoE) shift the burden of risk onto their partners. If this basic lack of solidarity is not resolved whatever the clever political and institutional fixes at the supreme political level the EU will progressively fail as a security actor – be it strategic or otherwise, and Europe along with it.

### 3.9 Public Support

A European grand strategy will be of little value in the absence of robust domestic popular support. The ambiguous commitment to a strategic ESDP of many of Europe’s political leaders is compounded by similar ambiguity amongst the EU’s citizens. Many of Europe’s people are confused and badly informed about what threats they face and how best to respond. Such ‘soft’ support for EU security is reflected in public opinion polls. Eurobarometer surveys of the prevailing mood of Europeans regularly reveal strong public backing for both CFSP and ESDP. Indeed, Eurobarometer 66 showed that 75% of Europeans are in favour of an EU common security and defence policy among EU member states and 68% would like to see an EU common foreign policy.

However, apparent strong public support must not be confused with security being accorded a high priority amongst Europeans. On the contrary, when asked about the most salient issues upon which the EU should focus Europeans choose economic and social questions above foreign and security policy, reflecting the strategic vacation that too many Europeans continue to believe they can enjoy. Eurobarometer 65 showed that 43% of Europeans said that top priority should be given to the fight against unemployment, whilst an equal 43% wanted poverty reduction and social exclusion given priority. The maintenance of peace and security in Europe came only third at 31%. Moreover, the fight against terrorism was given priority by only 19% of the population with the need for the EU to assert its political and diplomatic importance around the world receiving the support of only 5%. Put simply, the robustness of public support for the evolution of Europe’s foreign, security and defence policy is at best limited. The message? Too many of the Europe’s leaders seem only willing to follow public opinion, rather than lead it.

### 3.10 Action Needed on European Security

The European Union has made some progress in fashioning its security role in the world since the December 2003 publication of the European Security Strategy. Indeed, with its natural predilection towards a comprehensive
Beyond 2010

Too Little,
Too Slowly

concept of and approach to security the Union is well placed to engage the many complex challenges that Europeans will face in the twenty-first century. However, the pace of change beyond Europe seems markedly quicker than the pace of security reform within Europe. Whilst the issue of threats, challenges and reform was an academic issue in the 1990s that politicians could avoid, that is no longer the case. Like it or not, the next five years will be crucial for effective European security in a dangerous world.

Today too many Europeans, even at the highest levels, see little or no link between the security investments they make and the security effect they need to generate. Each state is responsible for crafting its own security policy and thus the assessment of security investment is necessarily done from a parochial and fragmented position. Only if the analysis of the environment is lifted to the level of the EU will all states be able to think big enough about big security in a big world for such investments to make sense. This is particularly the case for the smaller EU member-states for which only economies of scale will render their security investments cost-efficient or effective. Indeed, those investments only make sense in support of Europe-wide security and defence efforts. Thus, only an EU Security Policy will enable both CFSP and ESDP to make far more cost-effective use of limited financial resources, help to resolve the security budget deficits of most EU member-states and lead to far better and more rigorous coordination of national security projects. The EU is a long way from being an effective global actor and Europeans are all the more insecure as a result. Therefore, any situation report can only conclude that too little is being done, too slowly and that if nothing changes Europe’s leaders are condemning their people to a dangerous future.

The clock is ticking.
4. **Project European Security: The Leadership Plan**

*Fact*

It was agreed at the 2000 Treaty of Nice that when the EU reaches 27 member-states European Institutions should be reformed. In January 2007 Bulgaria and Romania joined the Union at 27.

### 4.1 Establishing Leadership

**Establishing Leadership**

The focus of this report is the generation of global security effect by Europeans founded on a new political realism about Europe’s world role, the consolidation of Europe’s strategic effort and the realisation of relevant European capabilities. The report is unequivocal in calling for clear recognition that it is the member-states that lead security in Europe with the Union acting as the aggregator and agent of the states. There are no pretensions herein to create a European super-state through the back door. However, so long as considerable controversy remains over questions of organisation, analysis and funding member-states, particularly the larger ones that enjoy far more cohesive crisis managements structures, will be unwilling to invest further in the future development of the strategic structures of the Union.

**The Need for a European Strategic Culture**

Underpinning better preparation and organisation is the urgent need to create a European strategic culture, i.e. a common European way of assessing danger and responding to it founded on the opportunities and constraints afforded by Europe’s position, history, tradition, power, approach and structure. To that end the military realm must play an important role therein given its tradition of hard planning and transnational co-operation. Interoperability, i.e. effective interaction between arms forces of different nations requires, by definition, a cultural convergence and harmonisation that is second nature to Europe’s armed forces. Moreover, a European Strategic Concept that is more than a literary aspiration will by necessity be reliant upon the fostering of such a culture. Give people the confidence to act and the process becomes self-sustaining.

**An EU Security Policy**

Furthermore, in a security environment replete with big and complex security issues leadership must also be at a premium. By far the most powerful security actors in Europe a strategic consensus between Britain, France and Germany will be essential to the forging of an effective European grand strategy.

**Europe’s Hard Power Facts**

Whilst recognising the need to avoid mechanistic approaches there are certain leadership/power realities at the core of European security. According to IISS “The Military Balance 2007” the defence budgets for EU in 2006 totalled...
€164.3bn (at 5 May 2007 exchange rates for UK and other non-Euro states). British spending in 2006 on defence was €41.9bn or 26% of the total. French spending was €35.4bn or 22% of the total, whilst German spending was €27.9bn or 17% of the total. Thus the biggest three EU member-states spent 65% of all defence expenditure by the EU 27. In other words, 24 EU member-states are spending an average of €3bn per state per annum on defence which is insufficient to generate the capabilities already identified.

