Rebuilding the International Order –

Profiles of a Trilateral Strategy

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Executive Summary

The prelude to the recent war in Iraq triggered the most severe transatlantic tension in decades, dividing Europeans and Americans from each other and the Europeans among themselves. The post-World War II order of Yalta has totally lost its relevance for preventing and managing the new threats.

International terrorism is at the top of the list of threats and problems. Western societies have become both a target and a base for international terrorists. From the American perspective, international terrorism is the vital threat to political and economic freedom. The second major security threat comes from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Even if this problem is regulated by international treaty regimes, it has new dimensions. Failing states constitute another widespread security risk.

The new security risks can hardly be prevented by the old international order, and even the United States has always had interests in cooperating with other actors on certain issues. American approaches raise the question of recent experiences in security cooperation, and different regional perspectives.

The turnabout led to a reassessment of Russia's international position; what had been seen as a troubled, collapsing superpower became viewed as an active partner in the international arena. At the same time Russia is struggling for internal modernization and external Western orientation. From Washington's perspective, Russian support on a sensitive issue has been crucial and has opened new possibilities for goal-oriented strategic cooperation. European actors add experiences and capacities concentrating on the post military intervention period. Despite some analysts' tendency to divide tasks between American hard power and European soft power, both halves of the alliance have serious capabilities in both categories of power. Nevertheless, European governments have lately preferred to stabilize and shape the world through economic actions, technical assistance and other nonmilitary means. In contrast to former goals of creating a counterbalance to the US in order to get in the way of American hegemony, a future oriented international order would also connect interests of Russian-American strategic cooperation. Based on different economic and political interests, all three players are currently attempting to strengthen a multilateral system within a unilateral world.

Consequences include a multi-layered Europe, one that combines both current EU members, future members and countries that are unlikely to ever become members.

Multi-layered Europe requires a paradigm change from guaranteeing security and stability through enlarging EU institutions, towards defending common European risks and cooperation. Security-related problems in the European framework can only be solved by including Russia. From the American perspective, the discussion of building a new international order has to be based on two factors with contradictory aspects. On the one hand, the latest interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq made the supremacy of US military quite obvious; in this regard, Washington has no reason to share its hegemonic position with other actors or to limit its power in outdated international organizations. On the other hand, the participation of Europe, and Russia in particular, would increase the effectiveness and sustainability of conflict resolutions. Russia is particularly challenged to overcome any kind of great power attitude to be a partner within in new international order. Defining overlapping interests with the Europeans is very much related to internal modernization, regional conflict management and building a pan-European security architecture. These experiences should support a future-oriented approach in building a new international order, one that at present remains in many ways less of a new institutional setting than an open question of identifying risks, actors and windows of opportunity for functional cooperation.

Introduction

The prelude to the recent war in Iraq triggered the most severe transatlantic tension in decades, dividing Europeans and Americans from each other and the Europeans among themselves. Operation Iraqi Freedom cut the Gordian knot of Saddam Hussein's intransigence and United Nations fecklessness. However, the critical stance taken by key European governments and the United States government's preparedness to proceed despite allied opposition should be seen as a watershed toward building a new international order. Partners who share the same values and goals were in fundamental disagreement about how to deal with the Iraq regime. Furthermore, pressure to act and faltering institutional frameworks created ad hoc alliances, such as the working arrangement between France, Germany and Russia, or the different constellations of a "new" Europe.

Even if the Iraq conflict, including the establishment of a sustainable new regime, is far from successfully concluded, the time has come to discuss rebuilding the international order and possible consequences for structural changes in an American-European-Russian triangle. While these actors do not exclusively determine the shape of the international system, their importance in military, economic and other arenas means that an international order supported by all three will carry substantial weight. Furthermore, all three are deeply involved in the trouble spots—from the Balkans to the Caucasus, and from the Middle East to Central Asia—most likely to have broader repercussions. Rising powers such as China and India do not yet have the ability to shape the international order as a whole, and other major powers such as Japan or the ASEAN countries are not as involved in the crisis areas.

To further develop a sustainable framework for the international order, one has to go beyond a purely institutional perspective, and delve into a serious debate about the strategic goals of such a new framework. This kind of debate is more common among American and Russian decision makers than among those from the European Union, but urgently needed on both sides of the Atlantic. A future-oriented international order should consider two key questions.

Even if the Iraq conflict, including the establishment of a sustainable new regime, is far from successfully concluded, the time has come to discuss rebuilding the international order and possible consequences for structural changes in an American-European-Russian triangle.

First, what are the main motives for shaping a new order in the American-European-Russian triangle, or is it sufficient to count on the capabilities of the United States, the sole superpower? This question is closely linked to the analysis of the recent experiences of risk management.

Second, what are the interests of the actors involved? Identifying specific American, European and Russian perspectives on a new international order might provide better results and clearer strategies for conflict prevention and conflict management than attempting to shape a new international order that contradicts American interests, and would thus create more global problems than it would solve.

Reasons for Reshaping the International Order

The post-World War II order of Yalta has totally lost its relevance. The positive aspects of its collapse, such as the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of potentially disastrous superpower competition, should not be overlooked; many threats caused by Cold War problems simply do not exist any more. Nevertheless, the world is far from stable and safe. At the same time, the capabilities of international systems for preventing threats and solving problems have decreased.

Threats

The attacks of September 11, 2001 placed international terrorism at the top of the list of threats and problems. Western societies have become both a target and a base for international terrorists. From the American perspective, international terrorism is the number one threat to political and economic freedom. As a consequence, fighting against international terrorism is the highest national priority. While in the American perspective fighting against international terrorism is equated with protecting the nation against an external attack, the perception of terrorist threats has a different background in other places. Russia's intervention in the Caucasus is the most controversial paradigm. The conflict in Chechnya and the northern Caucasus has elicited a contradictory response from Russia; Moscow is holding off the international community with the argument that it is handling a purely internal conflict, while at the same time connecting the conflict's roots to international terrorism. This demonstrates that fighting against terrorism is a difficult target, defined by the entire framework of national interests. In addition to fighting against international terrorism, open Western societies are also challenged to find a balance between maintaining the necessary openness of a modern society and preventing acts of terror effectively.

Considering the controversy involved in defining international terrorism, one has to point out the EU's common framework decision on combating international terrorism, which was adopted in September 2001. According to this document terrorist acts are actions targeting the EU member states: intentional acts, infringements linked to terrorist activities. It also covers behaviors that may contribute to terrorist acts in third countries, thus contributing to the fight against terrorism at international level, especially in the framework of the United Nations and G8. At the same time, the document emphasizes the respect for fundamental rights, such as the freedom of assembly, freedom of association and freedom of speech.

The second major security threat comes from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Even if this particular problem is regulated by international treaty regimes, it has new dimensions, particularly caused not only by regional pressure in the Middle East but also by illegal proliferation practices, for instance in some of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Russian cooperation with Iran's nuclear development program was the subject of high-level concern throughout the Clinton administration; North Korea's challenge to the global nonproliferation regime threatens its remaining credibility.

Failing states constitute another widespread security risk. Weak governments and instable societies are unable to contain, or sometimes even combat, organized crime; smuggling of goods, drugs, weapons and items; trafficking in children and women; corruption; or armed uprisings. Western Europe is confronted with legal as well as illegal migration, caused by economic, social and political asymmetries between West European stability and the instability of the East European states in transition. In the worst cases, failed states may be captured by domestic or transnational criminal or terrorist groups. The collapse of state power may give rise to zones of anarchy, taken advantage of by international outlaws. Governmental collapse has national origins but international consequences such as forced migration, smuggling of goods and persons, non-demarcated borders and weak border controls, collaboration with international terrorists, and dominance by organized crime. Afghanistan under Taliban rule presented an egregious example, but parts of the Caucasus, the separatist regime in Transdniester (located in the immediate neighborhood of the enlarged European Union), swathes of West Africa, southern Sudan, Congo and Somalia are further examples. State failure in Pakistan would present a near-perfect alignment of the worst possibilities: lawlessness, arms smuggling, missile proliferation, Islamic grievances and nuclear weapons

The post-Yalta list of threats is not only dominated by international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and failing states, but also by the mutual linkage among these three factors. Failing states are a preferred environment for terrorist activities; at the same, time terrorists use illegal drug and weapon trafficking to strengthen their activities. The presence and activities of such groups can also drive weak states into failure.

The new security risks can hardly be prevented by the old international order, and even the United States, the world's most potent military power, has always had interests in cooperating with other actors on certain issues. American approaches raise the question of recent experiences in security cooperation, which should be differentiated among positive and negative experiences, and different regional perspectives.