Equally, there is a clear second rank grouping. In 2006 Italy spent €12.1bn or 7% of the total, the Netherland €7.8bn or 5% of the total and Spain spent €7.7bn again 5% of the total. Sweden spent €4.3bn or 3% of the total and Poland €4.3bn or 3% of the total. Thus, the five second rank states represent some 23% of the total defence expenditure of the EU. Eight EU member-states thus represent 88% of total expenditure on defence by EU member-states whilst the remaining 19 member-states can only muster 12% of which a significant portion of that is provided by Greece.

The message from the figures is clear. The smaller member-states need to make a choice between moving ahead through some form of security and defence integration or providing niche support to the bigger European powers and organising themselves to that end. Indeed, whilst the trirectoire is necessary it is not sufficient, given the limitations of Britain, France and Germany, which is why other major countries must be involved in such a process from the outset.

Clearly, there is a natural form of order with the EU given the land focus of both the French and the Germans and the maritime/amphibious emphasis of the British. With all the major states involved, and notwithstanding that they will need to retain the capacity to operate either alone or with other partners, all EU member-states would enjoy some incentives to buy into the future development of a strategic ESDP. Those that do not invest in a strong ESDP will inevitably face marginalisation.

To further such a goal a new strategic security framework should be established through the creation of a Security and Defence Group under the authority of the European Council to ensure leadership takes place within the institutional framework of the EU and not beyond. Such a Group would establish the primacy of the member-states by overseeing all of the Union’s security activities. One approach would be to establish a leadership group comprised of Britain, French, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain as permanent members drawn from those states in the first and second layers of power. A further six states from the remaining block of eighteen could then sit for a period of two years, whilst the other twelve member-states would during that period lead challenge clusters. These would be task-oriented working groups charged with looking at specific security issues, such as climate change, water shortage, the changing demand for food, population growth etc.
Beyond 2010

Challenge Clusters

Such an approach would also help to resolve the problem of a Commission at twenty-seven. Although the Treaty of Nice provides for the ending of the one Commissioner per country rule when the Union reaches twenty-seven, it is hard to see which member-states would be prepared to give up such influence. Indeed, although all European treaties call upon Commissioners to be above national interests experience confirms that such political altruism is rarely the case. The Constitutional Treaty proposed to limit the number of Commissioners to two-thirds of the number of countries with a rotation to ensure that all member-states took turns in having a Commissioner. Better organisation of Commissioners could enable them to head challenge clusters alongside their Council counterparts and in conjunction with ‘lead’ countries, thus honouring in spirit Pioneer Groups and structured co-operation.

EU Strategic Directorate

Those units in both the Council and the Commission responsible for security and defence should in time be brought together in a new combined Strategic Directorate with an EU Foreign Minister at its head. The PSC, General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) could then be subsumed within a new EU Strategic Affairs Committee. An EU Diplomatic Service would have to be established to support the new Directorate and to foster co-operation with the UN, NATO and those other states, such as the United States, committed to grand stability.

4.2 EU Security Sector Reform

The drive towards an EU Security Policy is an area in which Britain, France and Germany must take the initiative by first aligning their expectations and better coordinating their actions. An EU Security Policy would necessarily be based on four strategic goals:

- Coping early with a broad spectrum of threats from wherever they emerge;
- Establishing true strategic partnerships with all those committed to grand stability;
- Reviving the system of institutional security the West spent a century creating by repairing the institutional order through effective multilateralism; and
- Further strengthening security in and around the EU, with particular focus on the EU Neighbourhood in the Mediterranean, Middle East, Africa and Central Asia.

To establish a critical path towards an EU Security Policy EU security sector reform is also needed. To that end, the reform and adaptation of the future strategic roles of both CFSP and ESDP beyond 2010 would need to be based on an activist agenda:
• Elaboration of the specifics of an EU Security Policy, together with the strengthening of the ESS into a European Strategic Concept;
• Elaboration of the leadership mechanism, including the Security and Defence Group;
• Elaboration of a European Strategic Comprehensive Approach;
• Creation of an EU Foreign Minister and supporting Foreign Service and Intelligence means;
• The re-organisation of both relevant Council and Commission agencies into a single Strategic Directorate;
• Elaboration of a European Defence Strategy by high-ranking senior military officers drawn from member-state General Staffs and working under the aegis of the EU Military Committee (EUMC); and
• Strengthening of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and by extension a European security procurement policy capable of supporting the new strategic security role, including the elaboration of needs in key strategic enabler sectors such as space-based assets and Intelligence-gathering systems.

In the interim, to accelerate EU security reform, EU member-states must make better and more frequent use of informal meetings at the foreign and defence minister level (in bilateral, trilateral or multilateral formats). Most importantly, they must overcome the self-imposed constraint that emerges from dual membership of both NATO and the EU, which is true for most of the member-states, by clearly delineating the objectives of the two organisations and by reinforcing the relationship between the EU Battle Groups and the NATO Response Force (NRF). They must also re-examine together the arrangements for the use of NATO assets and capabilities through the Berlin-Plus process to streamline a system that has not worked effectively. A useful first step in inter-institutional confidence-building would be to establish practical projects on the ground, such as EU-NATO Crisis Action Teams that could pave the way for a sensible and sustainable planned relationship between the Union and the Alliance.

In the short-term European civilian crisis management, including economic measures, needs to be better focussed on the EU and expanded across the security spectrum. The role of the Commission, particularly with regard to aid and development, must be far more closely linked to the strategic objectives established by EU Security Policy.

4.3 The Need for Institutional Reform

There are precedents for a flexible, creative and yet structured approach to problem-solving. The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was built around several Working Groups led by different states and comprising different groupings. The leaders of such groups were by no means invariably the EU3 or...
the larger member-states. It would therefore be useful to extend that principle
to the development of broad security leadership to deal with complex security
issues.

**Reinforcing ESDP Today**

In the interim, a new Code of Conduct would strengthen co-ordination
between the High Representative, and the European Commission’s Directorate
General for External Relations (RELEX). Moreover, the European Parliament’s
Committee on Foreign Affairs should be given genuine powers of
parliamentary oversight. At the heart of the system would be a new Planning
Directorate with a beefed up Situation Centre that would look at threats both
short-term and long-term and recommend suitable responses. This would
include an EU Homeland Security Group charged with better preparation and
organisation. It would also be useful to reinforce ESDP with a Strategic Futures
Branch to develop plans for a comprehensive Headline Goal 2020 that looked
to the future and properly balances civilian and military security efforts.

**A New Council-Commission Relationship**

Fifty years on from the Treaty of Rome it is time to re-negotiate the security
relationship between the member-states, the Council and the Commission to
create a single strategic security framework. Indeed, whilst the Commission
and the Council are slowly refining their crisis management relationship it is as
yet far from seamless. This is reflected, for better or worse, in both Headline
Goal 2010 and Civilian Headline Goal 2008 which both emphasise close co-
ordination between the Council and the Commission.

**Re-connecting European Security to World Security**

Put simply, if strategy and power are intimately related so are structure and
organisation. The loss of political momentum following the failure of the
Constitutional Treaty has made the positing of strategic security within the EU
far harder. Indeed, the failure to reform the institutional framework of the
Union to take account of its now twenty-seven members, and their very
differing security traditions and approaches, has left European security at best
tenuously connected to world security.

The clock is ticking.
5. Project European Security: The Strategic Partnership Plan

Fact
According to Goldman Sachs China surpassed UK Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2005 and will surpass that of Germany in 2008, Japan's in 2033 and the US in 2040.

5.1 Forging Real Strategic Partnerships

In a world in which even the most powerful state structures are daily being undermined it is vital that the EU and its member-states seek common ground with all like-minded actors committed to global stability. For that reason an EU Security Policy would necessarily move the EU beyond the transatlantic relationship as the sole strategic relationship and forge close ties with the newly powerful. These powers not only include emergent and re-emergent states such as Russia, China, Japan and India, but also cornerstone regional powers such as Brazil, South Africa, South Korea and Australia. The forging of robust and durable relationships with such countries would help to reinforce the centre-piece of an EU Security Policy, effective multilateralism. This would make the EU an indispensable strand in a web of stabilising regional institutions designed to reinforce both Europe’s political legitimacy and effectiveness.

To that end, the EU must promote convergence, and wherever possible harmonisation, of interests and values with key partners. Indeed, such a programme founded on a pragmatic commitment to the application of overwhelming resources and effort in pursuit of rule-based international relations would establish a legitimate foundation upon which joint actions to realise common interests or fight off common threats would be possible.

5.2 The EU and Russia

There are several important factors why the EU and Russia must continue to work towards a meaningful strategic partnership:

- Shared history and geographical proximity;
- The need to reinforce support for the transition to democracy in Russia;
- To overcome concerns about Russia shared by many of the Central and Eastern European members of the EU;
- To promote a common interest in stabilising the Caucasus and Caspian
Region and the solving of the several frozen conflicts that exist therein;
• To emphasise and confront common challenges and threats such as strategic terrorism and international crime; and
• To dissuade Russia from adopting aggressive political postures towards Europeans.

Above all, there is the need to establish a sustainable, durable and just energy relationship. In 2005 EU energy dependence represented some 56% of all energy consumed, with some 25% of the EU’s oil and gas imports coming from Russia. Thus, a very real strategic partnership already exists not least because Russia depends significantly on resource revenues from its European customers. Moscow needs to understand that. Indeed, without the flow of resource income from Europe, Russia’s economy would grow far less than the 7% per annum that it has enjoyed this past decade.

Europeans must therefore make better strategic use of this mutual dependence to strengthen a genuine strategic partnership with Russia. First, through the creation of a stable relationship between supplier and client that can ensure and assure oil and gas supplies. Second, through the development of co-operation aimed at preventing conflicts injurious to the interests of both parties. Third, by focussing on the joint realisation of a pragmatic security agenda that improves the security of all. Such an agenda should at the very least include preventing the proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and small arms and light weapons (SALW).

Europeans and Russians can benefit together from a more transparent and stable relationship, both economically and politically. However, Europeans must exert collective influence on Russia to curb anti-democratic and aggressive tendencies. It should be clearly understood by Moscow it is easier for European countries to save energy and to expand their sources of energy than it is for Russia to expand its distribution network toward Asia. Russia, therefore, will lose if its relationship with the EU deteriorates. However, Europeans must speak with one voice, which will require far more solidarity among the twenty-seven member-states than hitherto. Indeed, energy relations with Russia could well prove to be the first major challenge for an EU Security Policy. Without such policy it is all too likely that Moscow will be play EU member-states off against each other.

5.3 The EU, China and India

Strategic partnerships with China and India must go far beyond trade statistics, textile quotas, or even arms embargoes. Indeed, it is vital that the EU and China and the EU and India enter a strategic dialogue that goes back to strategic basics. Put simply, the EU, China and India need a firm
understanding of the respective roles they will play not only as regional, but as global actors, in the twenty-first century if global stability is to be realised. At the very least Europeans must far better understand the strategic consequences of China and India as world powers, and be seen by the latter two as a credible and autonomous strategic actor. Be it the setting up of a free trade area in Asia-Pacific, the security political stability of that region, or attitudes over greenhouse gas emissions – the role and the development of China and India will be crucial. In an interconnected world what happens in South and East Asia will impact profoundly on Europe.

There is a multitude of security challenges which calls upon the three to cooperate; the fight against strategic terrorism, energy insecurity, unbalanced migration, dangerous demographic change, international crime or environmental destruction are just the most prominent issues. Moreover, an EU Security Policy would help better craft European understanding of Chinese and Indian perceptions and their perceptions of the EU as a strategic actor. Initially, existing cooperation and/or meetings, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), need to be strengthened as essential tools for the establishment of a new strategic agenda within the context of true EU-China-India Strategic Partnerships.