Responses

Overall, the aftermath of 9/11 offers examples of widespread cooperation. With the assistance of Cold War technology, Russian president Vladimir Putin used the "hot line" to be the first international actor declaring his solidarity with the United States, condemning the terrorists and offering assistance. Washington welcomed the unexpected good news from the Kremlin, and since then has benefited not only from Moscow's intelligence on the region but also military infrastructure in Central Asia, both of which supported America's goal of military intervention and regime change in Afghanistan. American-Russian unanimity on this point exemplifies a new Western orientation in Putin's foreign policy. The turnabout led to a reassessment of Russia's international position; what had been seen as a troubled, collapsing superpower became viewed as an active partner in the international arena. From Washington's perspective, Russian support on a sensitive issue has been crucial and has opened new possibilities for goal-oriented strategic cooperation.

Sharing the same values, Western Europe also condemned the terrorist attacks on the United States. Officials declared their solidarity, and hundreds of thousands of citizens demonstrated their support on the streets of Europe. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 guarantees for a member under attack. It is somehow explicit that for the relevance of the old international order that ensuing military intervention in Afghanistan was led by the United States, supported by other individual Western partners. As actions followed rhetoric, however, cooperation in the framework of international organizations became more important for the regime change than military tasks.

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Altogether, the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the intervention in Afghanistan provide examples of how the American-Russian-European triangle can work together to restructure the international order. The United States provides overwhelming military power; European actors add experiences and capacities concentrating on the post military intervention period. Russia's positive function involved offering a more stable framework for military conflict management and offering relevant information. Military intervention, conflict management and implementing regime change in the Balkans are additional examples for a positive linkage between unilateral and multilateral international action.

The situation in Iraq, however, placed different challenges on the EU, Russia and the US. The United States followed its own agenda, which constituted a severe burden on the bonds of the transatlantic community, and marked a clear difference from the interventions in Afghanistan and the Balkans. The intervention was, first and foremost, guided by the Americans, but to evaluate the intervention's potential for order building, one has to include a multilateral perspective. The Kremlin's position was guided throughout the prologue and the war itself by its own political and economic interests, leading neither to total refusal nor to support for the United States in the UN Security Council. This position once more demonstrates that Russia, despite the relative military weakness of a declining superpower, has to be taken seriously not only its because of some regional interests but also because of the voice within the relevant international organization, a part of the old international order.

As a part of reshaping the international order, the Iraq conflict is not just a signpost for the transatlantic agenda; it also includes some crucial aspects concerning intra-European discourse. For a start, it is time to discard the equivalence between the European Union and Europe. Obviously, the EU is an important European actor, but with regard to international interests in particular, Europe extends beyond its most important organization for economic and political integration. Different interests between "old" and "new" Europe, as well as the leadership role assumed by London are signs that transatlantic cooperation runs less between Washington and Brussels than between the United States and individual EU member states, including some of the upcoming EU-member states. Furthermore the European Union also failed to speak with a single voice in foreign and security policy, which has caused some critical remarks concerning the institutional capabilities of Europe's role as a global power.

From this perspective of current developments, one has to look with some pessimism at a future triangle as the basis of a new world order. However, the negative evaluation should be tempered first of all by the fact that even if some important EU members, France and Germany, did not share the American attitude toward military intervention in Iraq, all of them remain members of a community of values, economic and social cooperation. The recent disagreement can be seen as a deflection within a single coordinate system. Furthermore, if European action is not limited by geographic and institutional focus on Brussels, the developments could also open some new windows of opportunity. Paris and Berlin are strengthening their overlapping interests with Russia in international cooperation. Based on different economic and political interests, all three players are currently attempting to strengthen a multilateral system within a unilateral world. Even if the medium-term consequences and institutional results are still uncertain, this kind of cooperation includes some potential for a new European security architecture, which would be incomplete without integrating both "new" old "old" European players, as well as defining interests and burden-sharing with the United States.

Interests and Actors in the Building of a New International Order

The end of the Yalta international order and the emergence of new security risks have also changed the interests and actors involved. There are more players in the field than ever before since the Cold War began. Some of these players still have greater influence than others in shaping the international order. First and foremost among them are the participants of the triangle dialogue, America, Europe and Russia. Following them is a list of other participants, such as China, Japan or India.

US Interest

Initially, it appears that the American perspective is dominated by the conviction of being the one and only military superpower. Indeed, the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq are clear examples of the military capacities and capabilities of the United States, even with the serious set-backs in the post-conflict period. The Jacksonian element of American foreign policy is having a moment in the sun. Understandably, the United States is not willing to integrate its military preponderance into an old world order that would include the risk of being subordinated to other, militarily much weaker actors. To evaluate American interests in a global context, one has to consider linkages with the national situation and the specific character of risk. Two years after the attacks on New York and Washington, some European leaders, to say nothing of European publics, have not grasped the depth of the change in the American outlook. The premises of American policy are that the country is at war with groups that have targeted its most cherished aspects, that these groups have set their goals as achieving the greatest possible destruction of American lives and property, and that the necessary American response is to extirpate these groups. This consensus reaches across partisan boundaries, such that a change of government would not disturb the fundamental American view of the risks presented by the international system or the most important measures necessary to reduce them.

The Bush administration has coupled a massive increase in defense expenditure with a substantial reduction in the government's revenue. This may eventually lead to a

mismatch between American policy desires and the country's means, but in the medium term, it will present no obstacles to the pursuit of objectives the administration defines as crucial. A more likely limit on American military activism could come from the armed forces themselves, who see their resources stretched from the Hindu Kush to the Fertile Crescent, the Balkans and beyond. Still, it is prudent to recall that for the better part of a decade Pentagon planners worked to give the United States the ability to fight simultaneous wars in Iraq and North Korea.

Nevertheless, the high financial burden of geopolitically-driven fiscal policy raises the question of its economically sustainability. On the on the hand the current geopolitical agenda might require an increasing amount of intervention and growing financial burden, on the other hand the Bush Administration might change it priorities or the American public might opt for a political alternative. This may also take a financial shape, as in decades of debates with Europe about burden-sharing within NATO or the contribution seeking after the first Gulf War. It may involve enlisting the experiences and resources of partners to improve the performance of conflict management and system change.

The desire to do more with less might strengthen interest in cooperation with Europe or Russia in some specific areas. For instance, Russian toleration of the intervention in Afghanistan had three benefits. First, active Russian opposition would have made the entire program considerably more difficult; in this sense, the greatest Russian help has been the absence of Russian hindrance. Second, the Russian intelligence service and other parts of the Russian government had information that has proved helpful to American efforts. Finally, Russian support for toppling the Taliban paved the way for American access to military bases in Central Asia. From Washington's perspective, Moscow is not perceived as an equal superpower—as some Russian decision makers might wishfully or wistfully believe—but as an important partner for some specific requirements. President Putin's achievement has been to view the American perspective coolly and to make the most of his advantages without forcing contests his country is likely to lose.

With regard to Europe, disparities in the capabilities of NATO allies are causing increasing friction. This problem was papered over during the intervention in Kosovo, but it came to the forefront with the conflict in Iraq. Americans view most European assistance as distinctly limited in effectiveness, and including the European allies in fighting as a matter of graciousness, rather than necessity. At worst, the capability gap makes American technology different from EU technology, which constitutes a serious problem in practical cooperation. Coping with the gap will be a challenge for both parts of the alliance for several years to come. Even when considering EU's relative military weakness, some other European capacities and capabilities are complementary value for shaping global peace and security. In certain regions the Europeans have the advantage of being perceived as more even-handed than the Americans, because the Americans' function is dominated by their military superiority. Furthermore, prospects of gaining EU membership or strengthening economic and political cooperation have, so far, proved successful in stabilizing the Union's neighborhood beyond its borders. Assuming that the European Union can considerably strengthen its internal cooperation, opening membership prospects for countries such as Turkey; Ukraine or Kazakhstan would be an important soft power instrument.

In addition to Europe's strategic advantages as a civil power, it is also in the American interest to consider the quantitative amount of foreign aid dispensed by the Europeans. According to estimates, up to 70 percent of global foreign aid is provided by the EU and the EU member states. The US administration is also pursuing a new Security Council resolution to define the relationship between the participation of the international community and of the coalition countries in Iraq's reconstruction. The American side hopes that UN legitimacy will lead to substantial troop commitments from countries such as Turkey and India, as well as large financial contributions from other countries. Some non-American diplomats at the UN hope that the international organization will take control of returning Iraqi sovereignty. Neither side is likely to have their maximum demands met, but the details appear negotiable. The judgment about internationalization hinges on the US administration's conclusions about what works, since the American stakes in a successful outcome in Iraq are so high. Nevertheless, the administration's view is that it already has a very strong set of international partners.