Ultimately, such strategic partnerships must be founded on political realism. First, the China and India policies of all member states must be better coordinated through the EU. Second, EU Security Policy must include a credible military component. Indeed, the development of credible military power will strengthen the value of the EU as an actor in the minds of both Beijing and New Delhi. This is not for a minute to suggest a conflict. Rather, Europe needs to restore its currency of power across the world that military weakness denies it. Without such tight cohesion European influence on developments in Asia will remain weak. Make no mistake; like Russia, China and India are playing power politics and it is time Europeans also learnt to play by the same rules when the situation so demands.

5.4 The EU, the US and NATO

The transatlantic relationship remains the security cornerstone of the twenty-first century. Much in that relationship will rely upon a genuine strategic partnership between the US and Europeans with much of that effort focussed on and directed through the EU. NATO will remain the essential military alliance for ensuring that Americans, Europeans and others can work together militarily in Europe and beyond. However, it is the nature of contemporary strategy that any response requires all state instruments and that in Europe can only be afforded by aggregating state instruments and that in turn can only done through the EU.
Influencing the US

Furthermore, for the foreseeable future influencing the United States will remain essential to European Foreign and Security Policy. Thus it is time to put recent disagreements to one side. Iraq and Afghanistan have split Europe demonstrating yet again the ability of the Americans to divide Europe if Europe is not in strategic accordance with the US. That power will continue for the foreseeable future. However, the failure of US strategy in Iraq has also profoundly shaken Americans leading to a profound rethink about the nature of American strategic leadership. Indeed, the very damage to American power and prestige that has occurred of late has re-opened the idea that allies have value in a world in which one cannot be effective without being legitimate. As power moves inexorably to the East and becomes ever more state-centric as it does so transatlantic solidarity will be vital if emerging state power is to be embedded in functioning institutions, such as the United Nations, central to European grand strategy. That, after all, is the essence of effective multilateralism and only Americans and Europeans in harness can achieve such a goal.

A Bumpy Ride

There is thus every reason to believe that the transatlantic relationship could re-constitute as a meaningful politico-security idea. There will be problems. Politics inside the Washington Beltway still makes it hard for American leaders to understand the constraints imposed by partnership and the lack of a strategic tradition in many European countries means that the relationship between membership of a strategic community and the responsibilities it imposes are little understood.

A Direct EU-US Security Relationship

Again, the message is clear. In order to create common ground and to better influence the US, Europeans must develop their strategic credibility as actors and that means better organisation both within NATO and the EU, a direct EU-US relationship, but above all it demands increased European investment in strategic civil and military capabilities and capacity.

The Vital Need for Political Options

Such a pragmatic approach to the organisation of power in the transatlantic relationship would also have a profound effect on Europe's profile in the world. Recent talks with India and China were both revealing and sobering. European security policy is simply not relevant to the emerging powers. Only the US enjoys such influence. Such a reality reinforces the need for close relations with the US and a stronger Europe. Therefore, at the very least, the EU and NATO must forge a pragmatic and effective strategic partnership. Only then will the combination of economic, diplomatic and military power generate the hard and soft power effect that Europeans need to deal with the new global security challenges. Political options, an ability to escalate and security flexibility will be the key to security success in the twenty-first century and for the foreseeable future the transatlantic relationship is the pact most likely to afford Europeans all three.
However, in the current strategic environment, neither side of the Atlantic must have illusions that the transatlantic relationship of the Cold War can somehow be re-created. The nostalgia for a golden age that never existed has wasted much time in the creation of the new pragmatism that both Europeans and North Americans must forge. Therefore, the establishment of a new strategic partnership in a modernised transatlantic relationship must be based on first principles of power, practice and performance. For the time being the focus of that effort will necessarily be big power leadership in the face of serious security challenges – be such leadership expressed through NATO or the EU. Put simply, Americans must be open to the prospect of partnership; Europeans must be capable of meriting it. Make no mistake, it is in places like Afghanistan that ESDP will be forged or fail.

The clock is ticking.
6. Project European Security: The Defence Plan

Fact
Of 1.7 million hard uniforms in Europe only 170,000 or 10% can be deployed at any one time.

6.1 The Role of Armed Forces

The implications of European political strategy for security and defence must be far better understood. Indeed, such is Europe's political creed that it is not acceptable to simply punish adversaries, they must also be transformed. Stabilisation and reconstruction has become as important as coercion. However, to create a security space and fill it requires both military capability and capacity. The capability to coerce effectively and the capacity to sustain stabilisation and reconstruction are thus core components of European strategic effect. Today, limited European forces face a capability-capacity crunch as they are required to do both on a force base far too small for either. That is why a European Strategic Comprehensive Approach must become the centre-piece of Project European Security reinforced by a European Defence Strategy.

Thereafter the role of armed forces in an EU Security Policy must be and will be vital because they are the foundation upon which European strategic self-confidence rests. As a matter of urgency ESDP must be strengthened to enable the proper identification of long-term trends and afford the EU the planning freedom to prepare effectively and sustainably for the European Strategic Comprehensive Approach given the funds and resources that a more cohesive effort should release. At the very least, ESDP requires far more an ability and capacity to react to threats. To that end, the local crisis management mindset must change and that in turn can only be changed through a strategic ESDP.

The mission spectrum for Europe's armed forces should by and large remain the same as laid out in both the Constitutional Treaty and the European Security Strategy (ESS). Albeit with the caveat that all Europe's forces must once again begin to consider the long-term possibility of a direct threat to the European homeland. Moreover, all future operations must be seen in the global, as opposed to regional, context and planned for accordingly with all the robustness such a concept demands. To that end, it should be remembered that the Western European Union's (WEU) modified Treaty of Brussels of 1955 still exists, together with its famous Article V, which remains the only true automatic armed assistance clause in existence. It is surely time, therefore, to incorporate the Brussels Treaty into a new Treaty of Europe that
will likely emerge from the current debate over EU institutional reform and modernisation.