A key to a new transatlantic alliance to shape an international order would be American interest in using comparative advantages of European conflict management.

Despite some analysts' tendency to divide tasks between American hard power and European soft power, both halves of the alliance have serious capabilities in both categories of power. Nevertheless, European governments have lately preferred to stabilize and shape the world through economic actions, technical assistance and other nonmilitary means. Even if the overall goal remains conducting regime changes, in Iran or North Korea for example, the Europeans could be convinced to support the superpower in some actions. The leitmotiv of interests might be a multilateral world order within a unilateral context. A key to a new transatlantic alliance to shape an international order would be American interest in using comparative advantages of European conflict management. From this point of view, one should discuss the conditions under which the Americans are interested in using specific European experiences of conflict management.

European Interests

The self-definition of European interests in shaping a new international architecture is less obvious and less easy to identify than American interests, because it is necessary to consider both external perspectives and the internal perspectives of intra-European decision making simultaneously. In this regard, one should be quite careful with any kind of generalization about Europe. As argued above, the reactions to conflict in Iraq illustrate that Europe is not identical with the European Union. Within the EU, the Iraq conflict shed light on remarkable differences between Paris and London, or even between Paris and Berlin, and also between the reality in the respective governments and their population – given that countries whose governments supported the war did not have the support of their population. Furthermore, the European Union failed to speak with one voice in foreign and security policy, and Europe was divided between "old" and "new." A new definition of "European" interests creates windows of opportunity for a continental perspective that features decreasing British significance, along with Russia and the upcoming

EU-member states, first and foremost Poland, as new factors in European security policy. To sum up, the "who" and "with whom" questions of building a new international order would be simply fragmentary without considering the current debates among different European actors.

The "what" question of European interest can be described by two factors: strengthening capacities for international conflict management and looking for new options of multilateralism in accordance with the transatlantic alliance

Generally speaking, in the short term the EU is interested in promoting its soft power capabilities, while in the long term the EU is also strengthening its military potential by increasing defense budgets while simultaneously decreasing national duplications and reducing the technology gap with the United States. Overall, the EU should associate its soft power capacities with adequate hard power. To make its soft power capacities operational, Europe is interested in a new assessment of risks and partnerships. This assessment is largely confined to Europe's immediate neighborhood.

Risk prevention within the Eastern and Southern European neighborhoods is of major significance, because EU enlargement, as a successful approach to strengthen security and stability beyond the EU's border, is reaching its limits. Brussels is presently neither interested in nor able to integrate the former Soviet states, Ukraine and Moldova, both of which are interested in joining the Union. Deepening cooperation with Russia and with Mediterranean neighbors by offering them the four internal freedoms of the European Union—free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, as proposed in the EU concept "Wider Europe – Neighborhood" in March 2003—would definitely require far-reaching internal reform. On the one hand, the EU can only provide limited instruments for conflict management in its direct pan-European environment; on the other, these very challenges are increasingly important for European stability and security. The related overall goal of defining new partnerships must, first of all, begin with an intra-European process of understanding. Europe's capacities for security and defense action depend on its ability to implement common approaches. In this regard, Europeans should spend more efforts on defining interests than on creating new institutions

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With respect to the United States and Russia, one should assume that the European interest towards a US-shaped security order is less confrontational and more complementary. It is in Europe's interest to gain international influence by using its soft power experiences, particularly for pan-European conflict management. As far as Russia is concerned, Europe might use post-9/11 windows of opportunity to create a new alliance with Moscow, providing added value in regional networks of conflict management, some military capacities and cooperation within international organizations. In doing this, European actors should be aware of the asymmetric character of a security partnership with Russia, a country which might be a risk caused by typical transition problems such as economic crises, institutional instability, ethnic conflicts, illegal migration and smuggling. Russia remains a partner for economic cooperation in providing natural resources and access to

stability and security in trouble spots such as the Caucasus or Central Asia. Even though Europe and Russia agree on some points, that does not necessarily mean they constitute a community of goals. In addition to Russia's backwardness in transition, its attitude toward the Chechnya conflict causes normative disagreements.

Russian Interests

First of all, Russia's interests in creating a new international order result from its geographic situation as the state with the most varied external borders of any country in the world. To identify Russian interests, one should start with a realistic assessment about existing potential and possibilities. Even given any optimistic estimate of Putin's internal reforms, Russia is a relatively weak country, with a GNP comparable to the Netherlands, and by no means an international peer of the United States. Furthermore, its economic power is based much more on raw materials and energy than on technology development and modernization. Although Russia is the other major nuclear power, its military is neither capable nor modern enough to play a substantial active role on the international agenda. While Washington successfully conducted operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, for almost a decade Moscow has not been able to solve the military escalation in the Caucasus. This failure, along with declining capabilities of Russia's blue-water navy and its air force can be used as litmus tests of Russia's limited military capacities.

Not by accident, reforming the armed forces is already on Putin's agenda, but so far Russia has limited military capacities and capabilities for shaping violent conflicts. Not only because of its economic and military difficulties, but also because of its geographic location bordering a huge number of states that are either of strategic importance or high risk potential (or both) Russia is forced to use political power creatively to improve out its international position. These circumstances require powerful alliances, but for the first time in Russian history since the Crimean War in the 1850s, the country is not a member of any strategic alliance. The minor exception is the Tashkent treaty, which does not offer the necessary power to act. To establish a foreign policy corresponding to its geographic requirements, building international partnerships should be Russia's highest foreign policy interest. This raises the question of who would be the partner of choice corresponding with Russia's domestic interests.

In this regard, one should first consider Russia's self-definition as a great power. Even if Russia's current economic, social and military capacities are far form competing with America's superpower status, remarkable parts of the Russian elite and public still believe in the country's status as a great power. Despite all asymmetric realities, this belief drives the country to be a decisive part among the international community and to have a voice within the organization of the international system. The second aspect of major domestic interest is related to president Putin's agenda of internal modernization and economic growth.

Both agendas direct to different choices of international partners. Strengthening cooperation with the United States takes Russia's interests of being a great power and having an international voice seriously, even if the conditions of cooperation are asymmetric, and cooperation with Washington implies less economic modernization. After 9/11 it became clear that the US administration feels comfortable with the

some Russian positions, without considering Moscow a strategic actor. In comparison with the Clinton administration, the agenda of the current administration does not leave a lot of time for Russia. While the Clinton administration made Russia a major priority and spent considerable time and energy on it, the present administration is building on Clinton's success and deals with Moscow as a mostly normal state that can work as a partner with the US on some very important issues.

Assuming that key decision makers in Moscow are interested in a sustainable transition and regional conflict prevention in a pan-European environment, a partnership with Europe would correspond to numerous Russian interests. The European Union and its member states are already Russia's most important economic partners. After the upcoming eastern enlargement, Russia will conduct more than 50 percent of its foreign trade with the EU. In regard to internal modernization based on external support, the EU can provide positive experience from stabilizing Eastern Europe. Given that Brussels has already offered Moscow a common European economic space, the first steps toward a joint framework of modernization have already been made. Concerning its strategic options, Russia could implement its interest in being an important part of a pan-European security architecture. In contrast to former goals of creating a counterbalance to the US in order to get in the way of American hegemony, the new multilateral goal would also connect interests of Russian-American strategic cooperation.

Even if Russian decision making is still in a process of self-definition, there are strong pushes toward strengthening pan-European cooperation without contradicting American interests.

To sum up, Russia, even more than the United States and Europe, is forced to help create a new international order. Even if Russian decision making is still in a process of self-definition, there are strong pushes toward strengthening pan-European cooperation without contradicting American interests. In filling in this function, Russia might provide an unexpected chance to improve transatlantic integration.

Strategic Consequences for Rebuilding the International Order

The analyses of the current background and interests of reshaping the international order illustrate different actors and interests involving safeguarding security and stability with future-oriented approaches that have a multilateral character. In arguing for multilateral concepts one has to be quite careful to avoid three dead ends. First, multilateralism cannot become a synonym or an excuse for taking no action. Second, proponents of multilateral approaches must not repeat the deadlock situation of the Iraq conflict. Third, multilateralism cannot simply mean attempting to squeeze the American superpower into a framework of international institutions that do not correspond to contemporary realities. Added value between unilateral and multilateral approaches can be created on the basis of risk assessment within the American-Russian-European triangle. This principle can be implemented in the international order by favoring functional cooperation over institutional cooperation. Functional integration in this sense means identifying risks, interests, strategies and

according possibilities for alliances. These would be a solid basis for a new international order on different layers within American, Russian and European perspectives.