The need is pressing. The Constitutional Treaty expanded the Petersberg Tasks to include, “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue missions, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, and post-conflict stabilisation”. Such an expansion implied a military task list covering the following defence and security roles:

- Defence diplomacy: confidence building and dispelling hostility, such as assistance in the development of democratically-accountable armed forces;
- Strategic awareness to provide EU leaders with relevant and real-time intelligence data;
- Peacetime security: counter-terrorism, counter-crime, counter-proliferation and counter-narcotics;
- Support to civilian authorities in the event of emergencies, such as attacks on European critical infrastructure;
- Rapid deployment of troops either in support of EU homeland security or as part of a European counter-terrorism strategy;
- Peace support and humanitarian operations, operations other than war in support of European interests, international order and humanitarian principles;
- Support for EU conflict prevention, economic security and diplomatic efforts;
- Regional conflict inside the EU in response to a request from an EU member-state in the face of such a conflict, including peacemaking, possibly in conjunction with NATO;
- Regional conflict outside the EU, control of such a conflict, probably in conjunction with NATO, that could affect European security or international security, including peacemaking;
- Preventive missions world-wide to stop attacks in Europe or on European interests by strategic terrorists, possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and
- Deterrence of WMD states, including nuclear deterrence.

Against such a backdrop a new planning concept would necessarily include defining military and civilian responsibilities, aligning capabilities and bundling European instruments and forces capable of global reach at the European level. This would be based on the further elaboration of the Comprehensive Capability Development Process (CCDP).

The CCDP implies forces able and capable of undertaking advanced expeditionary coalition operations anywhere in the world and forces able to undertake and act as the focal point for sustained stabilisation and
reconstruction (S&R). Indeed, in time all Europe’s forces must be able to undertake all the missions required of them. Initially a particular emphasis should be placed on the development of robust, projectable forces strengthened at the top end by Special Forces and at the bottom end by gendarmerie forces capable of taking over stabilisation missions in non-permissive environments.

In the short-term military exercises between EU members must be increased, together with a rolling programme of exchanges between small units, to better prepare them for a strategic role. Where agreement already exists, cooperation should be accelerated and deepened, particularly in areas vital to enabling strategic operations, such as strategic air lift and air-to-air refuelling. Command structures also need to be ‘Europeanised’ on a far greater scale than hitherto leading in time to the creation of an EU Operational Headquarters (EUOHQ). At the very least, Europe must increase the political and military options available to it to run operations. Put simply, in complex politico-security environments the flag one puts on a military operation is almost as important as the capabilities and military capacity deployed. Having the option of NATO-led, EU-led or ad hoc coalitions must therefore be seen as strength rather than weakness. Unfortunately, it is inconceivable that members will be prepared to take the risks associated with complex, joint military operations when a clear lack of mutual military understanding still pervades relations between Europe’s armed forces. Indeed, this basic requirement for military effect is as much cultural as military. The EU is in a unique position to help resolve such weaknesses.

Furthermore, the more Europeans can see and hear strategically for themselves the more likely they will see the vital importance of a strategic role and thus a strong transatlantic relationship. The creation of common European assets, such as strategic sea and air lift and C4ISTAR would enhance Europe’s strategic self-confidence by reducing the unit cost per asset and thus make strategy affordable. NATO has adopted a similar approach with the decision to purchase both the C-17 Globemaster as a common asset and is exploring similar solutions for Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) and the Alliance Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ATBMD) programme. Interestingly, the debate over European missile defence is only now getting underway. Europe may need such a defence and such an approach would enable smaller member-states to buy more easily into a strategic ESDP.

In preparation for a European Defence Strategy a range of immediate measures are required:

- The Petersberg Tasks are now fifteen years old. Rescue and humanitarian tasks, crisis management and the role of combat troops in peacemaking were very different concepts back in 1992 compared with 2007. Not only is the operational environment very different, but
the sheer complexity of modern operations needs an urgent re-appraisal of the tasks and their implications;

- The better sharing of Intelligence is a sine qua non for effective and credible European military operations. To that end an EU Intelligence capability would much improve current arrangements. Indeed, improvements in the sharing of Intelligence and sensitive information are needed as a matter of urgency; and

- The only way Europe will obtain the military equipment it needs at affordable prices over a reasonable timeframe is to further consolidate the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB) on both the supply and demand sides. The European Defence Agency (EDA) must be strengthened and given a stronger initiation and co-ordination role.

### 6.2 The Focus of European Military Planning

However, before the EU can move to truly strategic military operations it is vital that the Union and its member-states get to grips once and for all with the nature and scope of strategic terrorism and the contribution of Europe’s armed forces to dealing with it. The new threat of strategic terrorism cannot be considered a tactical or local challenge. It requires co-operation between the national Intelligence services, the police and the armed forces. Indeed, Europeans had better understand the aim of strategic terrorism, which is both simple and catastrophic; to kill as many people as possible through the exploitation of whatever vulnerabilities exist.

Put simply, the challenge is both strategic and fundamental. Make no mistake, a few well-armed terrorists could not only seriously disrupt public order, leading to violence within European societies, they could disrupt and possibly destroy systems and structures vital to society. Such a challenge will require at the very least intense co-operation that can only be organised at the trans-national level. The EU’s counter-terrorism efforts must, therefore, be reinforced quickly.