A Multi-Layered Europe

Assessing the Russian-European perspective requires broadening the EU perspective. A wider Europe is part of the broad sweep of postwar European history. Since the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 1957, Western European history has been an ongoing process integrating and enlarging European institutions. Institutions now known as the European Union have become a major pillar for the security and stability for Europe as a whole. After the upcoming enlargement, the EU will have direct neighbors that can neither be integrated nor *a priori* excluded. To keep stability and security in Europe as a whole, the EU has to shape new strategic thinking.

This new strategic thinking should include a paradigm change in instruments, first and foremost, the instrument of EU accession as an objective of political goals and strategies. Furthermore, and with a particular focus on the neighborhood policy, European security and defense policy requires a paradigm change to come to terms with the consequences of the Iraq conflict. Despite all the homage paid to it, European security policy is one of the weakest parts of European cooperation. Major European actors in Paris and Berlin are strengthening their overlapping interests with Russia in international cooperation. Bearing in mind their different economic and political interests, all three players are currently attempting to emancipate themselves from American influence. Even if the medium-term consequences and institutional results are still uncertain, new partnerships might develop. Germany, Russia and France are giving the first sketches of an outline for a new European security architecture, which would be incomplete without integrating the "new" as well as the "old" European players, and defining the interests and burden-sharing with the United States.

To reduce the gap between external expectations in shaping neighborhood policy and fulfilling and shaping security policy on the one hand, and current EU capacities on the other, the Union has to develop a new level of pan-European capacities. This step cannot be achieved by "simply" continuing the success story of EU enlargement. The approach of a multi-layered Europe can fulfill the hopes placed in the EU.

First Layer: Deepening European Integration

Although the process is first and foremost oriented around the current enlargement, European integration must also meet pan-European requirements. It is not only Russia that challenges the EU to strengthen its Common Security and Defense Policy; Europe has to do so out of self-interests and as an American partner. Furthermore, the EU should identify other areas for functional cooperation with non-candidate states. Differentiated integration can offer alternatives for strengthening cooperation without full membership, and the future capacities and capabilities of European integration shape a multi-layered Europe. At the same time, the EU cannot solve the problem by ignoring it, because expectations beyond the Union's borders would either be constantly increasing or would be disappointed. In the latter case, the EU might lose its influence in stabilizing and safeguarding Europe.

Second Layer: Membership

Based on setting norms externally, on monitoring and on integration, EU is the success story *nonpareil* of the European Union's external relations. Within the multi-layer model, enlargement is the most concrete but also most ambitious option, which should not be used as a magic bullet. Its benefits also depend on internal capacities to strengthen integration, and a rash opening of the Union might destabilize its ability to act.

Third Layer: Pre-Accession Strategy

The current accession process illustrates that not all countries from the Baltics to the Balkans that have been offered more or less concrete accession prospects will enter into the Union in the short or even medium term. To reduce rejection shocks and to improve the accession process, pre-accession benefits have to be strengthened. Once the overall prospects for membership are decided, providing technical assistance and information should be instruments of a pre-accession strategy. Overall, in the third layer, a powerful pre-accession approach should be developed, which makes the status attractive enough to guide cooperation over the medium term.

Fourth Layer: A New Neighborhood Policy

For good reasons, the EU so far has not offered membership prospects to the countries of the fourth layer, such as Ukraine and Moldova. Currently, the decision depends not only on the shortcomings of the countries' internal reforms, but also on the EU's capacities for integration and its political will. In any case, declarations about avoiding a new dividing line should be taken seriously. To integrate countries without current accession prospects into the multi-layered model, a neighborhood policy is needed that is realistic from the EU point of view and attractive from the neighboring countries' perspective. The neighborhood policy can not be shaped solely by the EU; the neighboring countries must also play a role. This Neighborhood policy differs from pre-accession and accession policy. Having a neighbor status does not necessarily mean being oriented on the *acquis communautaire*, but does mean strengthening cooperation. For the neighboring countries, it is imperative to have access to European markets and societies.

Fifth Layer: A Pan-European Perspective, with Particular Regard to Russia

It is up to Europe to define its role within a realistic and effective multilateral approach. In doing this, the Europeans should pay particular attention to their soft power capacities to become a capable, active, successful and cohesive actor. Europe currently proves its strength by peacemaking, integration, regional cooperation and shaping neighborhood relations, while military cooperation and intervention are still on the list of a future agenda. By no means should a European perspective on security policy cause conflicts with the United States; on the contrary, it should be harmonized with Washington in the sense of burden and interest sharing. Nevertheless

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Security-related problems in the European framework can only be solved by including Russia. Because of the still asymmetric character of the Western-Russian relations, it will be necessary to overcome the asymmetries in the relationship. Western concepts might implement this strategic requirement with a twofold approach: creating a common European economic space and joint security environment. Moscow, in turn, must strengthen and broaden its process of internal modernization. Sustainable economic reform cannot be limited to natural resources but has to include technology and service sector development. As long as Russia differs from Western Europe, for example in guaranteeing freedom of the media and fulfilling democratic standards, particular attention should be paid to Russia's political and social transition. President Putin's attitudes after 9/11 are an important step toward a multi-layered Europe embedded in a transatlantic context. So far, however, Putin's post-9/11 Western orientation has not overcome the great power thinking of many Russian decision makers, which would be the most important prerequisite of integrating Russia into a Western security order.In order to implement a pan-European security architecture the actors involved have to identify spheres of common interests in regard to its geographic perspective and contents. Regions of particular pan-European interests include the Baltic Sea, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is among the strategic priorities of Europe, and the Europeans have an increasing interest of cooperation with their Mediterranean partners. To crate pan-European stability and security, the EU is very much interested in avoiding a new dividing line beyond its future external borders.

The Transatlantic Pillar

From the American perspective, the discussion of building a new international order has to be based on two factors with contradictory aspects. On the one hand, the latest interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq made the supremacy of US military quite obvious; in this regard, Washington has no reason to share its hegemonic position with other actors or to limit its power in outdated international organizations. On the other hand, the participation of Europe, and Russia in particular, would increase the effectiveness and sustainability of conflict resolutions. Several aspects already illustrate the future necessity of cooperation. The American administration might simply come to some financial limits of its foreign policy, either by internal problems or growing external requirements. Because of its international position, the United States is a top target for terrorism. To prevent and to fight against international terrorism, America needs a huge amount of information and cooperation. The cooperation of Russia's

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secret services and the air bases in Central Asia are but two examples. Intelligence and police cooperation with Western European states continued to function smoothly throughout the Iraq crisis. Last but not least, sustainable regime change goes far beyond military intervention. In this regard European experiences and capacities in supporting transition might not only be of added institutional value but also an important aspect of financial burden sharing.

If the Europeans strengthen their security power by building a pan-European alliance with Russia and increasing specific capacities in conflict management with the positive experiences of soft power management and a hard power capacities to be strengthened, and if the Americans come to see advantages in greater cooperation, then American and pan-European approaches could create an unexpected renaissance in the transatlantic partnership. For the time being, the basis of this partnership would be less dominated by institutions, which have to be reshaped anyway, than by functional factors.

Russia is particularly challenged to overcome any kind of of great power attitude to be a partner within in new international order. Defining overlapping interests with the Europeans is very much related to internal modernization, regional conflict management and building a pan-European security architecture. Establishing a sustainable American-Russian relationship needs to go beyond the presently personalized relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin, and should be more widely and publicly accepted in Russia, not only because of a substantial agenda of common interests. First of all, Moscow has to consider that the present regional hot spots in the Middle East, Central Asia and North Korea involve Russian and American political, security and economic interests, even if both actors might have a particular agenda.

In general, one can consider that pan-European security interests are important in world politics. In areas such as proliferation, fighting against international terrorism and cooperating in the international arena, Moscow and Washington can implement overlapping interests. In this regard functional cooperation first of all means risk identification. Threats in the Middle East or in Central Asia can by identified as an area of overlapping American, Russian and European concern. Even if all three partners have different interests, common action could be based on risk prevention. Another cornerstone of functional cooperation is informal consultation, often used during the Iraq conflict, in which *ad hoc* alliances were created on the basis of telephone conversations, common letters and brief meetings among top level decision makers. Considering the current requirements for an international order, informal meetings among the ministries of foreign affairs bring better output than sessions of the UN Security Council.

In addition to the purely security- and defense-related issues, the transatlantic pillar of a multi-layered international order also should include the enormous number of positive experiences in other areas of cooperation. First and foremost, America and Europe are connected by common values. If Russia continues its internal transition process towards western standards, the community of values would extend greatly and be of remarkable power. Even in times of European-American deadlock, economic and social cooperation have shown the endurance of a sustainable transatlantic partnership. These experiences should support a future-oriented approach in building a new international order, one that at present remains in many

ways less of a new institutional setting than an open question of identifying risks, actors and windows of opportunity.