Furthermore, lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that the use of armed forces against irregular opponents requires a complex understanding of their structure, modus operandi and their ability to carry the fight into Europe’s own home base even if Al Qaeda is holed up in the hills and mountains on the Afghan-Pakistan border. In short, such enemies have no natural centre of gravity like a state and cannot be defeated in the classical sense. Rather, complex military operations must become the military-operational norm for European forces. The EU Military Committee needs to lead a programme of research that can properly consider the implications for deployed European armed forces of the evolutions taking place in counter-insurgency.
Balancing Protection and Projection

Furthermore, projecting military power against such opponents creates a fundamental problem for European political and military leaders. This reinforces the need for a balance between projection and protection in the fight against such an enemy. History suggests that it is extremely difficult for modern forces to use their technological advantage in difficult terrain for maximum effect. Mountains are no go areas for tanks and armoured vehicles. They can only be used to block roads and provide fire support. However, the EU’s Battle Group concept could and should be developed to lead the way towards the creation of new types of European armed forces, be they land, sea or air that can operate effectively as counterinsurgency forces.

Creating the Security Space & Filling It

This is important because EU armed forces will find themselves sent to distant parts of the world, to deal with rogue states and other complex contingencies, such as international criminals and the consequences of failing or weak states. For that reason European forces will need to be configured to fight conventional wars against regular forces, as well as counterinsurgency operations against irregular forces and terrorists.

6.3 Accelerating European Defence Modernisation

Beefing Up European Defence Transformation

Key is acceleration of European defence modernisation. The various and varying attempts of member-states to restructure and reform their armed forces must be reviewed, aligned and managed as part of a European Modernisation Concept underpinning the post-2010 Defence Strategy. Such a concept would need to consider all aspects of effective military operational engagement. Thereafter, a regular EU Strategic Defence Review could prove very useful. Certainly, Europeans must make better use of the ESS dialogue and process to close the gap between Europe’s strategic environment and its security and defence capabilities by generating effective force planning guidance that is in harmonisation with NATO’s defence planning process.

Elaborating True Planning Guidelines

The EU must also move rapidly to build on its useful, but limited Long-Term Vision paper through the further elaboration of likely future missions and thus developing a range of planning guidelines based on tasks, capabilities and instruments in a single EU strategic defence concept within the European Defence Strategy. Indeed, any such analysis will further the growing intensity of co-operation between armed forces given the balance between costs and military effect that EU member-states will need to strike.

Enhancing the EDA

Over the medium-term the European Defence Agency (EDA) must be given the brief and the resources to task industry to develop a range of strategic enablers, inter alia limited space-based assets (reconnaissance, navigation and communications satellites), global reach unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), together with advanced communications and effective ground surveillance. The EU should also examine
the feasibility of affordable theatre missile defence, effective suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), offensive electronic warfare (OEW) capabilities, fast strategic lift (air and sea) and precision-guided munitions. Consequently, the European Capability Action Plan and the Prague Capabilities Commitment need to be harmonised and upgraded to that end. Indeed, as the 16 November 2006 European Parliament resolution on the implementation of the European Security Strategy states, “...the capabilities of the Member States' armed forces and their availability to the EU are influenced by the fact that most Member States are members of both the EU and NATO and maintain one set of armed forces at the disposal of both organisations’ demands”...”...therefore,...the EU should continue to work intensively with NATO, especially in the area of capabilities development”.

Financial burden-sharing must also be improved and the EDA could play a vital role therein. Common funding for all ESDP missions is a first order pre-requisite for an effective ESDP. The moment a decision is taken at the supreme political level, a pre-determined financial contribution by each member-state to an EU mission must be put in place. Thereafter, a programme of funding for certain common strategic assets on the basis of a fixed distribution of costs among the member-states would not only help to give Europe strategic options, but also reinforce a value-for-money approach to Europe’s emerging strategic role.

6.4 A European Defence Strategy

Back in 2004 the Second Venusberg Report, A European Defence Strategy, proposed a series of measures to improve Europe’s military posture. None of the events that have taken place since have changed the belief of the Group that the need for the military measures proposed therein. The main elements of European command and force transformation proposed were as follows:

- Strategic ESDP mission should be organised through coalitions of the willing and able. However, the EU itself should progressively assume the responsibilities of coalition leader to render the European civil-military Comprehensive Approach more effective.
- An EU Strategic Defence Planning Concept (EUSDPC) is needed to better co-ordinate and harmonise the defence planning cycles of EU member-states based on an elaborated military task list and a common understanding of the role of armed forces. Not only would such a concept better enable forces for courses to fulfil the missions to which they are best suited, it would help ease the Capability-Capacity Crunch and integrate civilian planning doctrines as part of the European Comprehensive Approach.
- European capabilities must be linked to the military task generated by the ESS. Headline Goal 2010 must be adapted to ensure that by 2010
EU forces could undertake 75% of all missions implied by the ESS.

- A European Force Modernisation Concept is needed as a matter of urgency. Such a concept would merge some American-style network centric warfare with European specialised forces and ‘muddy boots’ doctrine covering peacekeeping, peacemaking and counter-insurgency. The twenty-first century will be the age of the networked multi-task soldier, not the pure combat specialist.

- A European Network-Enabled Capability (ENEC) reinforced by some strategic Intelligence and C4ISR assets will be needed over time to electronically integrate European forces and improve both their strategic ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’. Such a capability would necessarily be developed within the framework of a European Force Modernisation Concept and will include both space-based and air breathing systems.

- A European Network Enabled Capability will better enable interoperability between European forces and thus must be developed in conjunction with specifically European military doctrine, i.e. how European militaries go about their business.

- EU forces will require robust operational headquarters. It is therefore vital that the EU planning and command cells at both SHAPE and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) are transformed into NATO-compatible strategic headquarters (OHQs) capable of handling both advanced expeditionary coalitions and stabilisation and reconstruction missions.

- To better enable force generation of complex EU coalitions the EU requires its own EU Force Generation Database together with a Civilian Expertise Database. Such databases would necessarily include forces and personnel from non-EU member-states through the Committee of Contributors system.

- The distinct force rotations of EU Battle Groups and the NATO Response Force (NRF) must be better harmonised so that they become interchangeable depending of the level of conflict intensity and sustainability required. Such intense co-operation will not only enhance interoperability but could pave the way for limited defence integration.

- European Special Forces are vital components of counter-terrorism operations. Special Forces are already being strengthened but given the varying doctrines of these forces an EU-NATO Special Forces Training Concept and Programme would significantly improve performance and preparation and lead to a more common definition of what constitutes Special Forces. This would reinforce the work currently underway in NATO.

- The European Comprehensive Approach will succeed and fail at the interface between conflict and initial stabilisation. The role of the European Gendarmerie Force will thus be critical to mission success. Not only to relieve the pressure on European combat forces but also to act as an interface with the civil reconstruction teams. To that end,
the European Gendarmerie Force needs to be strengthened and act as a focal point for EU Crisis Action Teams that, drawing on the lessons of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, merge the efforts in the field of the Council and Commission.

Europe is uniquely placed to develop a strategic Comprehensive Approach to security that will not only lead the way to effective security governance, but act as a model for all the forces of stability in a dangerous world full of challenges, risks and threats. However, only a far more realistic commitment by Europeans to invest properly in both capabilities and capacities will realise such potential.

The clock is ticking.
7. Project European Security: The Solidarity Plan

Fact
According to the OECD by 2015 EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will match that of the US as will economic output.

7.1 Going Back to European Basics

Without solidarity there is nothing. Indeed, security solidarity among member-states is the foundation stone of Europe upon which Europe is established – be it through political integration or intense co-operation between states. The need for such solidarity is self-evident. The European Security Strategy (ESS) emphasises the “increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU”. Indeed, for that reason the Constitutional Treaty included a Solidarity Clause that obliged all EU members to “act jointly in a spirit of solidarity” in the event one of them became “the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster”. Such solidarity in no way suggests an attempt to accelerate political integration through the back door. Rather, it is simply the logical consequence of the internal shape of Europe and the many security challenges Europe faces both internally and externally. In that light, the marked lack of solidarity with respect to fulfilling ESDP capability targets and the financing of ESDP operations is little short of a disgrace.

Fifty years on from the Treaty of Rome it is time to go back to European basics and revisit the ‘genetic code’ of Europe’s construction. One thing is clear; the EU cannot absorb at one and the same time the effect of enlargement and the consequences of globalisation. Indeed, the interaction of the two is reinforcing the paralysis at the heart of the EU’s mechanisms for action and exacerbating the contradictions and contentions over the finalité of the European project.

Consequently, it would be a disaster for global security if the European edifice began an irreversible process of decay and collapse. And, without a re-engagement of political and security vision to drive the EU forward that is precisely what could happen. If security of the citizens is the first duty of any state it is also the very essence of a state’s identity. It is the same for the Union. Again, the implications and consequences of the stalled Constitutional Treaty cannot be over-stated. The ‘pause for reflection’ that followed it is now in danger of heralding Europe’s security retirement. Real progress is now needed, therefore, to rebuild popular faith in Europe as a security actor. Moreover, it must be far more than the mere cosmetic ‘advances’ which have proved so detrimental to the European idea among Europeans citizens.
7.2 The New European Security Consensus

Security policy in democracies is necessarily founded on strong public support. However, it is notable that in the absence of effective leadership much of Europe’s public has gone to sleep over security. Indeed, such is the extent of this denial that politicians now have trouble in even discussing security matters. Europe’s security denial has not been helped by the incompetence of the West in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result it is now only possible for Europe to use but a fraction of the real security power it could generate. This, in turn, is leading to self-defeating security policy, weak security engagement and increasingly the splitting of civil society from military society. Indeed, one of the most potent symptoms of Europe’s security denial is the emergence of military isolation in society as professional armed forces take on ever more of the security dirty tasks just so that Europe’s leaders can keep the populace in its state of self-perpetuating security delusion. That must end.

Europe’s political leaders must together convince Europe’s people that the time to properly prepare for a secure future is now and that it will costs effort, commitment and money. Only then will security and defence begin to be accorded the priority status that any analysis of the world in which Europe resides demands. That is not to deny the salient importance of socio-economic problems. They are part and parcel of Europe’s security solution and must be closely intertwined as part of a security-social policy.

Furthermore, this report most certainly does not call for a militarist Europe. Far from it. Indeed, the central message of this Venusberg Report is that only through a broad concept of security can Europe hope to stabilise its security environment. However, without public awareness, understanding and commitment security policy cannot work. Winning hearts and minds in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan is important, but not as vital as first winning hearts and minds in Europe. The strategic vacation must be brought to an end with a strong EU Security Policy founded on strong popular support.

Therefore, decision-makers have no choice but to engage their populace in an open and frank debate about the security environment and the strategies and capabilities required to realise national and European interests in such a world. Given the interdependence of today’s world developments in Asia, Africa or elsewhere will have an impact on both the physical security and the economic and social well-being of Europeans. It would, therefore, be utterly misleading to assume that national security and prosperity can be ensured independently from global developments.

Thus far, however, political decision-makers have shied away from such a debate. Such avoidance is not sustainable. Political leaders must, therefore, start a public debate about security and defence. Only if people are convinced...
of the importance of global affairs not only for the abstract national security of their country but also for their own well-being will European foreign, security and defence policy receive the robust public backing essential to its success.

7.3 Communicating the European Strategic Security Message

To that end, four fundamental security messages must be communicated to Europe’s people as a matter of urgency to explain the need for security action and the demand for security investment:

**Message 1: Ensuring Europe’s Integrity**

Territorial and society integrity is the pre-condition for independent economic and social development and thus the foundation of Europe’s political independence. Without such territorial integrity participation in demanding civil-military security operations will be nigh impossible. Indeed, the ability to project security is intrinsically and inherently linked to the ability to protect society. Therefore, integrity and sovereignty will only be safeguarded if societies are adequately protected. Given the very openness upon which European society is founded no single member-state can assure such security. It is therefore time for autonomous EU territorial security incorporating five elements; missile defence, deterrence, conventional defence, airspace sovereignty and consequence management, including a pan-European plan for the defence of Europe’s critical infrastructure and cyber-Europe.

**Message 2: Sustaining Europe’s Prosperity**

Social coherence and stability, as well as political and military weight, are ultimately functions of economic strength. In the short-term European states are understandably concerned about contemporary economic stability in the immediate neighbourhood. However, in the medium-to-long term there is an intrinsic link between the preservation of a Western-oriented global order, global stability and European economic well-being. Indeed, the three are in any case intimately bound together and ensuring economic security will be a first order principle for Project European Security. It is evident that economic disruptions undermine the legitimacy of any government in power and thus the governability of European democracies. Indeed, such disruptions have had profound implications in the past for the European order, and led to challenges to the democratic order.

Furthermore, in a globalised economy such phenomena could also emerge in other powers, such as China and Russia. Certainly, a revisionist challenge to the economic order is implicit in much of the Islamist political creed. Project
European Security must therefore be focussed on maintaining Europe's economic order for without that the chance of solidarity between people's and states diminishes markedly. That in turn reinforces the need for an EU Security Policy to frame necessary action as part of the fight against the dark side of globalisation to ensure energy supply, to maintain the current economic order; to secure international lines of supply and communication and to prevent damage to critical infrastructure and people that could weaken Europe's economic base. Project European Security can explain what action is needed, why and at what cost.

*Message 3: Guaranteeing Europe's Stability*

Open and democratic societies are not only founded upon the highest degree of individual freedom for their citizens, but also a significant degree of personal responsibility on the part of those citizens. Indeed, it is that responsibility that demands of Europe's leaders a cogent new cross state multi-partisan debate with Europe's citizens however painful the message might be. Only then will the proper and constructive use of those freedoms by citizens be likely given the current security context. As poor weather has demonstrated it is relatively easy to disrupt the political and social life of Europe and thus shake confidence in institutions and organisations. By world standards many of the natural challenges Europe has faced are relatively mild. The threat posed by Islamic radicalism cannot be ignored and presents a clear and present danger to the European order. Excessive political correctness only serves to reinforce 'them' and 'us' societies increasing the likelihood of civil strife and ultimately planned challenges to the European order.

However, European leaders must make a far greater effort to improve societal cohesion as part of Project European Security to demonstrate that only through integration at all levels of European society can security be assured and the tolerance that is the hallmark of Europe restored as the centre-piece of its political philosophy. Paradoxically, in the short-term that will require some tough action against those committed to stirring hatred. Project European Security must generate solidarity in the inner-struggle against hate and Islamic radicalism and, of course, terrorism. To that end, Europe's position on the inner struggle needs to be harmonised and action against those who seek to exploit it expanded to include a Europe-wide criminal and terrorism code.

Furthermore, common cross-border assertive action focused on the EU will also be needed against illegal immigration, international crime, strategic terrorism and anti-system ideologies. Again, Project European Security must communicate to Europe's citizens just what the threat is, why such actions are necessary and the cost that they will be required to bear.
Message 4: Safeguarding Europe’s Environment

Problems in the field of ecological security might not have an immediate and dramatic impact on the social, political and economic life of Europe, but the risks associated with environmental problems, such as global warming or desertification, have significant and unfavourable security implications for Europe. Not only will the rate of illegal migration increase exponentially, but there is likely to be a marked increase in local and regional wars in the developing world, particularly in Africa with significant impact on Europe’s interests. Indeed, such wars will test Europe’s understanding of the link between global security and human security. Any European Strategic Comprehensive Approach must prepare now to improve assistance to such partners in the area of pollution control, disaster relief, disease and epidemic control, essential food and water supplies. To that end, Project European Security must forge a much closer relationship between European aid and development and all other European security instruments.

This third Venusberg Report started with the March 2007 Berlin Declaration. It is, therefore, appropriate that the last word should go to EU foreign and security policy supremo, Javier Solana. In a speech he made in The Hague on 23 November, 2006 he said, “The idealism behind the EU’s foundation is vital to defining who and what we are today. And it helps to appreciate the value of the European Union as a force for good in the world. We have carefully built a zone of peace, democracy and the rule of law of more than 500 million people. Now we have to extend that zone further. And to answer the call for Europe to act. To promote peace and protect the vulnerable. That is the aim of the Common Foreign and Security Policy”.

Beyond 2010 is tomorrow. Europe needs a European Grand Strategy today.

The clock is ticking.

The Venusberg Group 2007
From left to right: Bo Huldt, Thomas Bauer, Franz H.U. Borkenhagen, Josef Janning, Gustav Gustenau, Julian Lindley-French, Janusz Onyszczewicz, Stefani Weiss, Klaus Brummer, Yves Boyer, Rob de Wijk, Franco Algieri, Stefano Silvestri
The Venusberg Group is a high-level group of security and defence experts from across Europe brought together by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in Guetersloh and the Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP) in Munich to examine the future of EU security policy. The Group was formed in early 1999 following a meeting that took place at a hotel on the Venusberg near Bonn, close to the Petersberg where in 1992 European leaders established the basis for EU defence.


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Securing the European homeland: The EU, terrorism and homeland security (August 2005)

No. 2 Franco Algieri, Thomas Bauer, Klaus Brummer
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No. 3 Bertelsmann Stiftung
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Written by Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri; advised by Thomas Bauer, Yves Boyer, Klaus Brummer, Gustav Gustenau, Antonio Missiroli, Stefani Weiss and Rob de Wijk (November 2005)

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